HISTORY OF THE FAR EAST
(FROM 1840 A.D. TO 1945 A.D.)
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**History of the Far East (From 1840 A.D. to 1945 A.D.)**

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As the twentieth century ended, scholars throughout the world agreed that the twenty first century would once again see the Asian continent reclaiming its preeminent place among the regions of the world. Two nations that would play a huge role in this resurgence would be China and Japan. Both China and Japan are considered today to be modern industrialized nations. Yet, this was not always the case. Although they were once great ancient civilizations, the rise of Europe and the West resulted in the decline and regression of the great civilizations of Asia. By the nineteenth century, this decline had resulted in most Asian civilizations becoming essentially puppet states of Western imperial powers.

China and Japan were no different. However, by the time the nineteenth century ended, great churnings had taken place in China and Japan that would constitute the first steps to their re-emergence on the world stage.

The transformation of China and Japan from being feudal aristocratic societies to becoming modern industrialized nations by overcoming the yoke of imperialism was a bloody one. It was a transformation marked by civil war and revolution. Their transformation provided and continues to provide insights to other nations in Asia who are on their own journey of development.

This book, *History of the Far East (From 1840 A.D. to 1945 A.D.)*, is divided into fourteen units that follow the self-instruction mode with each unit beginning with an Introduction to the unit, followed by an outline of the Unit Objectives. The detailed content is then presented in a simple but structured manner interspersed with Check Your Progress Questions to test the student’s understanding of the topic. A Summary along with a list of Key Words and a set of Self-Assessment Questions and Exercises is also provided at the end of each unit for recapitulation.
BLOCK - I
WESTERN INFLUENCE IN CHINA AND JAPAN

UNIT 1 WESTERN INFLUENCE IN CHINA

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

China is one of the four ancient civilizations of the world. Archaeological findings point the formative stage of Chinese civilization to be as early as the twenty-first century BCE. Written records of China date back to 1,500 BCE. The Chinese people assert the antiquity of China as the country having ‘5000 years of history and 7000 years of culture’. Traditionally, the Chinese trace the country’s historical origin to the ‘Three Sovereigns and Five Kings’. These kings ruled over various small tribes. Xia is China’s first dynasty. Yu the Great (Da Yu) of the Huaxia tribe was said to be the founder of the Xia Dynasty in the twenty-first century BCE. However, due to a lack of dependable evidence, scholars debated over the existence of the Xia Dynasty. From 1959 onwards, a series of excavations uncovered urban sites, bronze implements and tombs at the same locations cited in ancient Chinese historical texts regarding Xia (in present-day Henan Province). These archaeological evidences gave proof of the existence of the Xia Dynasty. Slave society took root by the next dynasty, the Shang (sixteenth–eleventh century BCE). During the Zhou Dynasty (eleventh century BCE–221 BCE), China developed from a tribal society to a land-based feudal society and economy.
A strong political and economic system also evolved. These three dynasties are commonly known as the 'Three Dynasties' (Sandai) era in Chinese history.

The Zhou was the longest ruling dynasty in Chinese history, lasting nearly eight centuries. The Zhou Dynasty is divided into Western Zhou (eleventh century BCE–771 BCE) and Eastern Zhou (770–221 BCE) because of shifting of the Zhou capital from Xi'an eastward to Luoyang to escape frequent attacks of the Quanrong tribe. For the first time, China was unified as an empire by the Qin Dynasty (221–207 BCE), after which a more than two thousand year-long imperial period began in China. Through its long imperial history, China has witnessed cyclical periods of stable and centralized rule followed by periods of disorder and disintegration into small regimes.

In this unit, you will study about the First Opium War that the imperialist powers waged against China. The Opium Wars refer to two wars, the First Opium War (1839–1842) and the Second Opium War (1856–1860), discussed in a separate unit, waged against China by Western imperialist powers over trade and diplomatic relations. The First Opium War was fought between China and Britain. China lost the war. The immediate provocation for the first war was China’s decision to stop the smuggling of opium into China by Britain. The Opium Wars are extremely important to China's history. The year 1840 marks the beginning of the modern history of China. As a result of China’s defeat in the First Opium War, European imperialist countries started imposing their wish on China for gaining trading privileges.

### 1.1 OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit, you will be able to:

- Discuss why Western imperialist powers were attracted to China
- Describe the Western influence on China
- Analyse the dynamics of Sino-British relations in the nineteenth century
- Describe the impact of the British opium trade in China
- Explain the causes, course and effects of the First Opium War

### 1.2 CHINA’S CONTACT WITH THE WEST

The contact between China and Europe dates back to as early as the pre-Christian era, although the exact time is not certain. The West gained its first acquaintance of China probably in the sixth or the seventh century BCE. Trade and Christianity were two vital links between China and the West for nearly ten centuries of the Christian era. China’s contact with the West remained low for three-four hundred years thereafter.
The discovery of a Nestorian monument in 1625 in present day Xi’an suggests that Christianity was introduced in China in the seventh century. The history of 150 years of Nestorian missionary activities in China is inscribed on the monument, erected in 781. Nestorian missionaries introduced Christianity in China in 635 during the reign of Emperor Taizong of Tang (Tang Taizong, reigned 626–649). The Tang emperors allowed the Nestorian Christians to operate freely for two centuries, but the sect made so much progress that Emperor Wuzong of Tang (Tang Wuzong, reigned 840–846) saw them as a threat, and in 845, ordered them to stop all activities. The creed was completely destroyed soon. As a result, Christianity in China did not revive until the thirteenth century.

From very early on in its history, China had been a trade hub. However, a major development in trade and diplomacy took place during the Han Dynasty. Emperor Wu of Han sought an alliance with the Yuezhi people, who were driven out of their homeland (today’s Xinjiang and western Gansu region) by the Xiongnu tribe in 177 BCE, to fight against the Xiongnu tribe. The Emperor commissioned Zhang Qian as the official envoy to seek out the kingdom of Yuezhi (then relocated to Samarkand, in today’s Uzbekistan). Zhang Qian’s mission lasted from 139 BCE to 126 BCE. The mission failed to win over the Yuezhi, but was an important development in China’s history. It established diplomatic relationship between Han China and a number of Asian territories and opened up regular communication with central and western Asia. In addition, this mission established the famous trade route, the Silk Road connecting western China to the Roman Empire by road. As the name suggests, Chinese silk was the most famous and valued commodity sought by foreigners. The demand for Chinese silk was very high in Europe until the sixth century. In fact, the Chinese kept the knowledge of sericulture a close secret for over two thousand years. However, around 200 BCE, Chinese immigrants took the art of silkworm breeding and silk spinning to Korea. Cultivation of the silkworm and silk production technique traveled far and wide with increasing movement of Chinese people to foreign lands. The monopoly of China in silk ended when a Chinese princess, some foreign traders and clergymen smuggled silkworm eggs out of China. Silk reached the West through a number of different channels in the sixth century. While Arab traders continued to trade with China, Europe’s urge to trade with China started reducing considerably from the sixth century.

1.2.1 Renewed Contact

After a lull of many centuries, Europe was again interested in China in the thirteenth century. The desire for political alliance, trade and religious propaganda were the motive forces behind Europe’s renewed interest in China. The Islamic powers in the south and southwest and the Mongol Empire in the east was a great cause of worry for Europe. In 1222, the Mongol army invaded westwards to Europe and defeated Russia. The Mongols advanced eastward to North China and established the Yuan Dynasty in 1271. By the turn of the thirteenth century, the Mongol empire
Western Influence in China

stretched from the western borders of Russia to the Pacific. Under such a situation, Europe was inclined to explore the possibility of forming an alliance with the Chinese and the Mongols against the Muslims. Secondly, the Mongol conquest and subsequent unified administration over the vast territory in Eurasia had a stabilizing effect on the social, cultural and economic life of the inhabitants. Communication and commerce through the Silk Road between Europe and China became trouble-free after four centuries. Thirdly, the Roman Catholic Church recognized the opportunity to propagate Christianity in the pagan world. As a result, political, religious and commercial activities started increasing with growing presence of European traders, Christian missionaries and diplomatic missions in China since the thirteenth century. The first recorded travels by Europeans to China and back date from the Yuan Dynasty.

Kublai Khan (reigned 1260–1294), the first Emperor of the Yuan Dynasty, welcomed the Europeans warmly. He commissioned Venetian merchant brothers Nocolo and Maffeo Polo as his ambassadors to carry a royal letter of peace to the Papacy. In the letter, Khan requested the Papacy to send a hundred missionaries to his capital to convert areas of China to Christianity. The Papacy sent out two Dominican missionaries, but they did not travel to China. However, the Polo brothers returned to China in 1275. Nicolo’s seventeen years old son Marco came along. Kublai Khan welcomed all three to his court. The three Polos served Khan for seventeen years. After returning to Europe in 1292, Marco Polo wrote The Book of Marco Polo. Marco Polo’s account presented to the West the first complete portrayal of China, and sparked further interest in China. In 1293, Roman missionary, John of Monte Corvino arrived in China carrying a letter from the Pope to the Khan. Khan permitted him to build a church and preach. In 1307, the Pope made Corvino the Archbishop of Cambaluc. Corvino created a several thousand strong Christian community before his death in 1328. The Mongol rulers patronized Christianity largely to develop a cosmopolitan culture in China to restrict the influence of native Chinese, lest it becomes a threat to the foreign rule.

By the time of Kublai Khan’s death in 1294, the Mongol Empire had split into four khanates, and finally melted away by 1368. The collapse of the Mongol Empire cut off the direct trade route between China and Europe through Central Asia and between Europe and India through Persia. A need arose to establish an alternate route to the lands of spice and silk in the East, starting the Age of Discovery. Portuguese navigators began exploring a sea route for maritime trade in 1419 under Henry the Navigator. Over the following decades, Portuguese explorers and navigators explored a number of coasts and islands of East Asia. Bartolomeu Diaz reached the Cape of Good Hope in Africa in 1488 and Vasco da Gama reached India in 1498. The Portuguese sailed to Malacca in Malaysia in 1511. They monopolized the spice trade, established forts in the places they went, treated the forts as their territory and trade base. Between 1499 and 1580, Portuguese kings took the title of ‘Lord of Navigation’, and claimed sovereignty over the lands the Portuguese discovered. The Portuguese conquered Goa in 1510 and
Malacca in 1511. Under the Portuguese rule with its capital at Goa, the Portuguese made the Peninsula of Malacca their strategic base for trade expansion in China and Southeast Asia, particularly in Java, Siam, Indochina and the southern coasts of China.

1.2.2 Western Traders in China

From the fifteenth century, many European trade and diplomatic missions sailed all over Asia looking for direct access to the profitable spice trade. In the process, they exploited many Asian countries including China. Portugal, Spain, Holland and Britain were the major players. Portuguese traders were the first to reach China in the second decade of the sixteenth century, and traded profitably in Canton. In 1516, Tomé Piers led the first official mission to China. The mission was received cordially at Canton, and permitted to proceed to Beijing. While the mission was on its way to Beijing, the Malaccan Sultan, (Malacca was a tributary state to Ming China) reported to the Ming court the accounts of Portuguese conquests and atrocities. The news, combined with reports of piracy, banditry and violent activity of the Portuguese in China enraged Emperor Zhengde (Ming Wuzong, reigned 1505 – 1521). As soon as the embassy reached Beijing, Piers was imprisoned and sent back to Canton. After the death of Emperor Zhengde in 1521, Grand Secretary Yang Tinghe evicted the Portuguese. For several decades the Chinese authorities persecuted Portuguese traders and destroyed their trade base in China on suspicion that their real intention was conquest rather than conduct trade peacefully. However, trade flourished informally and illegally at Canton and Nongbo, albeit with periodic conflict between local and Portuguese traders. In the mid-1550s, the Portuguese managed to earn the goodwill of the Cantonese administration as a result of Leonel de Sousa’s efforts13 and Portuguese help in a government expedition against coastal pirates. In 1557, the Ming court finally gave consent for a permanent and official Portuguese trade base at Macau.

Spanish explorers were the next to come to China. The Spaniards reached the Philippines in 1521 led by Ferdinand Magellan.14 Spain soon conquered the Philippines Archipelago and colonized the Philippine Islands for over three centuries. At this time, trade between Philippines and China was sizeable. The Spaniards soon got involved in it. By the end of the century, the Ming court allowed Spanish traders to trade at Canton.

At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Dutch reached the Indonesian Archipelago, and established a trading post at Banten, northwest Java in 1603. The Dutch tried to trade at Canton in 1604 and 1607, but the Chinese did not permit them on both occasions. The Chinese were generally cordial to foreign traders. So, the Dutch suspected Portuguese influence in Chinese denial. The Dutch kept on attacking Portuguese trade interest from the nearest Dutch trade bases. In 1624, the Dutch established themselves in Taiwan (then known as Formosa) by building a fort and a trading post to trade with China and Japan. Zheng Chenggong (popularly known as Koxinga), a Chinese military leader and Ming loyalist defeated
the Dutch in Taiwan in 1662. He took over the island as part of his campaign against the Manchus, who established the Qing Dynasty in the mainland. The Dutch helped the Manchus to regain Taiwan. In the hope of gaining trading concessions due to the military support, the Dutch even sent four tribute missions to the Qing court in 1656, 1667, 1686, and 1795. The Dutch got permission to trade at Amoy, but the benefit was far below the expectation of the Dutch. As a result Dutch interest in trading directly with China reduced substantially. However, indirect trade continued from the Dutch trading bases.

The next Europeans to reach China were the English. In 1637, the first English fleet of ships reached Macao led by Captain John Weddell. Captain Weddell proceeded to Canton to initiate trade negotiations as a representative of the British East India Company. At first, Chinese officials resisted the English, however, in 1672, the English East India Company finally secured a trading post in Taiwan. After 1699, English ships regularly arrived at Canton for trade. Soon the British East India Company obtained permission to build a trading base at Canton. After the English, the French (1698), Danish (1731), Swedish (1732) and Russian (1753) ships arrived at Canton for trade as well. These countries played a relatively minor role in China trade.

1.2.3 Resuscitation of Christian Missionary Activity in China

As a result of the revival of European trade missions to China in the sixteenth century, the Roman Catholic Church started taking interest in China. Thus, a new wave of Christian missionary activity began in China. The first missionary to attempt to reach China was St. Francis Xavier, a Spanish Jesuit priest who died in 1552 before reaching the mainland. In 1582, Italian Jesuit Matteo Ricci arrived in China. Ricci impressed the Chinese with his knowledge so much that the Ming court permitted him to reside and preach in Beijing in 1601. Ricci initiated and continued religious propaganda in Beijing until his death in 1610. While preaching Christianity and converting people, the Jesuits did not criticize native philosophies and religions such as Confucianism and Buddhism, neither did they force the converts to reject their age old rituals such as ancestor worship. They were careful not to hurt the feelings of the Chinese. They used their knowledge of science and medicine to build a place among educated Chinese people. They were not only respectful of Chinese culture, but also adapted to the Chinese way of life. They learnt to speak the Chinese language, and also dressed and ate like the Chinese did. They tried their best to become one with the Chinese. As a result, Jesuit missionaries were extremely successful in China. However, from time to time, some Jesuits were persecuted, or barred to live in Beijing and were forced to return to either Canton or Macao. Nonetheless, due to their courteous attitude, they commanded high respect from common people as well as the administration. Many Jesuits were appointed in high positions in the Ming court.

In the seventeenth century, representatives of Dominican (1631), Franciscan (1633), Augustinian (1680) and the Paris Foreign Mission (1683) arrived in China.
All these branches of Christianity were far less considerate than the Jesuit school. They vociferously criticized the Jesuits for compromising Christian values and rites in order to appear friendly to Chinese political authorities and social institutions. Some of the Jesuits were also supportive of these objections. For the rest of the century, the rival schools debated these issues publicly, creating suspicion in the minds of the Chinese. Finally, in 1700, these disputes were carried to both the Pope and Emperor Kangxi (reigned 1661–1722) of the Qing Dynasty for resolution. Pope Clement XI unwittingly supported the stricter sects of missionaries, whereas Emperor Kangxi supported the Jesuits. Emperor Kangxi, who granted freedom of worship to the Roman churches throughout his empire in 1662, now ordered persecution and expulsion of all Roman Catholic missionaries from China. However, missionary activities did not stop in China. A considerable number of missionaries entered China illegally to win new converts.

1.2.4 Transformation of China into an Informal Colony

By the second half of the eighteenth century, a number of Western countries were doing brisk trade in China. Most of them were newly industrialized capitalist countries. Britain, France, Portugal, Spain and Holland had already started colonizing Asia and Africa. Advanced scientific knowledge, a thriving economy, sophisticated weaponry and strong military supported by abundant logistic supply from their colonial bases made these countries formidable powers.

The view of international trade and international relations that prevailed in the West in the second half of the eighteenth century was quite different from the Chinese worldview. The West had already learnt to recognize other countries as equal political entities and to respect treaties and agreements signed between countries or between allies. The Chinese empire, which enjoyed unchallenged cultural and military superiority, was completely oblivious of the new developments around the world. The Qing court applied the longstanding theories of the Middle Kingdom and tributary system while dealing with the West. The tributary status and trade restrictions imposed by China increasingly annoyed the Western countries. In the eighteenth century, Europeans who wanted to trade with China had no choice but to follow Chinese rules. Due to increasing competition among the Western powers and their growing clout as colonial power in the nineteenth century, the Western countries decided to use military strength to enforce their wish and strengthen their influence, in addition to gaining trading privilege with China. Japan also joined the league. China’s domestic problems made it easier for the imperialist powers to slice open the country by the middle of the nineteenth century. They divided China into spheres of influence among them. As a result, the more than two thousand years long feudal system fell apart. Thus, China became an informal colony of the modern imperialist powers, and entered into a semi-feudal semi-colonial era.
Western Influence in China

NOTES

Check Your Progress

1. When did the monopoly of China in silk end?

2. Name the Emperor who commissioned Venetian merchant brothers Nocolo and Maffeo Polo as his ambassadors.

3. When did the first English fleet of ships reach China?

1.3 THE FIRST OPIUM WAR: CAUSES, COURSE AND EFFECTS

In the seventh century, the opium poppy plant was introduced in China by the Arabs and Turks mainly because of its use as a medicine. However, after a few centuries, rich Chinese started using opium as a recreational drug. As the habit became deep rooted among the leisured classes, the government grew anxious. Taking note of opium’s harmful effect on the human mind and body, Emperor Yong Zheng (reigned 1722–1735) banned the sale and smoking of opium, barring a small quantity for medicinal purposes, by imperial decree in 1729. Under the order, opium selling and keeping opium dens became punishable offences. However, the order did not mention the punishment for growing, importing or using the drug. European traders took advantage of this loophole. While originally opium was eaten, European traders introduced the practice of mixing opium with tobacco for smoking in China. Opium smoking not only presented the greater possibility of addiction, but also reduced the cost because it was mixed with tobacco. In the beginning of the opium trade, it was not a major commodity as there was not much demand for the drug among the common people due to its high cost. However, when the cost of opium was lowered, it soon became a craze with the common people and the demand for opium started growing rapidly. Opium was the only high-value article of trade for which China was not self-sufficient.

In 1729, when the Qing court first banned opium, the annual import of opium into China was 200 chests. In 1790, the annual import grew to over 4,000 chests. Emperor Jia Qing (reigned 1796–1820) banned the drug’s cultivation in 1796 and its importation in 1800. Nevertheless, despite the ban, the opium trade continued, albeit with support from corrupt local government officials and greedy Chinese traders. Between 1800 and 1811, the average importation was 4016 chests, between 1811 and 1821, it was 4494 chests; between 1821 and 1828, it rose to 9708 chests and between 1821 and 1835, it jumped to 18,712 chests. In 1838, the annual import of opium stood at a whopping 40,000 chests. Although each European country was engaged in the opium trade, the British traders, using guile, bribery and deception, were able to completely monopolize the illegal opium trade in China.
Anglo-Chinese Trade Relations

In the early years of the nineteenth century, trade between China and Britain was heavily tilted in favour of China. British traders mainly imported Chinese silk and tea. In fact, tea had become the British national drink over the eighteenth century, for which Britain depended heavily on imported Chinese tea. But, Britain had nothing to sell to China in a similar volume. Because of its vast and diversified geographical condition, China could produce everything it needed. Moreover, the production was sufficient to satisfy domestic needs. China had nothing to buy from foreign traders. As a result, British ships mostly brought silver to China. Almost nine-tenth of British shipment to China consisted of bullion. The British viewed this one-sided trade and the drainage of silver stocks as damaging to its economy. Opium, a dreadful narcotic, became the tool by which the British turned the negative balance of trade in their favour.

The English East India Company’s Monopoly

The British were extremely successful in opium trade compared to other Europeans largely because the English East India Company could effortlessly procure and transport opium from India. In 1773, the Company established its monopoly over opium production in India. The Company forced Indian peasants to grow opium poppy on its own terms and conditions. The Company procured opium juice from peasants, then processed it into three-pound cakes in its Indian opium factories, mainly in Patna and Varanasi. The Company marketed the contraband in China through private merchants who operated under the Company’s license. Since the licensee merchants were not part of the Company officially, the Company remained technically out of the illegal trade. Its justification was that any individual trader or trading company can buy any product including opium from the Company, and that the Company was not responsible for where and to whom the trader or trading company sold it. After all, the Company was not selling opium to China. Thus, the Company was able to sell opium, yet maintained its trading privileges with China.

The Company smuggled a limited quantity of opium into China for its own benefit. First, the substantially high profit margin was satisfactory. Second, limited supply and increasing demand was useful to keep the price of opium high. Third, limited supply ensured that the Chinese authorities were not provoked to take action. However, the Company began to lose its monopoly over opium production in India in the 1810s. Greater competition within the British trading community in India brought down opium prices considerably, causing increased consumption of the drug in China. After the Company lost its monopoly in 1833, new groups of merchants entered the Chinese market. To optimize their profit margin, British traders lowered the price further to keep away competition from other European traders. Due to its now affordable price, a larger section of the Chinese including even the poor became addicted to opium, resulting in its unprecedented demand.

The British imperialist exploitation in the forced opium cultivation in India allowed
them to increase opium production in India to smuggle it constantly into China. By the end of the 1830s, the volume of illegal opium trade reached an explosive proportion. Drug dependence became a disease that progressed from bad to worse. It was fatal to health due to various complications. Opium addiction was not only a matter of public health but also had serious repercussions on China’s national economy. Under such a situation, China had two options, either legalize opium trade to earn revenue or crack down on the smuggling to save the people.

1.3.1 The Immediate Cause: Confiscation of Opium

As you studied in the previous section, opium addiction was not only a matter of public health but also had serious repercussions on China’s national economy. As a result, a worried Qing court decided to crack down on the illegal opium trade.

In late 1838, Emperor Daoguang appointed Lin Zexu as the imperial commissioner. Lin was an upright Confucian scholar. He arrived at Canton to solve the opium smuggling issue in early 1839. Lin adopted a three-pronged approach to deal with the issue in accordance with the imperial order. Firstly, he asked the opium addicts to give up opium smoking and assured them of rehabilitation. Secondly, Lin gave two options to the Chinese drug dealers, either confess and get amnesty or face arrest. Thirdly, he ordered the foreign traders to stop opium smuggling immediately and surrender their stock within three days. He also asked them to sign a bond stating that they would not indulge in opium smuggling in the future. The breaking of the bond would result in death penalty. The first two courses of action were extremely successful. Many sanatoriums were established and a large number of people came for de-addiction treatment. Many local drug dealers surrendered, a large number went underground, many were arrested and drug rings were smashed. The measures were so effective that foreign traders could not find local opium distributors even when they were willing to sell the contraband at a very low price.

However, the third measure caused conflict. While some foreigners complied, British traders refused to surrender their opium stock. In response, Lin blockaded the foreign traders inside their factories (trade centre) at Canton, withdrew Chinese workers from the factories and cut off their food supply. He declared that the blockade would be lifted and normal trade would resume only after the surrender of the opium stock. The blockade lasted for six weeks. At that time, Captain Charles Elliot, a naval officer was the British plenipotentiary and superintendent of trade in China. The British government had appointed him to supervise British traders and British trade interest in China. Due to the blockade, Elliot issued notices to all British traders ordering them to hand over their opium stock to him. In May 1839, traders surrendered 21,000 chests of opium to Elliot, who in turn handed it over to Lin. Lin destroyed the opium in public. He lifted the blockade, and trade was resumed on the condition that no more drugs would be smuggled into China.
Many traders signed the bond demanded by Lin, except the British. When Lin asked the British to sign the pledge, they officially protested the move and accused the Chinese of destroying the British crown’s property. The entire British trading community along with Elliot left Canton and moved to the Portuguese trade base of Macao without signing the bond. Elliot and the British firms engaged in trade with China urged the British foreign secretary Lord Palmerston to protect their interest in China. This conflict between China and Britain culminated in the First Opium War.

1.3.2 Course of the War

A few months after the British relocated themselves at Macao, some English sailors killed a Chinese villager in Kowloon in July 1839. Lin demanded the surrender of the offenders, but Elliot refused to submit British subjects to Chinese law. Charles Elliot’s attitude greatly irritated Commissioner Lin. Lin instructed the Portuguese to expel the British from Macao. On August 26, 1839, the British left Macao and took shelter in Hong Kong, which was then an isolated island. Some British traders were anxious to resume trade, and felt that Elliot had no right to prevent them from signing the bond and continue trade. When Elliot was still waiting for the government’s instructions, in defiance of Elliot’s order, some traders signed the bond individually to resume trade. When one of the private trading ships approached Bogue in November 1839, the British navy fired at it. The Chinese navy retaliated to protect the ship. Thus, the war broke out.

The information of the predicament in Canton reached London in August 1839. Representatives of the British opium traders, with the backing of industrial capitalists, lobbied for using force to open China’s market to their merchandise. It was ruled that the blockade of factories and the confiscation of opium amounted to obstruction to free trade besides an act of disrespect to the British Crown. On October 1, 1839, the British Cabinet decided to send out a retaliatory expedition. On January 31, 1840, the British authorities in India made a formal declaration of war against China acting on behalf of the home government. The Qing government did not declare the war formally. In June 1840, a large British fleet arrived in China seeking redress under the command of Rear Admiral George Elliot, who was a cousin of Captain Charles Elliot.

The military campaign of the First Opium War can be divided into three phases. The first phase lasted from the arrival of the British fleet in June 1840 to the conclusion of the Chuenbi Convention in January 1841. The second phase lasted from February 1841 to June 1841. The third phase started with the departure of Charles Elliot and arrival of Henry Pottinger in January 1841.

After the arrival of the British fleet in June 1840, Commissioner Lin readied his navy to engage the British forces at Canton, but the British avoided confronting the Chinese forces assembled at Canton. Instead, the Elliots imposed their own naval blockade there and moved swiftly towards Beijing along the coastline.
The British forces blockaded important ports on their way, and sailed to Beihe near Tianjin on August 29, 1840. As a result of their maneuvers, the British succeeded in intimidating the Chinese court. Their proximity to the capital, Beijing, alarmed the Qing court so much that the emperor replaced Lin Zexu with Manchu nobleman Qishan, and entrusted him with the task of dealing with the invading foreign forces. Qishan received the two Elliot’s at Tianjin, assured them of fruitful negotiation and sent them back. The subsequent negotiations next year resulted in the signing of the Convention of Quanbi on January 20, 1841 between Captain Charles Elliot as the British representative and Qishan as the Chinese representative.

The convention provided to the British the cession of Hong Kong, an indemnity of six million dollars, direct and equal interaction between the officials of the two countries and reopening of Canton to British traders immediately. In return, the British were to evacuate Dinghai, return the forts near Bogue and limit trade to Canton. Both Beijing and London rejected the agreement. Emperor Daoguang was enraged because his representative had made real concessions, that too without getting appropriate sanction from the throne. He dismissed Qishan from his post and condemned him to death, but later commuted the sentence to banishment. Captain Elliot also faced similar treatment from his government. Palmerston rebuked Elliot for failing to press his advantage and having settled for the ‘lowest possible terms’. The British cabinet dismissed Elliot from his post in April 1841, and dispatched Henry Pottinger to take his position.

Until Pottinger’s arrival in August 1841, however, Elliot was in command. The second phase of the war consists of this interim period of seven months. After dismissing Qishan, Emperor Daoguang appointed his nephew I-Shan as imperial commissioner, and made him the general of a large force to tackle the British menace. Seizing this opportunity, Elliot instigated a series of attacks. In quick succession, he captured all strategic points in the Pearl River and besieged Canton. A truce was signed in Canton on May 27, 1841. The terms included payment of six million dollars to the British within seven days, withdrawal of Chinese troops 60 miles outside of Canton within six days, evacuation of the British troops from Bogue, exchange of prisoners of war, and postponement of the cession of Hong Kong.

In the third phase of the war, the British renewed aggression against China. Upon his arrival, Henry Pottinger immediately directed his forces to occupy important cities along the coast, and moved north towards the capital. Pottinger recaptured all the ports that Elliot captured initially and went closer to Beijing. He occupied Amoy, Ningbo, Wusong, Shanghai and finally Zhenjiang by July 22, 1842. The Battle of Zhenjiang was the last major battle of the war. Located near the intersection of the Yangtze River and the Grand Canal, Zhenjiang was an important transportation hub. It was the artery by which essential commodities reached from southern regions to the capital. The British capture of this stronghold forced the Qing government to bargain for peace.
On August 29, 1842, the Treaty of Nanjing was signed. This time, the British extracted at gunpoint what they wished from China. Though the war was fought over opium, the treaty did not mention opium. A supplementary treaty, the Treaty of Bogue was signed on October 8, 1843. Soon France and the United States requested China for similar treaties. The Qing government did not have much choice, so it signed the Treaty of Wangxia with the United States on July 3, 1844 and the Treaty of Whampoa with France on October 24, 1844.

### 1.3.3 Effects of the First Opium War

China’s defeat in the First Opium War opened the floodgates to unequal treaties imposed on China repeatedly by imperialist powers over a period of six decades. With all foreign powers scrambling for concession through these treaties, China found herself surrendering her sovereignty gradually to the imperialist powers throughout the nineteenth century. The first in the series of unequal treaties was the Treaty of Nanjing, signed after the First Opium War on August 29, 1842. The main points of its thirteen articles included:

- War indemnity of $21 million
- Opening of Canton, Amoy, Fuzhou, Ningbo and Shanghai ports for trade and residence for British merchants and also the right to appoint consuls to the five port cities
- Cession of Hong Kong island
- Equality in official correspondence, as communication instead of petitioning

Since the Treaty of Nanjing did not specify certain issues such as the tariff fixation, a supplementary treaty, the Treaty of Bogue was signed on October 8, 1843. The main points included:

- Fixed tariff of five per cent on British goods
- Extraterritoriality
- Right to anchor warships at the five ports
- Most favoured nation status
Soon other countries sought similar treaty relations with China. The Qing government did not have much choice, so it signed the Treaty of Wangxia with the United States on July 3, 1844, the Treaty of Whampoa with France on October 24, 1844 and the Treaty of Canton with Sweden-Norway on March 20, 1847.

Check Your Progress

4. When did Emperor Yong Zheng ban the sale and smoking of opium?
5. Why were the British extremely successful in opium trade compared to other Europeans?
6. What was the strategy of Lin Zexu to deal with the issue of opium trade?

1.4 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS QUESTIONS

1. The monopoly of China in silk ended when a Chinese princess, some foreign traders and clergymen smuggled silkworm eggs out of China.
2. Kublai Khan, the first Emperor of the Yuan Dynasty, welcomed the Europeans warmly. He commissioned Venetian merchant brothers Nocolo and Maffeo Polo as his ambassadors to carry a royal letter of peace to the Papacy.
3. The first English fleet of ships reached Macao, China led by Captain John Weddell in 1637.
4. Emperor Yong Zheng banned the sale and smoking of opium, barring a small quantity for medicinal purposes, by imperial decree in 1729.
5. The British were extremely successful in opium trade compared to other Europeans largely because the English East India Company could effortlessly procure and transport opium from India.
6. Lin Zexu adopted a three-pronged approach to deal with the issue of opium trade in accordance with the imperial order. Firstly, he asked the opium addicts to give up opium smoking and assured them of rehabilitation. Secondly, Lin gave two options to the Chinese drug dealers, either confess and get amnesty or face arrest. Thirdly, he ordered the foreign traders to stop opium smuggling immediately and surrender their stock within three days.

1.5 SUMMARY

- The Opium Wars refer to two wars, the First Opium War (1839–1842) and the Second Opium War (1856–1860), waged against China by Western imperialist powers over trade and diplomatic relations.
In the seventh century the opium poppy plant was introduced in China by the Arabs and Turks mainly because of its use as a medicine. However, after a few centuries, rich Chinese started using opium as a recreational drug.

In 1729, when the Qing court first banned opium, the annual import of opium into China was 200 chests.

Emperor Jia Qing banned the drug’s cultivation in 1796 and its importation in 1800. Nevertheless, despite the ban, the opium trade continued, albeit with support from corrupt local government officials and greedy Chinese traders. As a result, in 1838, the annual import of opium stood at a whopping 40,000 chests.

Opium addiction was not only a matter of public health but also had serious repercussions on China’s national economy. As a result, a worried Qing court decided to crack down on the illegal opium trade.

In late 1838, Emperor Daoguang appointed Lin Zexu as the imperial commissioner. Lin adopted a three-pronged approach to deal with the issue of illegal opium trade. Firstly, he asked the opium addicts to give up opium smoking and assured that the government would help cure them. Secondly, Lin gave two options to the Chinese drug dealers: either confess and get amnesty or face arrest. Thirdly, he ordered the foreign traders to stop opium smuggling immediately and surrender their stock within three days.

While some foreigners complied, British traders refused to surrender their opium stock resulting in tension which quickly escalated into the First Opium War.

The Battle of Zhenjiang was the last major battle of the First Opium War.

The British capture of this stronghold forced the Qing government to bargain for peace.

On August 29, 1842, the Treaty of Nanjing was signed. The British extracted what they wished from China at gunpoint. Ironically, though the war was fought over opium, the treaty did not mention opium at all. A supplementary treaty, the Treaty of Bogue was signed on October 8, 1843. Soon France and America requested China for similar treaties.

1.6 KEY WORDS

Khanate: The word Khanate refers to a political entity in the Eurasian Steppe. A khanate can be of any size, from a small tribal chiefdom to a principality, kingdom or a big empire. The sovereign or military ruler of a khanate is called a Khan. With Genghis Khan’s death, the Mongol empire broke into four khanates. The Yuan Dynasty was one of them.
Western Influence in China

1.7 SELF ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

Short Answer Questions

1. What were the major phases of China’s contact with the Western world?
2. What were the major factors behind the stoppage and renewal of West’s contact with China?
3. Why did China turn into an informal colony?

Long Answer Questions

1. Describe the incidents that led to the First Opium War. Do you approve the Chinese reaction to the foreigners’ activities? Why did the Chinese act the way they did?
2. What was the outcome of the First Opium War? Why are the treaties signed after the war called 'unequal'?
3. What role did opium play in the First Opium War?
4. Discuss the factors that led to the First Opium War.

1.8 FURTHER READINGS

UNIT 2  TAIPING REBELLION

Structure
2.0 Introduction
2.1 Objectives
2.2 Background
2.3 Taiping Rebellion: Causes, Course and Effects
  2.3.1 Causes of the Taiping Rebellion’s Success and Failure
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2.4 Answers to Check Your Progress Questions
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2.8 Further Readings

2.0 INTRODUCTION

China’s defeat in the Opium Wars resulted in unequal treaties being forced upon the country by the Western imperialist powers. China’s surrender to the wishes of imperialist powers was to have a profound impact on the whole of East Asia socially and politically. The social and political crises fermented the ground on which rebellions and revolutions were to occur in China. Moreover, after the destruction of the Chinese forces in the Opium Wars, stories about the miraculous power of the West became popular in Japan. Japan soon discarded her Confucian way of life in favour of Western type modernism. Eventually, a reformed Japan joined the league of European and American imperialist powers in looting China. Two major rebellions occurred as a result of the Opium Wars- the Taiping and Boxer rebellions. This unit traces the background under which the Taiping rebellion broke out and discusses its causes, course and effects. The Boxer rebellion has been discussed in Unit 7.

2.1 OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit, you will be able to:

- Understand the background of the Taiping Rebellion
- Describe the course of the Taiping Rebellion
- List the factors responsible for success and failure of the Taiping Rebellion
- Examine the effects of the Taiping Rebellion
2.2 BACKGROUND

The defeat in the Opium Wars resulted in the shattering of the Chinese notion that their country was the most superior civilization in the world. This had a huge psychological effect on the Chinese who found it hard to accept the humiliation that the British inflicted on their celestial empire with a mandate from heaven to rule. In addition to the military and psychological suffering at the hands of foreigners, China also went through internal socio-political-economic problems. Due to long years of peace, the population had increased manifold, but grain production had remained the same. Arable land was concentrated among a small percentage of rich people. The majority of people were poor peasants, some with land but mostly landless tenants of landlords. Natural calamities like drought and opium addiction reduced grain production further. The royal court increased the tax burden on people to fill the state treasury, aggravating the hardship faced by common people.

This situation amounted to misrule, and according to the Mandate of Heaven theory, the Qing court lost the heavenly mandate that allowed the Manchus to rule. It was then the duty of the citizens to overthrow the regime. The southern part of the country had already witnessed a few uprisings before the First Opium War, mostly because of its distance from the centre of power (Beijing), and more exposure to Western ideas including Christianity. Anti-Manchu secret societies became more active after the First Opium War. These secret societies nurtured the hope of reviving the Ming Dynasty. A number of anti-Qing uprisings and rebellions broke out during the mid-nineteenth century including the Nian (1853–1868), Muslim (1855–1873), Tungan (1862–1878) and Taiping (1850–1864). But the Taiping Rebellion stands out among them because it came close to toppling the Qing Dynasty.

Check Your Progress

1. How did the defeat in the Opium Wars result in the shattering of the Chinese notion of their civilizational superiority?
2. List the anti-Qing uprisings and rebellions that broke out in China during the mid-nineteenth century.

2.3 TAIPING REBELLION: CAUSES, COURSE AND EFFECTS

The Taiping Rebellion was a complicated affair. It was an agrarian uprising, a rebellion of a persecuted minority, an outburst of a new religion and an anti-dynastic revolution all at the same time. It was also one of the bloodiest civil wars in history. Approximately 20 million people lost their lives in the rebellion.
The rebellion swept across sixteen of China’s eighteen provinces and almost overthrew the Qing Dynasty.

Hong Xiuquan (1814–1864), a Hakka Confucian scholar from Guangdong Province was the leader of the rebellion. Hong had aspired to become a court official and appeared in the Chinese civil service examinations several times, but failed to make the cut. After his third failure in 1843, he fell ill. During his illness, he apparently went into trance several times. When he became better, Hong stated that his hallucinations were visions from God and proclaimed himself the younger brother of Jesus Christ who had been chosen by God to establish a heavenly kingdom on earth. He thus decided to overthrow the Qing Dynasty and establish a new kingdom in China. Hong along with a few relatives and friends converted to Christianity.

In 1844, Hong moved to neighbouring Guangxi Province and started preaching Christianity. One of his associates, Feng Yunshan established a religious association called the Society of God Worshippers (Bai Shangdi Hui) there to propagate Hong’s revolutionary ideas. Hong and his three associates Feng Yunshan, Yang Xiuqing and Xiao Chaogui were the central figures of the Society. In 1847, Hong was declared the supreme leader of the Society. Feng, Yang and Xiao were given the titles of third, fourth and fifth sons of God respectively. Hong set up his command centre at Jintian village in Guangxi Province. Within a short period, Hong had a large number of followers. Initially, it was the economically and socially disadvantageous groups, such as miners, charcoal makers, poor peasants, etc., who converted to Christianity and joined the Society. However, gradually, educated and wealthy people also started becoming members. A majority of the members of the Society were Hakka people like Hong, who felt protected under the Society. Other secret societies also extended support to Hong.
In December 1850, the government sent troops to oust Hong Xiuquan from his base. On their way, the corrupt Qing troops attempted to make irregular exaction from some charcoal makers. The charcoal makers, who were members of the Society of God Worshippers, immediately retaliated and won a victory. Thus, the rebellion broke out. In 1851, Hong Xiuquan announced the establishment of the Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace. From Jintian, Taiping troops marched north capturing important cities along the way until they reached Nanjing in 1853. Nanjing was renamed Tianjing (Heavenly Capital), and was made the capital of the Heavenly Kingdom. Hong settled down in Nanjing. From Nanjing, the Taiping army moved in two directions simultaneously. Hong sent an army northward to capture Beijing, and another westward to capture Anhui, Jiangxi, Hubei and Hunan provinces. The Hunan Army (or Hunan Braves) commanded by scholar official Zeng Guofan blocked the western expedition of the Taiping rebels. After ten years of fighting, Taiping commander Shi Dakai finally surrendered and was executed in 1863, ending the northern expedition. The Qing troops managed to capture Nanjing in 1864. With the fall of his capital, Hong lost hope and committed suicide in 1864. Though Hong’s son became the Heavenly King, and the remaining Taiping army continued to wage sporadic resistance, in effect, the rebellion ended with Hong’s death. The Taipings were completely wiped out in 1871.

Taiping Policies and Institutions

Nearly all policies and institutions of the Taiping rebels were different from the existing Qing system. While some were influenced by the Chinese tradition, others were fundamentally opposed to conventional Chinese notions. To show defiance, the Taipings did not wear the mandatory Manchu hairstyle. They cut off their pigtails, and wore their hair long. For this, the rebels were also referred to as ‘changmao’ (longhaired rebels or longhaired bandits). The major Taiping policies and institutions are as follows:

(i) Religious Doctrine: The Taiping rebels essentially followed protestant ideology and opposed idol worship. Taiping Christianity put emphasis on strict obedience and the worship of God. Hong put together religious odes based on his understanding of the Bible. It was, in effect, a curious mix of Christian and Confucian teachings. For example, Hong’s Ten Commandments included the Confucian doctrine of filial piety. The Taipings were not tolerant towards any other religion and philosophy, such as Confucianism and Daoism. They often destroyed temples, symbols and relics of other religions.

(ii) State Ideology: The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom was a highly militarized theocracy. Hong’s title was Heavenly King, his order was Heavenly prescript and the rulebook or constitution was called the Land System of the Heavenly Kingdom. Even institutions and important places such as the palace, capital, treasury and currency had prefixes such as ‘heavenly’, ‘sacred’ and ‘holy’. Although the governing ideology of Hong and the Kingdom was based on
Christianity, major branches of Christianity rejected Hong’s brand of Christianity as heretical.

(iii) **Administration**: Hong Xiuquan was the Heavenly King, the supreme ruler of the central government. Hong’s five associates who ruled different regions as his subordinates were called the Kings of the Four Quarters (East, West, North and South) and the King of the Yi (Assistant). Yang Xiuqing was the East King, Xiao Chaogui was the West King, Wei Changhui was the North King, Feng Yunshan was the South King and Shi Dakai was the Assistant King. Of the five kings, the West King and South King were killed in combat when the Taiping army was marching north towards Nanjing in 1852. The North King killed the East King during a coup d’état in 1856. Later, the North King was also killed. The Assistant King was captured by the Qing authorities, and was executed in 1863. Hong committed suicide in 1864.

(iv) **Moral Code**: The Taiping advocated a classless society and enforced gender equality at home and in occupation. They also prohibited the use of narcotics (particularly opium and tobacco), alcohol, gambling, polygamy, slavery, prostitution and foot binding for women. These were heinous crimes and carried harsh penalties. According to Taiping ideology, all men were brothers and all women were sisters. Therefore, men and women were segregated into separate sections. Until 1855, even married couples were not permitted to live together.

(v) **Civil Service Examination**: The Taiping followed the traditional Chinese system of civil service examination to select state bureaucrats. However, unlike the traditional system in which the syllabus was the Confucian classics, the Taiping syllabus comprised of the Bible and Taiping ideology. The Taipings introduced everyday language as against the traditional classical language as the medium of writing the examinations and in official use. For the first time in the history of China, women were allowed to appear in examinations.

(vi) **Calendar**: The Taiping rebels replaced the traditional Chinese lunar calendar with a unique one. There were 366 days in a year in the calendar. The twelve months had thirty-one and thirty days alternatively. This system generated three additional days in every four years and thirty additional days in every forty years. Every forty years a year of adjustment was planned in which all twelve months were of twenty-eight days.

(vii) **Economic Structure**: The Taiping economic system was primarily egalitarian in nature. They advocated the abolition of private ownership of land and property. Members of the Society of God Worshippers sold off their land and property and deposited the proceedings to the sacred treasury. The state then redistributed the land equally among members. The Taiping state had an agenda of equal distribution. The Taipings derived the method of measurement of each member’s share of farm product from an ancient Chinese text named the Rites of Zhou. The Taiping government issued its own currency.
Military: The Taipings put together ideologically charged zealous contingents of soldiers. Organization of the army was elaborately intricate and complex. The military organization was based on the famous Ming general Qi Jiguang’s strategy. Besides, military and civil administrations were interwoven. Soldiers were farmers too, and played dual responsibility. Strict rules governed soldiers during camping, marching and on battleground. There were separate divisions of men and women soldiers. Women were engaged in public life for the first time in China’s dynastic history.

2.3.1 Causes of the Taiping Rebellion’s Success and Failure

There were many factors for Taiping Rebellion’s success in the early phases of the rebellion.

Causes of the Rebellion’s Success

Common people were generally sympathetic towards the nationalistic revolution of the Taipings against the alien Manchu rule. Other secret societies also extended considerable help to the Taiping cause. The Taiping military was strong and well organized. Many Taipings were coal miners, and they used their mining skill to dig tunnels under city walls. This strategy exhausted the Qing forces. As the Taiping army marched eastward out of Guangxi, they impounded large amounts of silver from the public granary, got hold of a large cache of weaponry and captured Qing vessels. This stock of wealth and weapons enabled material comfort and a smooth supply of provisions at the warfront. In addition to wealth and weapons, the Taiping rebels had a huge number of supporters. By the time they reached Nanjing in 1853, their supporters numbered approximately one million. The rebels were able to make great progress in the interior, because the Qing army concentrated its forces against the invading Anglo-French forces during the second Opium War of 1856–60, and the Nian Rebellion. Besides, the Qing army, demoralized after the defeat in the First Opium War and addicted to opium, was no match for the disciplined Taiping army. The Taiping rebels were an ideological army full of passion and zeal. The soldiers believed that if they died for the cause they would rise to heaven. After the capture of Nanjing, almost 100,000 of the Taiping followers preferred death to capture. Moreover, Taiping egalitarian policies, such as shared property and welfare policies attracted many famine-stricken peasants.

Causes of the Rebellion’s Failure

The major causes for the failure of the Taiping Rebellion are enumerated as follows:

(i) Ideological Conflict: The Taiping religious ideology alienated both foreigners and Chinese. Christian missionaries considered Hong’s views of Christianity as heretical mainly because Hong declared a new holy trinity which included God, Jesus Christ and Hong himself. Moreover, they also believed that Hong was infringing upon their own agenda of Christianizing China. The radical anti-Confucianism of the Taiping rebels also alienated
the gentry, who rallied behind the Qing court against the Taipings. The destruction of the temples and idols, and the concept of equality between men and women ran counter to the Confucian propriety and social hierarchy. The Taiping ideology considered all men as brothers and all women as sisters. Therefore, husbands and wives lived separately. This ran counter to basic human relationships.

Initially, several secret societies supported Hong as the Taiping Rebellion was an anti-Manchu nationalistic revolution. But later, Hong refused to cooperate with the secret societies because they were not Christians. He refused to support the Small Sword Rebellion led by the Small Sword Society (a secret society) which occupied Shanghai for a year and half in 1853–54. Placing religious consideration over the primary objective of patriotic revolution cost the Taipings dearly. Shanghai was too important a place to lose. Had they helped the Small Sword Society in controlling Shanghai, they could have earned huge revenue from foreign trade and would have cut off the contact between the Qing courts and the Western powers. Later in 1860, the Taiping rebels did attempt to capture Shanghai, but were driven away by the Westerners.

(ii) **Strategic Blunders and Poor Diplomacy:** Antagonizing the Western powers was a strategic blunder. Being Christians, the Taiping leaders could have easily forged friendship with the West, which could have won support for their cause. Foreign traders were initially interested in the prospect of a Christian ruled dynasty. However, Hong’s moral codes, such as a ban on opium and tobacco were against their trade interest. The Taiping rebels also constantly harassed the foreign traders in Shanghai and other port cities to curb the illegal opium trade. After China’s defeat in the Second Opium War in 1860, foreign traders gained considerable trade concessions. For them, it was rewarding to support the weak Qing government who might give them more concession under pressure than making the Taipings stronger who would never support the lucrative opium trade. Thus, the Western imperialists raised a pro-Manchu army to fight against the Taipings. This army undertook direct military operations against the Taiping rebels. This private army drove the Taipings away from Shanghai in 1860, and later captured many cities for the Manchu government.

Another wrong decision by the Taiping rebels was to halt the military expedition midway. After the Taiping forces conquered Nanjing in 1853, Hong decided to halt and consolidate instead of proceeding to Beijing to topple the Qing Dynasty. As you learned, Hong decided to split the army into northern and western expeditions, which caused the defeat to both the columns. When the Taipings had established their capital in Nanjing, the Qing Dynasty did not have enough troops to mobilize against the Taipings. It only managed to raise two army camps on both sides of the Yangze River.
near Nanjing. Until after the end of the Second Opium War in 1860, the Qing army was busy tackling the Western threats. The Taipings did not even attempt to utilize this opportunity for ten years. It was from these camps that the Qing troops took control of Nanjing in 1864.

Another military fault was that the Taiping rebels had no real cavalry units. This limited their mobility. The Taiping defense line was overstretched along the Yangzi River valley, forcing them to fight on several fronts. This prevented them from making a concerted strike northwards. The leaders of the rebellion did not try to remedy these military weaknesses.

(iii) **Infighting:** Internal strife damaged the Taiping Rebellion irrevocably. It started because of the East King Yang Xiuqing’s ambition to become the supreme ruler. Having seen through the falseness of Hong’s divine commission, Yang began to go into a trance. During his supposed trance, God supposedly melded with his soul and demanded that Hong give Yang increasing power. Hong could only agree to Yang’s demands since his own trance was false too, and he did not want to expose this falsity. Yang thus became extremely powerful. His supporters felt empowered and bullied others. Hong asked the North King Wei Changhui and Assistant King Shi Dakai, who were out in military expeditions, to return to Nanjing immediately. The North King reached Nanjing and murdered Yang and his 20,000 supporters in 1856. Upon his return to Nanjing, the Assistant King disapproved of the massacre. Hong then arrested Wei on criminal charges and issued the death penalty. Disgusted by this infighting, the Assistant King left the capital with his 100,000 veterans, roving through the country for seven years until the Qing troops cornered and defeated his isolated and independent force in 1863.

(iv) **Administrative and Leadership Failure:** Poor implementation of administrative policies and leadership failure led to the dissatisfaction of peasants—the main support base of the rebellion—in the latter years of the rebellion. The egalitarian policies that attracted peasants towards the Taiping were not implemented. For example, by 1850, members handed over their belongings and land to the state to implement the collective ownership system. In practice, however, the Taipings were too hard pressed to execute the system, and relied on the old landlord-tenant system. To run the government machinery, the peasants were required to pay taxes. They were also not paid for their labour. The peasantry was thus transformed from active participators in a new political formation to passive subjects of a government. In other words, the Taiping system was becoming the one that the people sought to change.

After establishing the government in Nanjing, the Taiping Kingdom lost its revolutionary nature, and became a traditional feudal government. The leaders became a privileged class. There were one set of rules for the
common citizen and another set for the leaders. The moral codes of monogamy and gender equality and the concepts of common property applied only to the common people. The leaders gave in to leisure and luxury. While Taiping rebels were supposed to oppose anything Confucian, Hong read Confucian literature openly, drew ideas freely from them, and interpreted Christianity in Confucian terms.

After 1856, there was grave leadership void. Of the original five associates of Hong, the South and West kings were killed in combat in 1852, and the East and North kings were killed in 1856 in fractional strife. The Assistant King abandoned the kingdom out of disgust. Hong had relied much on these associates. With none of them around, Hong completely withdrew from responsibility, gave in to pleasure and grew mentally unstable.

The breakdown of central leadership led to corruption, mushrooming of smaller kings, loss of command-and-control, and a general lack of discipline and skill among the generals. There were loyal generals like Li Xiucheng and Chen Yucheng. They kept the movement alive for eight more years until 1864, but it was not possible for one or two persons to arrest the collapse of the rebellion.

2.3.2 Effects of the Taiping Rebellion

The Taiping Rebellion changed the political balance of power in the Qing court. The two Confucian scholar officials in charge of suppressing the rebellion, Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang were ethnic Han Chinese. After their success, political power shifted from the Manchus to the Hans. Both Zeng and Li were provincial officials. After the suppression of the Taiping Rebellion, the influence of provincial leaders increased in national affairs. From that time onwards provincial leaders started to act independently of the central government. Militarily, the trend of regional leaders raising private army became popular among other regional leaders.
The Taiping Rebellion was also the opening phase of the revolutionary process that possessed China in the twentieth century. The rebellion became a source of inspiration for China’s two main political parties, the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party. The founder of modern China, Dr. Sun Yat-sen listened to stories told by Taiping survivor Lai Hangying and nicknamed himself Hong Xiuquan the Second in his childhood. The Chinese Communists regarded the Taipings as heroic revolutionaries fighting against a corrupt feudal system.

Check Your Progress

3. When did Hong Xiuquan announce the establishment of the Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace?
4. What was the religious ideology of Taiping rebels?
5. What was the effect of breakdown of central leadership among the Taiping rebels?
6. What was the political effect of the Taiping rebellion?

2.4 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS QUESTIONS

1. The defeat in the Opium Wars resulted in the shattering of the Chinese notion that their country was the most superior civilization in the world. This had a huge psychological effect on the Chinese who found it hard to accept the humiliation that the British inflicted on their celestial empire with a mandate from heaven to rule.

2. A number of anti-Qing uprisings and rebellions broke out during the mid-nineteenth century including the Nian (1853–1868), Muslim (1855–1873), Tungan (1862–1878) and Taiping (1850–1864).

3. In 1851, Hong Xiuquan announced the establishment of the Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace.

4. The Taiping rebels essentially followed protestant ideology and opposed idol worship. Taiping Christianity put emphasis on strict obedience and the worship of God.

5. The breakdown of central leadership led to corruption, mushrooming of smaller kings, loss of command-and-control, and a general lack of discipline and skill among the generals.

6. The Taiping Rebellion changed the political balance of power in the Qing court.
2.5 SUMMARY

- The defeat in the Opium Wars resulted in the shattering of the Chinese notion that their country was the most superior civilization in the world. This had a huge psychological effect on the Chinese who found it hard to accept the humiliation that the British inflicted on their celestial empire with a mandate from heaven.
- In addition to the military and psychological suffering at the hands of foreigners, China also went through internal socio-political-economic problems.
- Due to long years of peace in China, the population had increased manifold, but grain production had remained the same. Arable land was concentrated among a small percentage of rich people. The majority of people were poor peasants, some with land but mostly landless tenants of landlords.
- A number of anti-Qing uprisings and rebellions broke out during the mid-nineteenth century including the Nian (1853–1868), Muslim (1855–1873), Tungan (1862–1878) and Taiping (1850–1864). But the Taiping Rebellion stands out among them because it came close to toppling the Qing Dynasty.
- Nearly all policies and institutions of the Taiping rebels were different from the existing Qing system. While some were influenced by the Chinese tradition, others were fundamentally opposed to conventional Chinese notions.
- The Taiping Rebellion was one of the bloodiest civil wars in history. Approximately 20 million people lost their lives in the rebellion. The rebellion swept across sixteen of China’s eighteen provinces and almost overthrew the Qing Dynasty.
- After ten years of fighting, Taiping commander Shi Dakai finally surrendered and was executed in 1863, ending the northern expedition.
- Hong put together religious odes based on his understanding of the Bible. It was, in effect, a curious mix of Christian and Confucian teachings.
- The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom was a highly militarized theocracy. Hong’s title was Heavenly King, his order was Heavenly prescript and the rulebook or constitution was called the Land System of the Heavenly Kingdom.
- The Taiping advocated a classless society and enforced gender equality at home and in occupation. They also prohibited the use of narcotics (particularly opium and tobacco), alcohol, gambling, polygamy, slavery, prostitution and foot binding for women.
- The Taiping rebels replaced the traditional Chinese lunar calendar with a unique one. There were 366 days in a year in the calendar. The twelve
months had thirty-one and thirty days alternatively. This system generated three additional days in every four years and thirty additional days in every forty years.

- The Taiping economic system was primarily egalitarian in nature. They advocated the abolition of private ownership of land and property.
- The Taiping religious ideology alienated both foreigners and Chinese. Christian missionaries considered Hong’s views of Christianity as heretical mainly because Hong declared a new holy trinity which included God, Jesus Christ and Hong himself.
- Antagonizing the Western powers was a strategic blunder. Being Christians, the Taiping leaders could have easily forged friendship with the West, which could have won support for their cause.
- Internal strife damaged the Taiping Rebellion irrevocably. It started because of the East King Yang Xiuqing’s ambition to become the supreme ruler.
- Poor implementation of administrative policies and leadership failure led to the dissatisfaction of peasants—the main support base of the rebellion—in the latter years of the rebellion.
- Military campaigns led by two statesmen of the Qing Empire, Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang played a huge role in quelling the Taiping Rebellion.
- The Taiping Rebellion was also the opening phase of the revolutionary process that possessed China in the twentieth century. The rebellion became a source of inspiration for China’s two main political parties, the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party.

2.6 KEY WORDS

- **The Taiping Rebellion:** It was a complicated affair. It was an agrarian uprising, a rebellion of a persecuted minority, an outburst of a new religion and an anti-dynastic revolution all at the same time.
- **Hakka:** When the Song Dynasty moved southward from central China, starting the Southern Song Dynasty (1127–1278), groups of people migrated to Guangdong and Guangxi provinces from central China. They were called guest settlers (Kejia or Hakka). Due to different culture, aboriginal and Hakka settlers clashed frequently. Hong Xiuquan, the leader of the Taiping Rebellion was a Hakka.
- **Foot Binding:** In medieval China, it was common to bind the foot of girls to prevent normal growth in upper class Chinese households. The toes were curled under, then pressed downwards and squeezed into the sole of the foot until the toes broke. The broken toes were then tightly bandaged. The bandage was periodically changed. The process started at the tender
age of two to five year. The ideal size of the feet was seven centimeters. Foot binding permanently crippled women. However, the Chinese considered tiny feet very beautiful.

2.7 SELF ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

Short Answer Questions
1. Write a note on the background of the Taiping rebellion.
2. The Taipings themselves messed up their rebellion. Comment.
3. What were the effects of the Taiping rebellion?

Long Answer Questions
1. Why did peasants overwhelmingly support the Taiping Rebellion at its early stage? Which Taiping policies pushed away the same supporters later?
2. Describe the institutions and the ideology of the Taiping Rebellion.
3. Discuss the causes of the Taiping rebellion’s failure and success

2.8 FURTHER READINGS

UNIT 3  THE SECOND OPIUM WAR

3.0 INTRODUCTION

As a result of China’s defeat in the First Opium War (discussed in Unit 1), European imperialist countries started imposing their wish on China for gaining trading privileges. Soon, the United States of America and Japan joined hands with the European imperialist powers. With their superior technological knowledge, stronger military and advanced navigational skill, the imperialist powers steadily strengthened their influence in China. Each time China refused to give in to the unjust demands of the imperialist states, she faced military action by the imperialists. China lost each war. After each defeat, the victorious imperialist states forced unequal treaties on China. They extracted more and more concession from China, particularly jurisdiction over territory and privileges in trade. Even though the imperialist powers did not rule China directly, they divided China into spheres of influence among them by the middle of the nineteenth century. This situation ruined China’s economy and made China’s political institutions function like a puppet in the hands of the imperialist powers. Thus, China lost her sovereignty, and became an informal colony of the Western imperialist powers.

Due to the reasons mentioned above, the Han Chinese became very restive. Native Han people did not trust the Qing rulers, who were non-native Manchu people. They doubted the Qing court’s sincerity in dealing with the moves of the Western imperialists. The mass dissatisfaction, combined with an inefficient and corrupt administration, and poor economy due to imperialist exploitation ushered in an unparalleled social crisis in China. The situation increasingly became volatile. Soon, a number of uprisings and rebellions broke out. At the same time, the government initiated several corrective measures. A series of reforms were started. Though these reforms were mostly unsuccessful or partially successful, they played a vital role in modernizing China.
The external and domestic situations, coupled with a power struggle within the royal family finally resulted in the downfall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911. Nevertheless, imperialist exploitation of China continued until the Western imperialist powers were weakened due to the Second World War. Today, Chinese nationalist scholars consider the hundred-year period from the First Opium War until the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 the ‘century of humiliation’. In this unit, the background, causes and the aftermath of the Opium Wars are discussed.

### 3.1 OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit, you will be able to:

- Identify the real motives of Britain and France behind waging war on China
- Assess the importance of the two Opium Wars in modern Chinese history
- Discuss the causes and effects of the Second Opium War
- Highlight the characteristics of the Treaty of Tientsin

### 3.2 THE SECOND OPIUM WAR: AN OVERVIEW

To the Chinese, the main reason for the conflict of 1839 was opium smuggling and the resultant damage of China’s social and economic structure. To the British, opium was just the immediate cause of the Anglo-Chinese war; the real issue was the repeated humiliation of British nationals and alleged disrespect of the British Crown by the Chinese authorities. The fact that the Treaty of Nanjing did not mention opium proves that opium was not the main issue for the British. The British imperialists used the destruction of the opium by Lin Zexu as the pretext to extract trade privileges from China. Entirely different notions of social, political, economic and cultural systems played a major role in the conflict. The key areas of difference are as follows:

(i) **Attitude towards International Relations:** As you learned in the previous unit, the view of international relations that prevailed in the West was quite different from the Chinese worldview. The West had learnt to recognize other countries as equal sovereign political entities in the later half of the seventeenth century, particularly after the peace treaties of Westphalia in 1648. Europe gradually learned to respect treaties and agreements signed between sovereign states or between allies. China’s approach to international relations was an upshot of her Sino centric worldview. China maintained that as the Son of Heaven, the Chinese emperor was the only legitimate emperor of the entire world. Therefore, all countries in the world were her tributaries. China considered all diplomatic missions as tribute bearers. Thus, the nature of China’s foreign policy was that of sovereign and subjects.
Britain sent three diplomatic missions to China, namely the Macartney mission (1793), the Amherst mission (1816) and the Napier mission (1834). Each mission attempted to establish diplomatic relations with China on a regular treaty basis. Although the Qing court treated the missions well, each of the missions failed because the Qing court felt that diplomatic negotiations were out of question due to their Sino-centric outlook.

(ii) Clash of Culture: China allowed foreign trade as a goodwill gesture towards her tributary states. In Imperial Chinese protocol, the representative of a tributary state was supposed to perform kowtow and present a tribute to the Chinese emperor as a show of tributary status. The emperor then formally issued permission to trade. China conducted her foreign relations successfully under this system for two thousand years. The new nature of foreign relations in the West was completely opposite to this worldview. The West refused to accept that they were subservient to the Chinese sovereign. The British envoys refused to perform kowtow, resulting in the deterioration of relations.

(iii) Attitude towards International Trade: Industrial capitalism was the core of economic life in nineteenth-century Europe. As a result, international trade became the ruling concept. The West propagated that international trade was a mutually beneficial venture; they advocated free international trade while China regulated and restricted foreign trade in the country. The Chinese concept of international trade was opposite to that of the West. China was a self-sufficient economy. The Chinese believed that the prosperous Middle Kingdom required nothing from foreigners, but the generous emperor allowed foreign trade as an act of kindness. To China, foreign trade was a means to sustain the tributary countries’ appreciation of China as well as a means to control foreign barbarians. Although China had been a trade hub since the Tang Dynasty, the imperial court applied the theory of tributary system all along. China restricted foreign trade whenever she deemed fit. In the later half of the eighteenth century, the Qing court imposed many trade restrictions on foreigners, which ultimately became a crucial factor in Sino-British relations.

(iv) The Canton System of Trade: From 1757 onwards, Canton was the only port where foreigners could trade. The Qing court gave exclusive rights to some Chinese merchants to manage foreign trade. They formed an association, known as Cohong. The government entrusted these merchants to supervise each foreign ship arriving at Canton, collect payment of customs duty, arrange for boarding and lodging of foreigners and ensure that the foreigners behaved properly. The trading season lasted roughly from October to January. Traders brought cargo to Canton, stayed in the foreign factories, did business and then returned back to Macao or returned home. The foreign traders handed over their cargo to the Cohong merchants and also brought Chinese goods from them. The Cohong merchants then fixed
the price of foreign commodities and distributed the commodities inland. Since the Cohong acted as a buffer between the government and the foreigners the Qing court encouraged it. The guild monopolized foreign trade. Foreign traders found the monopoly of the Cohong merchants, particularly the arbitrary fixing of the levy and commodity price by the Cohong unacceptable. In the eighteenth century, Europeans who wanted to trade with China had no choice but to follow Chinese rules. In the nineteenth century, due to increasing competition among the Western powers and their growing influence as colonial powers, they sought to break the trade restriction.

(v) Concept of Law: The Chinese legal system was based on Confucian philosophy, which prescribed a limited role for penal law. The Confucian school of thought maintained that if society and family work to inculcate value in every individual, there would be no crime. Therefore, propriety, which was enforced by the family and society, was more important than penal law, which was enforced by the ruler. Thus, the head of the family was morally responsible for a family member’s fault, the community leader was morally responsible for a member’s crime and the governor general was responsible for every incident under his jurisdiction. Thus, the Cohong was responsible for the behaviour of the foreign traders and the British superintendent of trade, and later British consul, was responsible for the acts of all British nationals. This was an alien concept to the British. The British concept of law held every individual responsible for his or her act. Moreover, the Chinese had no idea of international and national water falling outside or within the Chinese jurisdiction. When Chinese troops boarded British ships to confiscate opium in 1839, the British argument was that since their cargo was in international waters, it was still legal. The Chinese also had no idea that when Charles Elliot handed over the opium to Lin Zexu on behalf of British traders, the commodity, even if illegal, became the property of British Crown because Elliot was a representative of British Crown. The Canton City Issue

The imperial commissioner and governor general of Canton Qiying declared the opening of Canton in January 1846. The residents of the city, however, protested the government move and refused to allow the British to move beyond the old factory area. During Captain Charles Elliot’s military campaigns, the Cantonese people had suffered British atrocities and thus, they had serious reservations against the British. At this time, John Davis was appointed the governor of Hong Kong. He utilized Cantonese resistance to the British to prevent the rumored French attempt to gain territory in China. In April 1846, Qiying and John Davis reached an agreement through which the British agreed to postpone their entry into Canton in exchange for a promise that China would not cede the Zhousan Islands to any other foreign power. The Cantonese people were emboldened by the apparent British compromise and thus intensified anti-British activities. In response to the
attacks by the Cantonese population, Davis retaliated by raiding and capturing the
Bogue forts and the Thirteen Factories District in Canton in April 1847.
Commissioner Qiying hurriedly settled the matter on April 6, 1847, promising
British entry into Canton within two years, punishment of offenders, and rights to
British traders and missionaries to build warehouses and churches respectively in
Canton.

3.2.1 The Immediate Cause: The Arrow Incident

The Arrow was a lorcha. Its owner was a Chinese resident of Hong Kong. The
ship sailed under British license to protect itself from pirates. On October 8, 1856,
when the Arrow was docked off Canton, Chinese officers searching for a notorious
pirate boarded the ship. The ship’s license had expired but it was still flying the
British flag. They arrested the Chinese crew of the Arrow. In the commotion, the
British flag was hauled down. The British consul at Canton, Harry Parkes demanded
immediate release of the crew and an apology from the Chinese authority. The
British argued that since the Arrow sailed under British license, it was a foreign
vessel. Under the extraterritoriality clause of the Treaty of Nanjing, a foreign vessel’s
activities did not fall under Chinese legal jurisdiction. Therefore, without a warrant
from the British consul, it was illegal for the Chinese officials to board the lorcha
and arrest the crew. The Chinese argued that the Arrow had no right to fly the
British flag as its British license had expired. Besides, a Chinese national owned it,
and the incident took place in a Chinese harbour. Therefore, it was an internal law
and order issue of the Chinese empire. However, the British confiscated the lorcha,
and insisted that since the ship was flying the British flag, and the flag was hauled
down, the governor of Canton must submit a written apology within forty-eight
hours for the insult to the British flag. The Governor of Canton Ye Mingchen
released the crew on October 22, 1856, but refused to apologize for the incident.
This minor incident was the spark that ignited another war against China. The
British warships bombarded Canton the next day. On October 28, the Chinese
countered it. Thus, the Second Opium War broke out. Since the alleged reason of
the war was the Arrow incident, the Second Opium War is also called the Arrow
War.

3.2.2 Course of the War

France, the United States and Russia supported the British in their campaign against
China. The United States and Russia conducted a peaceful demonstration against
the Chinese, but did not take part in the military expedition. France, however,
joined Britain in the military campaign as a junior partner. France’s pretext for
going to war against China was seeking redress for the killing of a French missionary
in Guangxi Province in February 1856. The military campaign of the Second Opium
War can be divided into two phases. The first phase lasted from the beginning of
the bombardment of Canton on October 23, 1856 to the conclusion of the Treaties
of Tianjin in June 1858. The second phase started in summer 1859 and ended in
1860 with another agreement, The Convention of Peking.
An Anglo-French joint force occupied Canton on December 28, 1857. The joint force captured Governor Ye, and shipped him to India. Ye died in Calcutta in captivity in 1858. The foreigners appointed Ye’s former associate Bo-gui, an ethnic Manchu as a puppet governor of Guangdong with British consul at Canton, Harry Parkes in overall control. Canton remained under the control of the allied forces until 1860. The coalition force under British High Commissioner to China Lord Elgin and French diplomat Jean-Baptiste Louis Gros cruised north towards Beijing. The forces occupied the Dagu forts and Tianjin in 1858. Alarmed by the rapid advance of the foreigners, the Qing court sent representatives to negotiate peace. In June 1858, China signed separate treaties with Britain, France, Russia, and the United States. Collectively these treaties are known as the Treaties of Tianjin.

The Treaties of Tianjin stipulated that the formal exchange of treaty ratification would take place a year from the date of signing. When the foreigners returned to ratify the treaties in May 1859, conflict arose. The Chinese authorities were interested to ratify the treaties in Shanghai. However, the British envoy Frederick Bruce insisted on going to Beijing for the ratification, and marched towards Beijing with a fleet of warship. The British forces reached Beihe on June 18. The Chinese disapproved of the mission taking that particular route, and asked the foreign envoys to take the north route via Beitang. The American envoy took the prescribed route and reached Beijing. However, Frederick Bruce insisted that only the main route from Tianjin suited his dignity. The British forces tried to proceed towards Beijing along the main route. But, on the face of an unexpectedly strong Chinese resistance, the British force suffered heavy losses. The British and French envoys had to withdraw to Shanghai. In May 1860, a larger Anglo-French joint force assembled in Hong Kong. The joint force marched north towards Beijing in August 1860. They defeated the Chinese resistance along the way and reached Tianjin on August 23. The joint force then marched inland towards Beijing. Facing an invasion of Beijing, Emperor Xianfeng (reigned 1851 – 1861) was forced to request for peace negotiation. The British commander Lord Elgin sent an advanced party under Harry Parkes to arrange for his reception. Parkes got involved in an argument with the Chinese authorities and was arrested on September 18. Though he was soon released, the British alleged that some members of Parkes’ entourage were tortured and killed. The British commander Elgin reacted by invading Beijing on September 21. He defeated the Chinese forces and marched into Beijing on October 8. The Qing Emperor Xianfeng fled to Jehol with the imperial court, after appointing his half brother Prince Gong as the imperial envoy with full authority to negotiate with the foreign victors on behalf of the Qing government. An enraged Elgin wanted to replace the Machu dynasty with a Chinese one and also wanted to burn the imperial palace (known as the Forbidden City) as punishment for imprisoning Parkes, but French and Russian envoys convinced him that the act would hamper ratification of the Treaties of Nanjing. Elgin, as a compromise, ordered his forces to destroy two imperial gardens in Beijing- the Imperial Summer
The imperialist forces looted and demolished artifacts and finally burnt down the royal gardens on October 18, 1860. The war ended with another humiliating treaty, the Convention of Peking (also known as the First Convention of Peking), signed on October 24, 1860.

Effects
Encouraged by the British advance after the First Opium War, Russia pushed into the Chinese territory, and threatened China with war. The Russian incursion was regularized through the Treaty of Kulja, also known as the Treaty of Yili in 1851. The treaty established Russia’s hold over Yili (also known as Kulja, modern Yining) and Tarbagatai (also known Chuguchak, modern Tacheng) towns in present-day Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The major concessions in these two cities included:

- Right to trade
- Right to build warehouses
- Right to appoint consuls

3.2.3 Treaties of Tientsin or the Treaties of Tianjin
After China’s defeat in the Second Opium War, China was forced to sign the Treaty of Tianjin separately with Britain, France, Russia and the United States in June 1858. This set of unequal treaties is collectively known as the Treaties of Tianjin, also known as “Treaty of Tientsin”. The main points included:
The Second Opium War

- War indemnity of 4 million taels for Britain and 2 million taels for France
- Opening of ten ports, Nanjing, Niu Zhuang, Dengzhou, Hangou, Jiu Jiang, Jinjiang, Da Wanzhu, Tansui, Suadou and Jiongzhou, to foreign trade
- Right to travel in all parts of China under passport issued by the consul and countersigned by Chinese authorities, with right to move freely within one hundred Chinese mile of the ports opened to foreign trade
- Freedom of travel in all over China for Christian missionaries, both Protestant and Catholic
- Inland transit dues for foreign imports not to exceed 2.5 per cent ad valorem

On May 28, 1858, Russian expansionist generals forced Manchu general Yishan to sign the Treaty of Aigun. The treaty granted the expanding Russian Empire vast new territories in eastern Siberia. However, Emperor Xianfeng did not approve it. Taking advantage of the Anglo-French siege of Beijing at the culmination of the Second Opium War, the Russians convinced the Chinese that Russia was a friendly power and as a prize for persuading the Anglo-French forces to leave Beijing after the war ended, extracted huge concession through the Treaty of Beijing in November 1860. China lost a long strip of its Pacific coastline south of the mouth of the Amur River to Russia.

The Convention of Peking, signed separately with Britain and France on October 24, 1860 was equally malicious. Besides ratification of the Treaty of Nanjing, other major concessions included:
- War indemnity of 8 million taels each for Britain and France
- Opening of Tianjin for foreign trade and residence
- Britain secured the right over Kowloon peninsula opposite Hong Kong as a base
- France secured the right for Catholic missionaries to build church and own property in interior China

As is evident from the treaty clauses, all concessions in each treaty were one sided. The imperialist powers only took concessions from China, but did not commit anything in return. This is why the treaties are termed unequal. Worse, all parties shared each concession granted to another because of their most favoured nation status. Most importantly, the Opium Wars and the resulting unequal treaties transformed China from a prosperous regional superpower to a semi-colonial entity. While extraterritorial concessions eroded China’s political sovereignty, fixed import duty and other economic concessions crippled her economy. After 1860, China gradually became a victim of financial imperialism.
The Second Opium War

Check Your Progress
1. Why was the second Opium War also called the Arrow War?
2. What was France’s pretext for going to war against China?
3. How did the Second Opium War end?
4. What are the Treaties of Tianjin or Tientsin?

3.3 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS QUESTIONS

1. Since the alleged reason of the war was the Arrow incident, the Second Opium War is also called the Arrow War.
2. France’s pretext for going to war against China was seeking redress for the killing of a French missionary in Guangxi Province in February 1856.
3. The war ended with another humiliating treaty, the Convention of Peking (also known as the First Convention of Peking), signed on October 24, 1860.
4. After China’s defeat in the Second Opium War, China was forced to sign the Treaty of Tianjin separately with Britain, France, Russia and the United States in June 1858. This set of unequal treaties is collectively known as the Treaties of Tianjin or Tientsin.

3.4 SUMMARY

- To the Chinese, the main reason for the conflict of 1839 was opium smuggling and the resultant damage of China’s social and economic structure. To the British, opium was just the immediate cause of the Anglo-Chinese war; the real issue was the repeated humiliation of British nationals and alleged disrespect of the British Crown by the Chinese authorities.
- China allowed foreign trade as a goodwill gesture towards her tributary states. In Imperial Chinese protocol, the representative of a tributary state was supposed to perform kowtow and present a tribute to the Chinese emperor as a show of tributary status.
- The West propagated that international trade was a mutually beneficial venture; they advocated free international trade while China regulated and restricted foreign trade in the country. The Chinese concept of international trade was opposite to that of the West.
- The Chinese legal system was based on Confucian philosophy, which prescribed a limited role for penal law. The Confucian school of thought
maintained that if society and family work to inculcate value in every individual, there would be no crime. Therefore, propriety, which was enforced by the family and society, was more important than penal law, which was enforced by the ruler.

- The imperial commissioner and governor general of Canton Qiying declared the opening of Canton in January 1846.
- On August 29, 1842, the Treaty of Nanjing was signed. The British extracted what they wished from China at gunpoint. Ironically, though the war was fought over opium, the treaty did not mention opium at all. A supplementary treaty, the Treaty of Bogue was signed on October 8, 1843. Soon France and America requested China for similar treaties.
- A relatively minor incident, the Arrow incident, was the spark that ignited the Second Opium War. During the war, Anglo-French joint forces defeated the Chinese forces and marched into Beijing on October 8, 1860. The Qing Emperor Xianfeng fled to Jehol with the imperial court, after appointing his half brother Prince Gong as the imperial envoy with full authority to negotiate with the foreign victors on behalf of the Qing government.
- The war ended with another humiliating treaty, the Convention of Peking signed on October 24, 1860.
- The treaties imposed on China were unequal and extremely malicious. As is evident from the treaty clauses, all concessions in each treaty were one sided. The imperialist powers only took concessions from China, but did not commit anything in return.
- The Opium Wars and the resulting unequal treaties transformed China from a prosperous regional superpower to a semi-colonial entity.

### 3.5 KEY WORDS

- **Lorcha**: Lorcha is a kind of light vessel that has Chinese style sails and a European style hull. It was developed around 1550 in Macau. This hybrid type vessel sailed faster than traditional ships. British traders began to use it after the First Opium War.
- **Kowtow**: Kowtow is the English pronunciation of koutou and ketou. In Chinese, ‘kou’ means to knock, ‘ke’ means to touch upon (a surface) and ‘tou’ means head. Kowtow is a ritual to show reverence to God, respect to elders or submission to the sovereign. The Chinese performed different forms of kowtow on different occasions. Generally, kowtow involves kneeling and bowing, sometimes so low as to touch the forehead to the ground.
- **Cohong**: Cohong is the English name of Gonghang. In Chinese, ‘gong’ means public and ‘hang’ means profession. The proprietors were government appointed agents, thus they were engaged in public (gong), and not private
trading, and it was their profession (hang). Hence they named the guild ‘Gonghang’.

### 3.6 SELF ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

**Short Answer Questions**

1. Why were the treaties signed after the Second Opium War called ‘unequal’?
2. Mention the outcome of the Second Opium War.
3. What role did opium play in the Second Opium War?
4. Write a short note on the significance of the Opium Wars for China’s future.

**Long Answer Questions**

1. Describe the incidents that led to the Second Opium War. Why did the Chinese act the way they did?
2. Discuss the factors that led to the Second Opium War.
3. Discuss the features and significance of the Treaty of Tientsin.

### 3.7 FURTHER READINGS


UNIT 4 WESTERN INFLUENCE IN JAPAN

4.0 INTRODUCTION

In this unit, you will learn about the Western influence on Japan in the second half of the nineteenth century. In 1853, Commodore Matthew Perry led a US expedition to Japan. The mission of the expedition was to open Japan to trade and other relationships with the US. Earlier, Japan’s exchange with the West was strictly limited and controlled through the port of Nagasaki and was confined to trade with the Dutch. The vast majority of Japanese knew little of the West. The government’s policy was to close the country from any unnecessary exchange with the West. Perry arrived in Japan with documents from US president Millard Fillmore and the express intent of negotiating a treaty to initiate trade relations between the two countries.

4.1 OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit, you will be able to:

- Analyse the early westernization of Japan and the background of US-Japan relations
- Discuss the role of Mathew Perry Mission in the US-Japan relations
- Describe the features of the Japan’s Treaty of Kanagawa with the United States
Western Influence in Japan

4.2 EARLY WESTERNIZATION OF JAPAN

It is an undisputable fact that Japan changed more in the four and a half decades to 1900 since the arrival of Commodore Perry in Shimoda in 1853 than in the three centuries of Tokugawa control. The Tokugawa regime attempted to seal Japan to the outside world to prevent change, while the Meiji leaders strove to execute change. The reason and motivation for this change was the Western threat to Japan’s sovereignty itself and the need to reverse the unequal treaties imposed on Japan in the 1850s.

Under the slogans of fukoku kyohei (Enrich the country, strengthen the military) and bunmeikaika (Civilization and Enlightenment), the Meiji leadership attempted to industrialize the nation and strengthen the army to protect national independence. Later the movement for civilization and enlightenment, adopted by government and intelligentsia, hoped to impress on the West that Japan was now an equal partner in world affairs and so could set its own tariffs and administer its own laws to Japanese and foreigners alike.

4.2.1 Japanese – US Relation: Mathew Perry Mission

Japan’s first contact with the West was in 1543, when Portuguese traders arrived in Japan. Thereafter, Spanish and Dutch traders regularly visited Japan for trade. The Tokugawa shogunate earned substantial profit from foreign trade. In 1549, Jesuit missionaries reached Japan. They converted some 300,000 Japanese to Christianity by the turn of the century. However, the large number of converts and their activities turned the shogunate against the Westerners. A large-scale purge of native Christians and foreign missionaries, stoppage of foreign trade and termination of the contact with outside world followed. Through a number of edicts and policies from 1633 to 1639, the shogunate enforced the policy of seclusion.

In the following centuries, the Western powers repeatedly attempted to open Japan unsuccessfully. The Portuguese made the first attempt in 1647, when they tried to enter Nagasaki forcefully, but they were repelled. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, an increasing number of other Western traders, particularly from Britain, France and the United States became interested in trade with China. They still had no base in Asia. Their ships came to Japan on their way to China, in the hope of getting a trade base or at least a maintenance centre on the island. There was a hope of trade as well. The urgency grew because of internal rivalries of these Western countries. The last of the unsuccessful attempts to open Japan was by Russia in August 1853. The West succeeded in opening Japan when Commodore Matthew Perry of the United States Navy threatened Japan with military force and forced her to sign a trade treaty, opening the country to foreign trade in 1854.

On July 8, 1853, Commodore Perry anchored off Uraga in the Yedo Bay with a squadron of four warships. These ships were called the ‘black ships’
He demanded that Japan begin to trade with the West. Commodore Perry came with the intention to apply force if the Japanese did not negotiate or if the negotiations failed. He demanded the right to present a letter from United States President Millard Fillmore to the Japanese emperor. Perry returned after delivering the letter, promising to come back for a reply next year with a bigger fleet. On February 13, 1864, Perry returned with a fleet of seven warships. Shogun’s representative, the chief member of the Senior Council, Abe Masahiro and Commodore Matthew Perry signed a treaty in Kanagawa, the Treaty of Kanagawa (also known as Treaty of Peace and Amity) on March 31, 1854.

Fig. 4.1 Commodore Perry

4.2.2 The Treaty of Kanagawa

The Treaty of Kanagawa with the United States provided for peace, the opening of two ports for supplies (Shimoda immediately and Hakodate a year later), for good treatment for shipwrecked American sailors, for limited trade under Japanese regulations and for supplies for American ships.

Viewed superficially, the Treaty of Kanagawa was little more than a convention covering shipwreck sailors and supplies. However, viewed in the light of more than two centuries of seclusion for Japan, the treaty was a remarkable achievement for the West. At the same time, the treaty was bad news for the shogunate as it exposed Japanese vulnerability, and lured other powers to demand treaties, compelling Japan to sign a series of unequal treaties with the foreign imperialists.

Within two years, three unequal treaties, the Anglo-Japanese Friendship Treaty with Britain (signed in Nagasaki in October 1854), the Treaty of Shimoda with Russia (signed in Shimoda in February 1855), and the Treaty of Peace and Amity with Netherlands (signed in Nagasaki in January 1856) were signed. The most favoured nation clause in the treaties made the provisions of each treaty
available to all the signatory countries. The total and enlarged rights held by the four countries in 1856 included:

- Permission to secure supplies in Shimoda, Hakodate and Nagasaki
- Permission to trade under the regulation of Japanese officials in these three ports
- Permission to appoint consuls in Shimoda and Hakodate
- Right of male residence in Nagasaki
- A limited extraterritorial jurisdiction

Shortly after the Treaty of Kanagawa of 1854, the United States sent Townsend Harris as its first consul general to reside at Shimoda. Harris’ main task was to secure a full commercial treaty. When news reached Harris that Anglo-French joint forces had just defeated China in a war and compelled her to sign treaties (the Treaties of Tianjin, June 1858), he convinced the Japanese that the Anglo-French squadrons were on their way to Japan to obtain new treaties by force. He persuaded the Japanese that the United States was offering a peaceful alternative, and by negotiating a new treaty with the United States first, Japan would obtain better terms. On July 29, 1858, Harris signed a treaty with Japan, the Treaty of Amity and Commerce. This treaty came to be known as the Harris Treaty. The Harris Treaty became the fundamental document in Japan’s foreign relations until 1894. European countries accepted it as a model for another set of new treaties they signed with Japan soon after. Japan signed Treaty of Amity and Commerce with Netherlands (August 18, 1858), Russia (August 19, 1858), Britain (August 26, 1858) and France (October 9, 1858). The five treaties are collectively known as Ansei Five-Power Treaties as they were signed during the Ansei era. The main points of these treaties included:

- Opening of five ports (Edo, Kobe, Nagasaki, Niigata and Yokohama) to foreign trade in addition to those opened in 1854
• Fixed import-export duties, subject to international control
• Right to foreign citizens to live and trade freely in those ports (barring opium trade)
• Extraterritoriality
• Religious freedom
• Exchange of diplomatic missions

With the signing of these unequal treaties the two centuries old policy of seclusion was abandoned by the shogunate. As in China, the unequal treaties imposed certain serious limitations on Japan's sovereignty. Anti-shogun voices became louder. Even the Shogun's family and relative daimyos rose to oppose the Shogun's pro-foreign policy. The people appealed to the emperor to take action. Shogun Tokugawa Yoshinobu resigned on November 19, 1867, paving the way for the restoration of power to the emperor, known in Japanese history as the Meiji Restoration, which is discussed later in this book.

Check Your Progress
1. When did Japan's first contact with the West occur?
2. Who signed the Treaty of Kanagawa and when?
3. Name the treaties that followed the Treaty of Kanagawa.

4.3 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS QUESTIONS

1. Japan's first contact with the West was in 1543, when Portuguese traders arrived in Japan. Thereafter, Spanish and Dutch traders regularly visited Japan for trade.

2. The chief member of the Senior Council, Abe Masahiro and Commodore Matthew Perry signed a treaty in Kanagawa, the Treaty of Kanagawa (also known as Treaty of Peace and Amity) on March 31, 1854.

3. Following the Treaty of Kanagawa, three unequal treaties, the Anglo-Japanese Friendship Treaty with Britain (signed in Nagasaki in October 1854), the Treaty of Shimoda with Russia (signed in Shimoda in February 1855), and the Treaty of Peace and Amity with Netherlands (signed in Nagasaki in January 1856).

4.4 SUMMARY

• The Tokugawa regime attempted to seal Japan to the outside world to prevent change, while the Meiji leaders strove to execute change. The reason
and motivation for this change was the Western threat to Japan’s sovereignty itself and the need to reverse the unequal treaties imposed on Japan in the 1850s.

- Japan’s first contact with the West was in 1543, when Portuguese traders arrived in Japan. Thereafter, Spanish and Dutch traders regularly visited Japan for trade.

- Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, an increasing number of other Western traders, particularly from Britain, France and the United States became interested in trade with China. They still had no base in Asia.

- The West succeeded in opening Japan when Commodore Matthew Perry of the United States Navy threatened Japan with military force and forced her to sign a trade treaty, opening the country to foreign trade in 1854.

- Commodore Perry came with the intention to apply force if the Japanese did not negotiate or if the negotiations failed. He demanded the right to present a letter from United States President Millard Fillmore to the Japanese emperor.

- The chief member of the Senior Council, Abe Masahiro and Commodore Matthew Perry signed a treaty in Kanagawa, the Treaty of Kanagawa (also known as Treaty of Peace and Amity) on March 31, 1854.

- The Treaty of Kanagawa with the United States provided for peace, the opening of two ports for supplies (Shimoda immediately and Hakodate a year later), for good treatment for shipwrecked American sailors, for limited trade under Japanese regulations and for supplies for American ships.

- Following the Treaty of Kanagawa, three unequal treaties, the Anglo-Japanese Friendship Treaty with Britain (signed in Nagasaki in October 1854), the Treaty of Shimoda with Russia (signed in Shimoda in February 1855), and the Treaty of Peace and Amity with Netherlands (signed in Nagasaki in January 1856).

### 4.5 KEY WORDS

- **Perry Expedition**: It was a diplomatic and military expedition to Bakumatsu period Japan, involving two separate trips by warships of the United States Navy, which took place during 1853–54.

- **Treaty of Kanagawa (Perry Convention)**: It was Japan’s first treaty with a Western nation, marking the end of Japan’s period of seclusion.

- **Treaty of Shimoda**: It was the first treaty between the Russian Empire, and the Empire of Japan, then under the administration of the Tokugawa shogunate.
4.6 SELF ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

Short Answer Questions
1. What was Japan’s approach to trade with the West before the Commodore Perry Mission?
2. List the main points of the treaties that followed the Treaty of Kanagawa.

Long Answer Questions
1. Discuss the characteristics and significance of the Perry Mission to Japan.
2. Critically analyse the significance of the Treaty of Kanagawa.

4.7 FURTHER READINGS

In this unit, you will study about the causes and significance of Meiji restoration, Japan’s relation with Korea and constitutional movement in Japan.
5.1 OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit, you will be able to:

- Explain the causes of Meiji Restoration
- Give an account of constitutional and social changes in Meiji regime
- State the basic reason for military reorganization
- Discuss the emergence of Modern Japanese Party System
- Prepare an overview of the constitutional movement in Japan

5.2 MEIJI RESTORATION: CAUSES AND SIGNIFICANCE

The Meiji Restoration propelled a turning point in the history of Japan. The incident not only marked the shift of power within the traditional power structure, in a broader perspective, the feudal lords were robbed of their power and a modern state under the monarch was established. Several reformists’ steps were taken by the Restoration leaders to strengthen the central institutions. The changes put Japan on the road to regional and world power. The Restoration, hence, constituted a major event for the history of Japan, East Asia, and the world. The work of historians has been undergirded by a vast apparatus of sources preserved by a history-minded government concerned with its own origins, and the scholarship that has been produced illuminates the intellectual history of Japan’s most recent century.

5.2.1 Japan’s Political Crisis of 1860

Japan’s political crisis of the 1860s was preceded by serious internal difficulties and foreign danger that brought to mind formulations of Chinese historians who habitually coupled internal decline with border incursions made possible by that decline: ‘troubles within, disaster from without’.

- In the absence of foreign aggravation, the possibility of an internal upheaval sufficient to bring about the collapse of the feudal order remained uncertain.
- What is clear, however, is that the almost total isolation of Japan before its ‘opening’ by the West served to magnify the consequence of the foreign impact in the public imagination.
- The regime’s internal difficulties came into striking focus during the years of the Tempo period (1830-44), during which years Japan was devastated by crop failures that caused ruinous famines in central and northern areas.
- The most spectacular revolt of this period was one led by a Confucian samurai official in Osaka, Oshio Heihachirō, whose emotional call to
insurrection made him a hero for later historians who sometimes dated the loyalist revolts from his manifesto.

- Oshio’s uprising resulted in little more than the burning of large areas of Osaka, but the striking incompetence shown by Bakufu officials in its suppression contrasted with his own courageous performance to symbolize what was wrong with the regime.

- Oshio’s revolt, led by samurai and centered in the second most important city of the land, provided a national shock, but it was only one of the many risings in that period. Peasant insurrections and urban ‘smashing’ had tended to grow in size with the interrelationships of Japan’s increasingly close-knit economy, and popular risings often moved rapidly along lines of communication.

- The agricultural technologist Okura Nagatsune (1768-1856), the rural reformer Ninomiya Sontoku (1787-1856), with his plans for mutual cooperatives, and Ohara Yugaku (1798-1858) all worked to restore the healthy conditions of the rural areas.

- All three focused on the reclamation of land left fallow, whether by bad governance or famine or migration. Their teachings were usually moralistic and pietistic, stressing the maintenance and care of land as an essential part of filial piety and ancestral obligation.

- The appearance of genuine rural leaders of this sort testified to a rising level of scholarship and leadership among the commoner elite throughout the Japanese countryside.

- Reforms in some of the larger domains, notably Satsuma and Choshu, were somewhat more successful, but none fully met its goals. The Bakufu’s failure was particularly important, for its inability to raise its revenues augured ill for the greater crises that lay ahead.

- Nevertheless the ambitious, though abortive, plans for more intensive bureaucratic control of society have provided the basis for some historians’ interpretations of the Tempo years as inaugurating late-feudal 19th-century ‘absolutism.’ Although judgments of these issues differ sharply, undoubtedly the future Meiji leaders, ‘men of Tempo’ who experienced that turmoil in their early years, built on those lessons to their loss or gain.

- Central authority, as Harold Bolitho’s study of the fudai daimyo points out, had not grown; if anything, the shift from strong to weak Shoguns had resulted in bureaucratic immobility. Mizuno’s effort during the Tempo reforms to reclaim some vassals’ holdings roused a storm of complaint, and yet his abortive efforts anticipated the measures that would be found necessary by future reformers when the crisis deepened in the 1860s.

- The once pragmatic Bakufu had become a rather fine-tuned instrument that found it difficult to proceed without the cooperation of a number of distinct
interest groups. Institutionally it remained pre-modern. The senior counselors served on cycles of monthly rotation, and the adoption of regular responsibilities and the abolition of the rotation system came only on the eve of the Tokugawa fall in 1867.

- Internal dissatisfaction and bureaucratic rigidity may not have reached the levels that characterized contemporary China, but both regimes operated in a setting in which custom and precedent placed limitations on central power. More important, both regimes were limited by an inadequate governmental share of the nation’s product.
- The precedents set by the ancestors and the barriers set by established and deeply routine patterns of administration made it difficult to initiate radical change. The Bakufu, though charged with the responsibility for the national defense, had access to only the income of its own lands.
- A Shogunal procession to Kyoto in the 1860s required most of its regular cash income for that year, and the cost of restoring traditional preparedness and purchasing modern arms was soon to become prohibitive.
- The crisis in foreign affairs that followed the Tempo years is explained by William Beasley as thus: ‘it was a crisis that had been developing for decades.’

The danger of unsettling elements

A growing consciousness of the foreign danger had been one of the unsettling elements in the 19th-century climate of opinion among informed intellectuals. The defeat of China in the Opium War of 1838–42 brought this consciousness home to a far larger public. The Japanese had ready knowledge of that disaster through the messages brought by Dutch and Chinese merchants to Nagasaki, and Chinese accounts.

In a secluded island country whose great metropolises were collection points for the literate elite of all sectors, speculation inevitably led to uneasy fears that imperialist flotillas would next come to Japan. Such consciousness had also been advanced by changes in the world of thought. The nativist thought of national scholarship moved in increasingly extreme directions in the 19th century.

A new and compulsive ethnicity was in formulation, still pre-modern and perhaps only proto-nationalistic. This thought lay at hand as a potent incitation to alarm and indignation when once the sacred soil and sparkling waters of Japan might be sullied by foreign boots and hulls. Knowledge about the West, and consequently informed awareness of its capability, was also available through the rise of Western learning.

The practice of translating Western books was launched in 1771. The Bakufu did its best to channel such learning and also to appropriate that part of it that seemed useful, but restless minds and figures soon carried it beyond the bound of the permissible. In the Morrison incident of 1837 a group of ‘Dutch scholars’
concluded that the rude rejection of an English emissary would subject Japan to
great danger. The ship in question had in fact already been repulsed successfully,
but political criticism of this sort provided the impetus for political repression of
the scholars in the purge of 1839.

A third, and ultimately the most important, development in the thought world
of the 19th century was a growing concern with the imperial institution, which was
the product of the tradition. This cut across all groups, but it found its most forceful
and powerful formulation in a blend of ethnic and Confucian teaching that associated
loyalism with morality and justified—and even required—participation in the political
process under its imperative. In the slogan ‘revere the Emperor, drive out the
barbarian!’, loyalism wedded to anti-foreignism became the most powerful emotion
of mid-century Japan. Historical scholarship has often limited its consideration of
emperor-centered thought to treat it as a political tactic without considering its
substance, in good measure as a result of and in reaction to the use made of the
institution by the modern state. In fact, however, it can be demonstrated that the
development of loyalist thought had a long continuity in Tokugawa intellectual
history and was not without its roots in Chinese thought as well. The dominant
stream of Tokugawa Confucianism drew on the neo-Confucian thought of Sung
China, which developed at a time when the foreign danger in the form of northern
barbarians was at the forefront of scholars’ consciousness.

The anti-foreign thrust of Chu Hsi, neo-Confucianism had been blunted in a
China ruled by Manchus, but in Japan the non-functioning throne became idealized,
and it ended as the focus of ethnic nationalism. In samurai minds the identification
of ‘country’ with ‘virtue’ tended to make absolutes of duty and action. ‘Loyalty’
became a ‘great duty’ and the supreme test of the moral individual. This primacy
of political values became the more powerful because, it carried with it the
implication that it was the vassal’s responsibility to ‘correct’ or ‘admonish’ as well
as to ‘obey’ his superior. In the 19th century, Tokugawa Confucian scholarship
stressed a hierarchical scheme of obligations in which sovereign came to stand
above Shogun. Chinese civilization gradually came to seem distinct from the country
of its birth, particularly after the fall of the Ming to the Manchus in the 17th century.
Indeed, many 19th-century writers referred to Japan as the central country. There
were also trends in Tokugawa policy that gave impetus to this trend of imperial
loyalism. In the 18th century, the Bakufu, increasingly responsive to Confucian
morality, demonstrated its respect for the court by protecting and maintaining the
imperial tombs and by increasing the miserly stipends that the early Shoguns had
provided for the court and courtiers. Whereas Ieyasu and his immediate successors
had taken care to sever the ties the court had with the military class up to that time,
awards of imperial rank and title to the Tokugawa cadet houses now became
expected. Gradually extended to other leading daimyo, such titles became a matter
of prestige and pride and helped lead to daimyo-court connections against which
the early shoguns had guarded. Gradually and almost imperceptibly, the Bakufu’s
‘virtue’ came to be identified with its ability to protect and insulate the court and
country from outside contact. Sakoku, begun as a measure to ward off domestic
dissidence in the mid-17th century, ended by becoming a criterion of Shogunal
loyalty and performance.

Intellectually this package of patterns and ideals found its most persuasive
setting in the writings of a group of scholars in Tokugawa Nariaki’s domain of
Mito. Aizawa Seishisai’s Shimron (1825) provided in particularly compelling form
a warning of the power of the West, insistence on the sacred nature of Japan and
its imperial polity, and reminders that that superiority was based on the benefits of
the imperial family. Mito thought, and especially Aizawa’s book, became widely
read in the 1840s and 1850s, at a time when the Mito daimyo began to take a
vigorous part in urging measures of moral and material rearmament and in extending
his political contacts to the Kyoto court.

5.2.2 The Harris Treaty and Its Aftermath

Economic difficulties and military unpreparedness made it important for Japan to
avoid military conflict until preparations had been advanced. This required
information (gathered by the Bansho Shirabesho, the new Institute for Western
Learning established in 1855), money (collected through new taxes, forced loans,
and government economies), and political consensus to provide a time of quiet
during which plans could be prepared. The search for that consensus brought
efforts to consult, and thereby to educate, the daimyo and the Kyoto court. That
consultation had the effect of activating first them and then their vassals and
subordinates. Abroadening circle of concern among people who were often poorly
informed about foreign affairs but who were anxious to use those issues for internal
affairs came close to paralyzing government processes.

The Bakufu’s first response to the news of the Opium War was to relax its
standing orders for the prompt repulse of foreign vessels and to order that supplies
be provided for them when they requested them. This order, issued in 1842, brought
a reminder from Emperor Komei four years later to be careful about coastal defense.
However mild its wording, it was an early indication that the court would consider
itself involved in matters of foreign policy and defense. A letter of warning from the
king of Holland in 1844 and the Biddle mission of 1846 were successfully turned
aside, but no one doubted that more such would follow. Bakufu orders to daimyo
to be vigilant about coastal defenses were issued in 1849, but because of the
general financial stringency of the times, no real advances had been made when
the Perry mission arrived in 1853.

Abe Masahiro, an able conciliator who had been roju since 1845, sent the
Perry letter to the court for information and to the Tokugawa vassals with requests
for advice. Abe was aware of the need for change; he had promoted a number of
low-ranking officers to key posts. He also had a keen awareness of Japan’s military
weakness and had established an office of coastal defense over which he himself
presided and which he manned with his own followers. Abe tried to outmaneuver
the leading exponent of exclusion, Tokugawa Nariaki of Mito, by appointing him
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to a key defense post. The opinions that the Bakufu received from daimyo and lesser vassals revealed a wide range of views on the American request, but for the most part they agreed that conflict should be avoided. The Bakufu made its decision without a great deal of reference to the views that came in; it was a full year before it sent the text of the Shimoda treaty that its negotiators had worked out with Perry, the daimyo and the court. At the same time its orders to the daimyo had sharp reminders of the importance of coastal defense, and police officials were given sharp warnings about the importance of quick and ruthless action to prevent contacts between foreigners and ordinary Japanese. Abe seemed to have resolved the first step, but even his political agility could not conceal the change that was to come. In 1854 the court issued an order to melt down temple bells for guns, the first time in the entire Edo period that Kyoto had taken it upon itself to issue a national directive. Matsudaira Shungaku, the collateral house (shimpan) daimyo of Fukui, Abe’s father-in-law, and a leading figure in national politics from then on, wrote to remind Abe that daimyo respect for the Bakufu was contingent on the Bakufu’s respect for Kyoto. In the future, the Bakufu’s desire for daimyo support in difficult decisions would find it consulting them more frequently, and the court itself developed the tactic of suggesting that daimyo, or at least leading Tokugawa vassals like the gosanke, should be consulted again.

The Commercial Treaty of 1858 negotiated by Townsend Harris marked the real opening of Japan to trade and residence. Harris drew his most effective arguments from the disasters that China met in the second round of warfare (the Arrow war) that ended with the Tientsin treaties in 1858. Oddly enough, the Bakufu’s fear of following the course of China into foreign subjection led it to accept treaties almost identical to those inflicted on China. The debates about the Harris treaty next became inextricably interwoven with the problem of Shogunal succession. Tokugawa Iesada, who died in the summer of 1858, had no successor, and so adoption procedures had to be set in motion. The leading candidates were Hitotsubashi Yoshinobu (Keiki), an able young man who was in fact one of the many sons of Tokugawa Nariaki of Mito, and a still immature descendant of the Tokugawa house of Kii (Wakayama), the future Tokugawa Iemochi. Iemochi’s selection would be the more conventional, and in the manoeuvring that took place, reference to an ‘able’ heir was code language for choosing Hitotsubashi (later Tokugawa) Yoshinobu.

Hotta Masayoshi, who had succeeded Abe Masahiro as chief Bakufu official, informed Townsend Harris that the regime would need the formality of court approval of the new treaty before signing it, and he arrived in Kyoto to secure that approval in the spring of 1858. To his astonishment, the court instructions he received a half-month later instructed the Bakufu that because this was of utmost importance to the country, it should take up the matter once more with the three cadet houses and the daimyo. This marked the first time in the Tokugawa years that the court had presumed to disagree publicly with Bakufu policy. What had happened was that a number of leading daimyo, among them Tokugawa Nariaki,
had recognized in the commercial treaty an issue on which they could use die
court’s xenophobic instincts to influence Bakufu policy in the matter of Shogunal
succession. Henceforth it was proposed that the court may grant reluctant approval
of the treaty with the condition of selecting an ‘able’ and mature heir to the Shogun.
When Hotta addressed his second request for approval to the court, he was close
to having his way when eighty-eight Kyoto nobles joined to protest. As a result,
instructions to consult the vassals were handed down a second time. With this the
lines were drawn for a showdown. House succession went to the heart of
Tokugawa policy and was an internal Tokugawa matter.

The court’s second rebuff came in a context of growing exasperation with
Kyoto xenophobia and obstruction, and it brought hard-liners to the fore in Edo.
Shortly after Hotta’s return from Kyoto, Ii Hikone became regent and took over
the leadership role in the Edo councils. He now began a period of personal
leadership that had no real precedent in the history of Shogunal ministers. It seemed
to him that the reassertion of Bakufu control over dissidents was a matter of the
highest priority and that other issues were secondary. On June 25, Harris was
promised that the treaty would be signed by September 4. Once again letters
were sent off to the daimyo in apparent conformity with imperial instructions. But
when Townsend Harris brought word of the Treaty of Tientsin and speculated that
the British and French warships would probably proceed to Japan next, the treaty
was hastily signed on July 29 before the results of the new survey were in hand
and without court approval. Ten days later the Bakufu announced that Shogunal
succession had gone to the young Iemochi of Kii. Thus Ii Naosuke had decided
the two burning questions of the period within ten days, and quite on his own
authority. Ii now moved against the opposition. Bakufu moderates and foreign
affairs specialists who had come to office under Abe and who had favoured a
cooperative and conciliatory policy toward the daimyo were dismissed, demoted,
or moved to less important posts. The great daimyo who had lobbied through
their agents in Kyoto for the succession of Yoshinobu as heir were driven into
retirement and, usually, house arrest. Matsudaira Shungaku of Fukui, Tokugawa
Nariaki of Mito, Tokugawa Yoshikumi of Owari, and Yamauchi Yodo of Tosa
were only the most eminent of those punished.

Emperor Komei was furious at this flouting of his sentiment and even
considered abdication to demonstrate his frustration. He ordered that the head of
one of the three cadet houses, or the Tairo himself, come to Kyoto, only to receive
the response that the house heads were being punished and that the Tairo was too
busy with national affairs to absent himself from Edo. Manabe Akikatsu, was
designated as emissary, and even that worthy delayed almost two months before
setting out for Kyoto. The court struck back; its directive to the Bakufu, in a
totally unprecedented breach of channels and security, was transmitted to the Kyoto
representative of Mito and sent on to Edo by him to the consternation of the
Bakufu, which forbade Mito to divulge its contents to other quarters. At Kyoto,
low-ranking agents of the daimyo who had favored the Hitotsubashi cause urged

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on inexperienced courtiers in misguided efforts to have the court insist on a reversal of Bakufu policy, the dismissal of Ii, and a reversal of the Harris treaty. Ii Naosuke had his own agent in Kyoto, one Nagano Shuzen, who reported all this activity to Edo and helped provoke the counterstrokes that followed. By October, Bakufu arrests of those agents began. Umeda Umpin, Mito agents, and others were arrested in Kyoto. Hashimoto Sanai, Matsudaira Shungaku’s chief emissary, was arrested in Edo. The men arrested in Kyoto were transported to Edo in cages and under heavy guard, and were severely interrogated by a judicial board of five that sat for only the most serious offenses. The sentences handed down were unexpectedly severe and made this one of the largest crackdowns in the history of the Bakufu. Over one hundred men were sentenced. Eight were condemned to death, and six of them were beheaded like ordinary criminals. While all this was in progress, roju Manabe was working to wring approval from a sullen and reluctant court for the treaty that had already been signed. His hand was strengthened as Bakufu punishments approached the court itself, with a round of changes and retirements in courtier positions there. In the end the reluctant sovereign agreed that because the treaties had been signed, it was too late to stop them.

Even more serious and tragic in popular imagination was the fate of the Choshu scholar-teacher Yoshida Shoin. Yoshida began as a low ranking but brilliant student of military science. After traveling to Nagasaki and elsewhere he concluded that these places would not suffice to protect Japan. He came under the influence of the modernizer Sakuma Shozan and tried to persuade Perry to take him back to America with him for a period of study in 1854. After Perry maintained his commitments to the Shogunate and refused this request as illegal, Yoshida was discovered, arrested, and sent back to Choshu. There he was given partial freedom to teach in a village academy that came to number among its students many of the future Meiji leaders. Furious at what he considered Bakufu disrespect to Kyoto and the servility to foreigners shown in signing the Harris treaty, Yoshida schemed with Umeda Umpin to engineer the assassination of Manabe on his way to Kyoto. Arrested and extradited to Edo, Yoshida was executed. He became posthumously exalted as a martyr for emperor and country.

5.2.3 The Loyalists

The purge that Ii Naosuke carried out had resulted in his murder; the persecuted loyalists had retaliated by assassinating the chief Bakufu minister. These events ushered in a period of violence and terror that transformed the setting of late Tokugawa politics. The loyalists, known to their contemporaries and to history as Shishi - men of high purpose - became an explosive element in local and national affairs and ended by serving as ideal ethical types for the ideology of the modern imperial state and also as models for young radicals in future periods of instability. Shishi tended to be of modest rank, status, and income. Lack of status meant that they were little encumbered by official duty and office, which were reserved for higher samurai rank. They lived in a world that was less structured by ritual than
was that of their superiors, and communication with men from other domains was also easier for them than it was for their superiors. Because the Shishi were at the outer circumference of the ruling class, frustrations of limited opportunity and ritual humility often made them suspicious and critical of their cautious superiors. Poorly informed about the context of national diplomatic and political issues, they were inclined to the simplistic solutions of direct action. Calls for preparedness that accompanied the opening of Japan produced a lively expectation of war and led to a setting that was alive with rumor and that put new emphasis on the importance of the martial arts. Swordsmanship academies were crowded as never before with students, and together with tournaments they became settings for political bravado and self-assertion. The Shishi were men of the sword. The lower samurai’s frustrations often meshed with the discontent of the rural samurai and village leaders. In the countryside, pseudo-samurai pretensions were symbolized by swords, surnames, and rudimentary scholarship. These could combine with the experience of administrative responsibility to encourage critical attitudes toward urban-based but underemployed samurai, sometimes with the conclusion that it was the leadership of the farm villages that really mattered.

Shishi learning varied widely, but it tended to include assertion of the primacy of sincerity demonstrated through action. The Satsuma hero Saigo Takamori was steeped in the views of Wang Yang-ming Confucianism which stressed the identity of knowledge and action. Others drew on popularized teachings of Chu Hsi and Mencius to emphasize the meaning of sincerity and a well-ordered polity and to draw quick conclusions from Bakufu concessions to the imperialist powers and its apparent disregard of the wishes of the court. Although they were drilled in the virtue of loyalty and subordination as the highest duty of all, the Shishi also accepted the retainer’s obligation to correct his superiors when convinced of their errors. The Bakufu itself accepted this in its death verdict against Hashimoto Sanai. The Shishi were ready to condemn Bakufu officials for carrying out Shogunal instructions in defiance of the sovereign’s wishes. The Shishi began as loyal retainers, convinced of the identity of their lord’s wishes and the desires of the court. Ii Naosuke’s punishment of the daimyo that had advocated the Hitotsubashi cause and did then best to block the Harris treaty turned them against the Bakufu minister in the name of loyalty to their lord. In the southwestern domain of Tosa, for instance, an oath signed in blood committed a group of young swordsmen to a loyalist party in the fall of 1861 with a statement that combined indignation at the humiliation of Japan by the barbarians and the punishment of ‘our former lord . . . who, instead of securing action, was accused and punished.’ ‘We swear by the gods,’ the statement concluded, ‘that if the Imperial Flag is once raised we will go through fire and water to ease the Emperor’s mind, carry out the will of our former lord, and purge this evil from our people.’

At the outset, ethnic nationalism, retainer loyalty, and imperial reverence could be combined in a devotion that was relatively free of moral dilemma. But once feudal loyalty seemed at variance with imperial reverence—when the daimyo
chose the path of caution and pulled back from the loyalist cause—the Shishi faced a difficult personal choice. Large numbers resisted renewed subordination to their superiors through flight from the domain jurisdiction, seeking protection and employment under the aegis of a domain perceived as more committed to the imperial cause (Choshu long served as a protector of men from all over the country) or entering the employment of court nobles in Kyoto who had need for bodyguards, agents, and messengers as the political cauldron heated up. Participation in politics in this way was dangerous and often tragic for men who gave up the security of family, home, and safety, but it also proved stimulating and ennobling for many who contrasted the excitement of their new life with the tedium of the ritualized subordination that they had known at home.

The loyalists did not have a structured view or program towards which they were working. They had slogans (of which the most important was *sonno-joi* revere the emperor! drive out the barbarians!) but not programs. They were opposed to their authorities but not to authority; they were full of ethnic nationalism but only dimly aware of the possibilities of a true nation-state in which the two-sworded class would not stride forth as a special repository of virtue and privilege.

This point requires further comment. E. H. Norman’s pioneering study of the Restoration perceived a coalition of ‘lower samurai’ and ‘merchants’ at the center of the political movement, with implications for future social change, but more recent writers have differed sharply over the utility of this as an analytical distinction. The ‘merchant’ participation has proved even more difficult to examine. W. G. Beasley’s summarised of Restoration politics as thus:

> There is, therefore, a valid connection between low-rank below that of hirazamurai, which qualified a man for domain offices of some responsibility - and rebellion, terrorism, or the threat of violence. The ronin who were the placard-posters, the demonstrators, the conspirators, the assassins were characteristically men of lower standing than the ‘politicians.’ The same argument extends to others whose ‘claim to samurai status was tenuous or even nonexistent: the village headmen, rich farmers, and merchants who had perhaps bought the right to use a family name and wear a sword.’ Tokugawa status divisions had no provision for the political participation of such individuals, and to participate at all was to set aside authority and to ally oneself with kindred spirits who had at least some claim to status. Thus the Tosa loyalists included a goodly number of rural samurai and village heads or their sons whose normal horizons of political awareness would have been expected to be limited to the valley within which their acreage lay.

Albert Craig, who restricted his focus to Choshu, found the ‘lower samurai’ phrase imprecise and without analytical value since according to him ‘almost any large movement of samurai would by necessity be a lower samurai movement.’ ‘The samurai class,’ Craig concluded, given its disparity, ‘could not act as a class, a gentry’s class, with common class interests.’ Thomas Huber, who also studied Choshu but limited his attention to the students of Yoshida Shoin’s academy, defined
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5.2.4 The Court and Camps of Daimyo Style

The domains of Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa, and Hizen furnished the early Restoration leadership. With the notable exception of Mito, which destroyed its strength in a civil war, remarkably few other han achieved a clear-cut presence or identity in the Restoration movement. Among these, Saga was a latecomer and was co-opted only after 1867. It may have joined the charmed circle chiefly because...
its proximity to the port of Nagasaki, which it was required to defend, helped bring some able and experienced leaders to the fore. Consideration of the sources of Restoration leadership therefore leads immediately to inquiry into the special characteristics of a very small number of domains. If samurai constraints and frustration were roughly comparable in all parts of Japan, what additional factors distinguished those southwestern domains and the few others that counted in the late Tokugawa years? Factors of size and location come to mind immediately. Satsuma was second, Choshu ninth, Saga tenth, Mito eleventh, and Tosa nineteenth in assessed productivity among the feudal domains. Distance and tradition helped create pride and autonomy. Large-scale resources were necessary for mounting a significant military force through the purchase of Western ships and guns in the 1860s. Satsuma, Choshu, and Tosa also had disproportionately large numbers of samurai. Satsuma and Choshu had been on the losing side in the struggles that brought the Tokugawa to power in the early 17th century; they suffered a loss of territory and had compressed a large military force into a reduced area.

The three domains were also integrated territorial units with defensible borders along land communication routes that permitted vigilance over contacts with contiguous areas. Satsuma, at the extremity of southern Japan, was particularly famous for its own exclusion system. Each was a tozama domain, although Tosa’s status was special because the Tokugawa founder had installed a man of his own selection after expelling his predecessor. Consequently, the Tosa lord sought some way of combining gratitude with warning and worked out the suggestion for Shogunal resignation. Elsewhere, compunctions of loyalty were weaker. The entire samurai class of Satsuma and Choshu and the lower ranks in Tosa, many of them rear vassals who had served the previous daimyo, harbored a centuries-old resentment of Tokugawa rule.

Remoteness and secure borders made for a greater degree of autonomy and of self-consciousness. ‘Han nationalism,’ to use Albert Craig’s term, guaranteed that strong competitive urges operated to drive men on and to exacerbate fears of being left behind or out of whatever new political order might eventuate. Remoteness also made for a smaller role and presence in Edo, for higher costs and greater inconvenience attached to the central Bakufu control mechanism of sankin kotai, and for reliance upon the Osaka market over that of the Shogunal capital. Distance and size made possible relatively autonomous responses to Bakufu and imperialist demands, as when Satsuma refused to make amends for the murder by its retainers of an English trader who happened along its line of march on horseback (the Richardson, or Namamugi incident), and when Choshu tried to expel the foreigners by shelling ships along its shores without Bakufu authorization. These incidents brought both domains face to face with the superiority of Western military technology, demonstrated by the British fleet against Kagoshima in 1863 and a foreign flotilla against the Choshu Shimonoseki batteries the following year.

Remoteness had other consequences. At a time when money economy, economic change, and social dissolution were making the domains along the main-
traveled parts of the Osaka and Edo plains, most of them held by Tokugawa houses, less feudal, social and economic relationships in southwestern Japan were still backward and traditional. The higher ratio of samurai to commoners in southwestern Japan could also be used to inhibit commoner complaint or participation; this was particularly so in Satsuma. Traditional authority structures provided an effective base for efforts to bolster the domain economy, tap more of its surplus for the regime, and speed military reforms. The Tempo reforms failed in Bakufu territory, but Tempo fiscal and economic reforms in Satsuma and Choshu left those domains in much stronger position for the competition that lay ahead. In Saga, too, the mid-century decades witnessed a successful campaign to redistribute land equally once again on the lines of the old Heian kinden system, a ‘land reform’ program that spoke volumes for the ability of the feudal administration to control its most important resource. At mid-century the great fiefs of the southwest also enjoyed strong and able leadership. Throughout Japan able daimyo were few and far between in the late Tokugawa years and in Edo itself Shogunal power was entirely in the hands of surrogate bureaucrats during the reigns of Iesada and Iemochi. In Satsuma and Tosa, however, a fortunate accession to power of able men, products of the adoption system, introduced strong direction at the center. What counted was the presence of a generous number of unusually able and adroit subordinates in each fief, men who did not hesitate to speak their minds. This combination of historical, geographical, and economic circumstances helps to account for the few domains that took leading roles. But it does not explain why so few other domains, some more or less comparably endowed, took vigorous part in national politics. In Mito, where the loyalist teachings of the Confucianists and the personal prestige of Tokugawa Nariaki made for a leading role in the 1850s, an internal power struggle that destroyed domain unity combined with a Tokugawa affiliation to remove the han, once Tokugawa Yoshinobu became a Bakufu leader.

In Fukui, also a related Tokugawa house (shimpan), Matsudaira Shungaku’s early leadership gave way to watchful waiting and hoping for the moment when political conciliation would again be possible. But most daimyo—and indeed most upper samurai—witnessing the dangers that could accompany wrong judgments, preferred to conserve their resources and keep their counsel until the situation was clarified. There was no ‘anti-imperial’ party, but there was a good deal of suspicion, much of it well founded, that those who professed loyalty to Kyoto were chiefly interested in their own advantage. For Tokugawa adherents, on the other hand, the twists and turns of Bakufu policy made it both difficult and dangerous to follow a consistent and active line. The assassination of Ii Naosuke was followed by a series of efforts to bring court and Bakufu together in a new and more cooperative structure. It did not succeed. For Edo, as Beasley points out, it meant ‘a bolstering of Bakufu authority by the use of the imperial prestige,’ while to the great lords involved ‘it implied a renewed possibility of intervening in politics in the Emperor’s name so as to achieve, among other things, an increase in baronial privilege.’ Yet these efforts were important, for they led to the Bunkyu reforms of 1862, reforms

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which so changed the political balance of power that a recent study begins its consideration of the Tokugawa fall at that point. Meanwhile for others they engendered returned at the last to inspire the Tosa proposal under which the last Shogun agreed to surrender his powers in 1867.

The proposals are usually grouped under the slogan *kobu-gattai*, for reconciliation of court (*ko*) and camp (*bu*). The first of these to be proposed was put forward by Choshu, where the official Nagai Uta persuaded his daimyo to urge that a new agreement make it clear that the Shogunate ruled ‘in accordance with the orders of the court,’ which would thus set policy while the Bakufu carried it out. Having secured agreement with this in Kyoto, Nagai proceeded to Edo for negotiation. But there he was soon overtaken by a Satsuma proposal and mission that seemed to promise Kyoto a good deal more. This proposed pardon for all those who had been punished by Ii Naosuke in 1858 and dismissal of the principal Bakufu leaders who had held office since then. More important, the court would designate certain daimyo to represent its interests in Edo; the two principal figures of the succession quarrel, Matsudaira Shungaku, daimyo of Echizen (whose vassal Hashimoto Sanai had been executed for advancing the candidacy of Tokugawa Yoshinobu), and Tokugawa Yoshinobu (Keiki) himself were to be appointed to newly created offices. Yoshinobu, who had been denied the Shogunate, would serve as guardian for young Iemochi, while Shungaku would be Supreme Councillor. This set of proposals was brought to Edo by the court noble Ohara Shigetomi, and the escort was provided by a large Satsuma military force headed by the regent Shimazu Hisamitsu. These plans had antecedents in thinking that began in the years following the arrival of Townsend Harris under the urgency of military reform.

The great lords who had lobbied for the succession of Tokugawa Yoshinobu wanted cooperation to replace the costly control measures of the Tokugawa system. Yamauchi Yodo, the Tosa daimyo, had proposed a seven-year moratorium on sankin-kotai duty for daimyo at that time, and many large domains had developed steps for financial reform to make military spending possible. Saga had pushed the implementation of its land division program, and Tosa and Satsuma had developed programs for central merchandising of regional specialties to increase domain income - Satsuma with sugar from its southern islands and Tosa with its camphor and indigo. Modification of the ritualized alternate attendance at Edo would be the best possible economy measure.

Unfortunately the strains generated by Ii Naosuke’s purge and the enforced absence through punishment of several of the daimyo who were most important to the Ansei reforms had changed this pattern of planned cooperation into one of competitive assertion and rivalry. The Ohara-Satsuma mission itself was soon followed by a third, this time accompanied by troops from Tosa. While Yamauchi Yodo was still in forced retirement, his chief minister had been assassinated by loyalists, who promptly moved to the center of the decision structure that surrounded the young successor daimyo.
Takechi Zuizan, the leader and founder of the Tosa Loyalist Party, now proposed in his young lord’s name that the court nobles Sanjo Sanetomi and Anegakoji Kintomo precede to Edo with orders from the court that the Bakufu prepare to expel the foreigners immediately. These plans went on to propose establishing the Osaka-Kyoto (Kinai) plain as the private realm of the court, granting the court clear political primacy, ending *sankin kotai* so that the daimyo could spend their money for defense, establishing seven or eight of the daimyo of southwestern Japan in Kyoto as support for the court, and establishing a private defense force of courageous ronin from all parts of the country to defend the court. Costs of all this would be met by ordering wealthy merchants in the Osaka area to put up the money. This proposal was one of the most sweeping the loyalists put forward, and it serves to illustrate the way thinking became radicalized. But it did not get much farther, for much to Takechi’s surprise his former daimyo, Yamauchi Yodo, moved skillfully to oust the Tosa loyalists after he was released from house arrest. After lengthy interrogation Takechi was ordered to commit suicide in 1865 for insubordination. The Choshu and Satsuma initiatives, however, produced results before the Sanjo-Tosa procession had reached Edo, and the changes that came are known as the reforms of the Bunkyu era. These changed the political setting so basically that a recent study of the Tokugawa fall begins with the assertion that ‘the Tokugawa Bakufu’s time of troubles began early in 1862 . . . [when] a series of political changes . . . reduced the Bakufu to a secondary role in national politics.’ In terms of politics, the most important changes were the implementation of the Ohara mission proposals: Matsudaira Shungaku of Fukui was appointed Seiji Sosai (Supreme Councillor) and Hitotsubashi (Tokugawa) Yoshinobu *koken* (guardian), the latter appointment specifically announced as made at ‘imperial request.’ Japan’s problems with the imperialist powers, the extent of court disaffection, the insecurity of top-level Bakufu officials, several of whom had been assassin’s targets, and the appearance of the strong Satsuma military force in Edo to accompany Ohara had combined to suggest to Bakufu officials the wisdom of retreating from Li’s insistence on traditional bureaucratic direction of Bakufu and national affairs. Shungaku and Hitotsubashi were in any event from Tokugawa houses, and the appointments did not at first seem an undue participation by outsiders in Bakufu and national affairs.

Unfortunately for those who thought in these terms, Shungaku saw his appointment as a first step in a sharing of power by the great lords who had been his allies in the succession dispute a few years earlier. He began by insisting on a general pardon for those who had been punished by Ii; having carried his point he went on to demand punishment for the Bakufu officials who had helped direct the purge. There followed a stream of demotions. The house of Ii lost its mandate as protector of Kyoto, and Ii’s retainer and adviser Nagano Shuzen was ordered to commit suicide. Soon additional pressures represented by the Sanjo-Tosa mission persuaded Bakufu officials of the need to show good faith with the court by extending the punishments to almost all officials who had worked with the successor.
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The 1862 reforms went on to a series of steps that were cumulatively disastrous to Bakufu primacy. The first of these was the moderation and virtual abolition of the system, undertaken in order to permit economies to facilitate domain military preparedness. The period of daimyo residence at Edo was reduced to one hundred days in three years. Many of the lords, freed from duty at Edo, now transferred their attention to Kyoto, which thereafter competed with Edo as center of a national politics. Within a year Bakufu officials were trying to undo the effects of this; two years later the Bakufu asked all daimyo to send their families to Edo as before. Some lesser lords complied, but the more important domains showed no interest in returning to the restrictions of earlier times.

By 1865-66 the great lords hardly granted the Bakufu the courtesy of a reply to its summons, and a Bakufu survey of Edo mansions turned up the fact that some of the lesser lords had gone so far as to rent their residences to commoners. Another step that was undertaken to repair relations with Kyoto involved a visit to the imperial court by the young Shogun Iemochi. No Shogun had visited Kyoto since the third Shogun Tokugawa Iemitsu had traveled south with a mighty retinue in 1634 to demonstrate his power. Iemochi’s trip to Kyoto was a dramatic contrast to that of his ancestor. Iemitsu had gone to Kyoto to show his might; he had acted to sever daimyo connections with the court, and redirected daimyo residence and attendance from Kyoto to Edo. Iemochi, however, went to Kyoto as part of an attempt to gain strength from reconciliation at a time when daimyo attention was shifting from Edo back to Kyoto. In one point the visits were comparable. Iemitsu had taken an imperial princess as consort, and the same course was now suggested for Iemochi. In an effort to further cement relations with the court an imperial princess Kazu no Miya was proposed as consort for the young shogun.

The arrangements were made in apparent disregard of her reluctance and that of the Emperor Komei, and the matter served to inflame loyalist indignation further as a demonstration of Shogunal disrespect. Iemochi’s trip was planned to be a short one for reasons of economy and politics; Bakufu optimists hoped that his presence would serve to reestablish the awareness of Bakufu primacy in Kyoto. It worked out quite differently; before the young Shogun could be extricated from the intrigues at the imperial capital four months had gone by. He was obliged to show ritual humility in processions to imperial shrines, and his ceremonial deference to the Emperor left little doubt of his subordinate position. In 1634, in contrast, it was the Emperor who had called at the Shogun’s Nijo castle. The Shogun’s position had always depended in the last analysis on force; it was therefore significant that Bakufu ministers now thought it desirable to secure a specific court authorization of Shogunal authority.
Unfortunately, that commission included orders to drive out the barbarians. Further instructions reminded Iemochi to consult with daimyo on major questions and to respect ‘lord and vassals’ relations. ‘Not since the Muromachi period,’ Totman observes, ‘had a Shogun been given such a patently empty title of authority.’ The Shogun’s visit was an important step in the growing transfer of political centrality to Kyoto. Within months of his return to Edo proposals for a second visit were underway; he was to die at Osaka, still a youth, on his third visit in 1866. More and more daimyo now established headquarters in the ancient capital. Kyoto became a prime object of political and military planning for the southwestern domains. In order to retain control of the capital the Bakufu appointed Matsudaira Katamori, young lord of Aizu, protector of the city in 1862, and as a result he became an important factor in the politics of the next decade. So important did Kyoto become to Edo policy that the 15th and last Shogun, Tokugawa Yoshinobu, spent his entire period in office in the Kyoto area and never once felt free to take time for a return to Edo. All this added urgency to the Bakufu’s economic problems. The Kyoto visits of Iemochi were ruinous for Bakufu finances, and the necessity of maintaining an ever larger force and presence three hundred miles from the Tokugawa heartland worsened an already difficult situation.

A fourth product of the Bunkyu reforms was cooperation with the great daimyo. This had indeed been at the very heart of the program of proposals grouped kobu gattai from the first, and it constituted the platform on which the last Shogun based his resignation in 1867.

The great lords that mattered included, in addition to Matsudaira Shungaku and Tokugawa Yoshinobu, a number of leading lords of Tosa, Satsuma, Uwajima, Choshu, and Aizu. They were intermittently drawn into conference to discuss court-Bakufu relations and diplomatic problems. In theory this was supposed to prevent unilateral, ‘selfish’ Bakufu direction. But the meetings, which began in 1862 and continued sporadically thereafter, produced no real results. There was no agreed-upon program of procedure, and the lords themselves were at least as ‘selfish’ as the Bakufu, usually retiring to their domains when things did not go well. The Tokugawa members, meanwhile, inherited the suspicion of bureaucratic ‘regulars’ in Edo.

The first attempt ended particularly badly when Matsudaira Shungaku, Supreme Councilor who had initiated the whole programme, resigned and returned to Fukui, followed by a Bakufu order that he place himself under house arrest. He was pardoned by the summer of 1863 and remained a major figure, but then and later his program of councilor cooperation had no real basis in regional interest and bureaucratic politics. As far as Bakufu leaders in Edo were concerned, Shungaku and the others were outsiders whose interest in and loyalty to the Tokugawa cause was quite different from their own. In addition, haughty daimyo had great difficulty in controlling irritation and overcoming disagreement. Confrontation was not a congenial mode of resolution for them. A system without provisions for retreat and conciliation found them bargaining by absence and boycotting meetings. Most
important of all, however, was the fact that the Western pressure left no slack for the resolution of differences. The insistence of court xenophobes on undoing the treaties clashed directly with the deadlines that had been agreed upon with the Western powers.

The Bunkyu program foundered most importantly on the issue of foreign policy. Throughout most of the negotiation about restructuring power between Edo and Kyoto, Japan was facing diplomatic problems and military threats that required more effective central-government decision making at the very time that power was becoming more diffused. Important figures at the Kyoto court never wavered in their distaste for the treaties that had been signed with the Western powers, and an inevitable effect of the increased attention to court wishes in the rhetoric of 1862 and 1863 was subscription to promises, however ambiguously worded, to get rid of the foreign plague.

The Ansei treaties opened to foreign trade Yokohama (Kanagawa), Nagasaki, and Hakodate and within four years (by January 1863) Osaka, Hyogo (Kobe), Niigata, and Edo were to be opened. Hakodate proved of little importance, and foreigners soon lost interest in Niigata, but Osaka was a national center and located, together with Hyogo, close to the imperial court at Kyoto.

In the spring of 1862 the Bakufu sent a mission to Europe to ask for delay in the opening of additional ports, and an attack on the life of Ando Nobumasa, just after the mission had sailed, underscored its assertions about domestic difficulties as grounds for the request. Trade had not yet assumed major proportions, and even Rutherford Alcock, British consul general and later minister, thought the request reasonable. A protocol delaying further openings until 1868 was worked out as a result. The agreement unfortunately unraveled quickly. Within Japan competitive jockeying for favor at court produced more extreme demands for exclusion of foreigners, while on the spot ‘exclusion’ in the form of samurai and ronin terrorist attacks on foreigners (and, in 1863, on the British legation itself) produced a negative response on the part of the imperialist powers. At Kyoto demands for exclusion were set in motion to embarrass the Bakufu, which then confounded its critics by agreeing to exclusion even after many great lords had backed away from the prospect of unsuccessful war.

The Satsuma regent, Shimazu Hisamitsu, emerged as a force for moderation. On his way to Kyoto in 1862 his men crushed a ronin conspiracy in which his retainers had taken a leading role, and upon his return from Edo he warned of the impossibility of exclusion. Unfortunately his samurai had also taken a major step in strengthening English policy by their murder of Richardson on the way back to Kyoto. Thereafter Hisamitsu was preoccupied with the impending threat of British reprisal (which took the form of shelling and burning of his castle town of Kagoshima), and he helped destroy the hopes for a successful council of great lords by leaving Kyoto for Satsuma.

In Choshu during this same period the pendulum swung from conservatism to radicalism. The initial Choshu initiative represented by the proposals of Nagai
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Self-Instructional Material

Uta had failed before the more sweeping counter initiative of Satsuma; Nagai was disgraced, retired, and ultimately ordered to commit suicide. By summer of 1862 Choshu stood as the principal protector and instigator of radical Shishi and ronin activities at Kyoto. In the latter part of 1862 Choshu strength was joined by that of Tosa after the loyalists had taken control of that domain. Thus it happened that, as has been described, the Tosa-Sanjo mission to Edo carried with it the clearest call yet for immediate and unconditional exclusion of foreigners from Japan.

The chief Bakufu representatives in Kyoto, Matsudaira Katamori (guardian of Kyoto) and Tokugawa Yoshinobu (Shogunal guardian), were inclined to the view that the Bakufu would have to announce agreement with this demand to show sincerity, and meanwhile look for some way of delaying its implementation, but the regular Bakufu officials at Edo were aghast at the dangers involved in even a verbal pledge of exclusion.

Edo leaders were operating under the guns of foreign warships in Edo bay and in fear of an English bombardment of their city when they hurriedly agreed to pay over to Great Britain an indemnity for the murder (by Satsuma men, it will be remembered) of Richardson in the spring of 1863, just as Tokugawa Yoshinobu was returning from Kyoto where he had agreed to a court demand for a promise of expulsion. It seems probable that Yoshinobu and other officials hoped they could avoid a clear deadline for action, and that even when they accepted, reluctantly, the court imposed date (June 25, 1863) they thought of it as a date on which negotiations would commence (and inevitably fail). In any event they passed it along to the daimyo but with instructions to avoid hostilities.

In Choshu, however, the extremist-dominated administration seized the opportunity for full compliance and opened fire on an American merchant ship at anchor in the Shimonoseki straits and later on French and Dutch vessels as well. Thus, the kobu-gattai programme ended in a shamble.

Check Your Progress
1. Give two reasons that led to the Meiji Restoration.
2. When did the last of the Tokugawa shogun surrender?

5.3 MEIJI REGIONAL REFORM

These experiments gathered momentum with proposals for an officially-sponsored trading company that would generate funds for Bakufu purchases abroad. The banker Fleury-Herard was invested as the Bakufu representative in Paris and put in charge of purchasing equipment for a foundry and mint. French advice (though not, it should be noted, French money), began to pour into Tokugawa circles about ways to restructure Japan’s economy and administration in order to speed modernization and build up power. Long before much could come of this, however, the Tokugawa forces were gathering in Osaka to carry out the second punitive
expedition against Choshu. When hostilities broke out in the summer of 1866, it was still a largely traditional congeries of Bakufu vassal forces that tried to contest the issue with the more highly motivated Choshu units. The second war with Choshu proved a disaster. Although elements of the Bakufu’s new units were employed, they were fielded together with old-style units from other han. The Bakufu army was a coalition of vassals’ armies, as had always been the case, enabling the Choshu warriors to select their target and attack the Tokugawa forces where they were weakest. Bakufu efforts to attack Choshu at each of its borders were poorly coordinated, and the forces were poorly led. While all this was in progress, the young shogun Iemochi died at Osaka.

When the full scale of the military disasters became clear, Tokugawa Yoshinobu, now the ranking figure on the Bakufu side, reluctantly decided that the battle would have to be broken off and seized upon the Shogun’s death as a face-saving reason for a cease-fire. Yet the cease-fire left Choshu troops occupying areas of Bakufu and fudai land, and it dealt the Shogunate a blow in prestige from which it never fully recovered. The defeat of the Bakufu armies by Choshu gave the Tokugawa modernization movement new urgency. The last year of the Tokugawa Shogunate saw sweeping changes that portended centralization, rationalization, and bureaucratization. Once Yoshinobu was fully invested as Shogun, with full honors and titles, the reconstruction of the Bakufu began in earnest. Foreign relations were regularized. Permanent missions were set up in capitals. Yoshinobu’s younger brother Akitake was sent to France as the Bakufu representative at the Paris Exposition of 1867, and plans called for him to spend years of study there to prepare him for future leadership. Appointive changes brought to office some of the most effective of the modernizing officials of the recent half-decade.

The entire foreign diplomatic corps was invited to Osaka for an audience with the new Shogun, who entertained them at a dinner prepared by a newly employed French chef. Western dress replaced Japanese at the Shogunal court for that occasion. Numerous requests for advice were addressed to Roches, and he answered during long sessions with senior officials and a private audience with the Shogun Yoshinobu himself. The list of questions covered administrative changes, taxes, military development, mineral resource development, and economic growth, queries about Switzerland and Prussia, and questions about the abolition of feudalism by European countries. Administrative reforms followed; these set up a sort of cabinet system with specialized responsibilities replacing the monthly rotation of all-purpose generalists that had been the pattern. New personnel practices were designed to facilitate the selection of competent officials, with a regularized salary system for government departments.

A great deal of time went into the preparation of diagrams laying out specific administrative responsibilities and procedures. Shogunal power in the Edo area was strengthened by measures to call in small nearby fiefs in order to rationalize and centralize administrative procedures. Military reforms were pushed particularly rapidly. A French military mission arrived in January 1867. Western uniforms were
adopted; obsolete forces were disbanded; and steps were taken towards the
substitution of a monetized tax on house vassals as the basis for a peasant
conscription system. Nishi Amane, who newly returned from study in Holland,
was ordered to draw up a more modern scheme of government and produced a
parliamentary draft that envisioned a division of power among the court, an
executive branch, and a bicameral legislature with an upper house of daimyo
empowered to dissolve the lower house.

As a result, it can be asserted that the Bakufu leaders were launching a
modernization program—perhaps a ‘Tokugawa restoration’—that would in time
have emulated at many points the programs adopted by their successors in the
Meiji government. Seen in this light, it can be said that the civil war of 1868 was
fought over the issue of not whether Tokugawa feudalism would survive but whether
its demise would be presided over by Tokugawa or anti-Tokugawa leaders. It
was no longer a matter of saving the Bakufu system but of replacing it, now that it
was collapsing. As Totman said of the period immediately before the summer war,
‘There was no longer in Japan an authority symbol capable of moving the feudal
lords. There was no national polity; the Bakuhan system no longer existed.’  Ironically ,
however, these needs were probably seen more clearly by the Bakufu leaders
than by the southwestern lords who opposed them.

5.3.1 Meiji in the Process of Restoration

The changes launched in Edo are difficult to evaluate, for they did not mature in
time to help the Bakufu; it is always easier to sketch reforms than to carry them
out. Nevertheless, the fear that they would result in a greatly strengthened Shogunate
was an important factor in impelling leaders in Satsuma and Choshu to try to
anticipate such success with efforts of their own to overthrow it. What they
particularly feared was that the administration of Yoshinobu would use French
military and administrative assistance to build a central government capable of
destroying the daimyo, with the Shogun serving as its chief executive officer.

In 1867, the death of Emperor Komei, of smallpox, brought changes at the
court as well. Though consistently anti-foreign, Komei had usually been well
disposed toward the Bakufu as represented by Tokugawa Yoshinobu, with whom
he had established relations of considerable trust. With the succession of the boy
Mutsuhito, the future Meiji emperor, court nobles had a new field for political
manoeuvre. The most able and important of those courtiers was now Iwakura
Tomomi, a shrewd judge of events and possibilities. By the fall of 1866 Iwakura
was writing that the court had the choice of siding with the Bakufu against Choshu
and, possibly, Satsuma, or manoeuvring to make itself the center of a new united
polity. Because Bakufu prestige and power were in decline, he suggested that ‘the
Emperor should issue orders to the Bakufu that from now on it must set aside its
selfish ways, acting in accordance with public principle; that imperial rule must be
restored; and that thereafter the Tokugawa house must work in concert with the
great domains in the Emperor’s service.’ To restore national prestige and handle
the foreigners, the country would have to be united, and “for policy and
dadministration to have a single source, the Court must be made the center of
national government.” In additional documents Iwakura sounded more and more
like the Satsuma leaders with whom he communicated, as when he wrote: “In the
heavens there are not two suns. On earth there are not two monarchs. Surely no
country can survive unless government edicts stem from a single source... Hence
it is my desire that we should act vigorously to abolish the Bakufu’ and relegate the
Tokugawa house to the ranks of the great domains. Some of this language was
echoed in future proposals, as in a Satsuma-Tosa document worked out in the
summer of 1867:

There cannot be two rulers in a land, or two heads in a house, and it
is most reasonable to return administration and justice to one ruler...
It is evident that we must reform our regulations, return political
power to the court, form a council of feudal lords and conduct affairs
in line with the desires of the people, only then can we face all nations
without shame and establish our national polity.

These notes of national danger, international prestige, and the need
for an effective, single center of government recur in many
pronouncements of late Tokugawa days. In fact Japan now had not
only two governments but even two Bakufus, given the presence of
Yoshinobu in Osaka/Kyoto and the more Tokugawa-centered world
of the bureaucrats at Edo.

Although such divisions of power seemed impossible to men like Iwakura
and many others, they also made it troublesome for foreign representatives who
wanted firm guarantees of their privileges and a clear understanding as to the
channels of power. Roches accepted the Bakufu as a legitimate national government
and devoted his efforts to help it become a more effective one. His British counterpart
Harry Parkes was not sure and suspected that Japan would not have a real
government until basic changes in Edo-Kyoto relations took place.

Though junior to Roches in time of residence, Parkes proved a ruthless
competitor, on one occasion forcing his way into a private meeting between Roches
and Yoshinobu to insist on equal treatment as Her Majesty’s representative. When
the Bakufu requested postponement of the second installment of the enormous
indemnity exacted for Shimonoseki because of the costs that had been incurred in
the preparation of the second campaign against Choshu, Parkes demanded an
accounting of those costs. When the Bakufu argued court opposition as grounds
for delay on Hyogo, Parkes demanded—and secured—explicit court approval
of the treaties by staging a demarche at Osaka in November 1865. When he saw
the Bakufu’s difficulties with its recalcitrant daimyo, Parkes concluded that England,
in a spirit of neutrality, should cultivate those daimyo as possible future power
holders, and he alarmed Bakufu officials by visiting several castle towns in the
southwestern domains, including Kagoshima. Parkes’s interpreter Ernest Satow,
probably the best informed foreigner in late Tokugawa Japan, maintained close
friendships with the leaders of the southwestern hart and wrote a pamphlet (which
was immediately translated into Japanese) arguing that English policy should work toward the creation of a council of great lords, of whom the Tokugawa head would be one, under the emperor, in order to secure binding guarantees of foreign privileges and rights. This private opinion was widely taken to represent English policy and seemed to be in the process of implementation by the actions of Harry Parkes. Thus foreign as well as court and daimyo opinion was working to exacerbate unstable national politics.

As the great domains shook off their subordination to Bakufu leadership, they began to negotiate private agreements among themselves. These were no longer the personal discussions of daimyo, as in the early years, but policy decisions reached by the bureaucratic leaders who staffed han administrations. The most important of these was an agreement between Satsuma and Choshu that was worked out early in 1866 to lessen the possible dangers for Choshu in the approaching second Bakufu punitive campaign. The agreement was made possible by the efforts of Sakamoto Ryoma and Nakaoka Shintaro of Tosa who provided their good offices. In February 1866, Kido Takayoshi, for Choshu, and Saigo Takamori, for Satsuma, agreed that Satsuma would provide its help in mediating for Choshu at court; it would do its best to prevent the Bakufu from crushing Choshu; it would secure Kyoto if necessary; and it would join with Choshu, once that domain had been pardoned, in working for ‘the glory of the Imperial country.’

After the defeat of the Bakufu armies at the hands of Choshu, the Satsuma-Tosa agreement that has been mentioned added another agreement. The two domains agreed on a programme for politics. The court should have full authority, and a council with two houses would be established in Kyoto, one chamber staffed with daimyo and the other made up of ‘retainers and even commoners.’ The Shogunate as such would be abolished. New treaties would be drawn up with the foreign powers ‘on the basis of reason and justice’; institutions would be revised and brought up-to-date; and self-interest was everywhere to take second place to the consciousness of the larger national good. This optimistic view of an unselfish future, clearly a legacy of the kobu-gattai persuasion, represented a Tosa plan to secure a peaceful solution to Japan’s political crises.

Choshu, flushed with its victories in the summer war, was still technically under the ban of both court and Bakufu and determined to exploit its military advantage in further violence. Simultaneously, the treaty powers were demanding action on the opening of Hyogo, which was scheduled for the summer of 1867. Once again the great lords assembled to discuss the crisis. Matsudaira Shungaku, Shimazu Hisamitsu, Yamauchi Yodo, and Date Munenari proposed to Yoshinobu that the Bakufu combine a solution to the two and proposed to the court a pardon of Choshu together with court approval for the opening of Hyogo. Yoshinobu, however, was inclined to hold out for the impossible condition of an apology from Choshu, but because Hyogo could not wait, he preceded to wrest approval from the court for that opening on grounds of pressing national danger. This stance confirmed Satsuma’s discouragement with even a reformed Bakufu and helped
produce a new Satsuma-Choshu agreement for a military coup against the Shogunate in the summer of 1867. The Tosa leaders, still trying to head this off with a peaceful solution. Tosa’s size made it fearful of losing out in a military showdown. Its relationship to the Bakufu, which had treated the Yamauchi house favorably, was also one of obligation and loyalty. All this reinforced hopes of a negotiated settlement by which the Shogun would agree to step down and become one of the great lords in a new councilor structure under the aegis of the throne. Similar hopes had been at the heart of the kobu-gattai movement since 1862. Matsudaira Shungaku reappeared on the scene once again. Sakamoto Ryoma, once a Tosa loyalist and then an associate of the Bakufu official Katsu Kaishu, subsequently sheltered by Satsuma and central to the Satsuma-Choshu agreement of 1866, now worked out an eight-point program that contained Tosa hopes for a negotiated settlement. The Satsuma leaders who willingly subscribed to this program in endorsing the Satsuma-Tosa compact in the summer of 1867 were quite willing to help propose the Bakufu’s voluntary dissolution and were prepared to use force if a peaceful settlement should fail.

These currents converged in November 1867. While Edo modernizers were pushing reforms to produce a more effective Bakufu, and Choshu and Satsuma leaders made ready their troops for a military showdown, Tosa representatives in Kyoto presented Yoshinobu with Yamauchi Yodo’s proposal that he resign his office and titles. The proposal contained eight parts. The court would rule, but a two-house council, made up of daimyo and court nobles, would be established; new treaties would be worked out; an imperial army and navy would be established; ‘errors of the past’ in procedure and institutions would be abolished; ‘wrong customs’ in the court would be reformed; and once again, self-interest would be put aside. Yoshinobu accepted the proposal. He did so without consulting the Edo government leaders and after almost no consultation in Kyoto. Clearly he saw it as a way of escaping his predicament of responsibility without power and retaining the power base that his reforms were building at Edo. Once the court accepted his resignation as shogun, the Tokugawa polity of 267 years formally came to an end. But there was still nothing to replace it. The council of daimyo did not materialize, for uncertainty was so widespread that only sixteen daimyo arrived in Kyoto in response to a court request for attendance.

The kobu-gattai movement proved no more viable in 1867 than it had been in 1862. Soon, large contingents of samurai were being sent to Kyoto; parts of the Choshu domain army, still unpardoned, were nearing the city. The Satsuma-Choshu plans for a military coup were still intact, and tension grew steadily. On January 2 and 3, 1868, an assembly at the court was convened, dominated by Iwakura and Satsuma men. Yoshinobu and his closest supporters, suspicious of what was planned, declined to attend. The meeting resolved to transfer the palace guard from Bakufu to non-Tokugawa hands, to abolish old offices, and to demand the surrender of Tokugawa domains to the ‘court.’ Yoshinobu, in doubt as to his next step, withdrew to Osaka. For over three weeks, things were at a standstill.
Court representatives ordered Yoshinobu to appear in formal contrition and surrender, only to have him propose that all daimyo dedicate a comparable fraction of their income and land to the court.

Roches offered Yoshinobu such French aid as he could muster, an offer that was not accepted, but neither was the advice of Bakufu leaders who wanted to fight. A powerful document from Yoshinobu to the court calling attention to Satsuma’s duplicity and his own exemplary behavior was kept from the young emperor. The former shogun’s indecision began to cost him the support of even Tokugawa houses. Finally, in late January 1868, Yoshinobu decided to return to Kyoto with a body of troops to remonstrate. His commanders did not expect to have to fight their way back; their formations and composition represented an unlikely mixture of modern and pre-modern companies. To their misfortune they were opposed and ambushed by modern Satsuma and Choshu units that stopped them and drove them back. The civil war had begun; force would decide the issue. Fighting at Fushimi-Toba went on for four days and produced a casualty count of five hundred dead and one thousand to fifteen hundred wounded. On both sides, units fought well, but the leadership and determination of forces committed to the Kyoto cause was superior to that on the Bakufu side. The Bakufu commanders seem to have let a fear of popular disorder keep them from using all their Western trained and armed troops at the front, whereas their adversaries had their best units at the right places. The Bakufu units, trying to advance along two narrow roads, one on either side of the Yodo River, had the harder task to carry out. In some units, morale was a problem, but others, notably those of Aizu, fought with dash and courage.

When the dimensions of this new disaster were apparent, Tokugawa Yoshinobu and his Bakufu army headed north for Edo. Within two weeks the former Shogun had decided against further resistance to his enemies, despite Roches’ encouragement and advice that he tries again. The Bakufu army was dismantled as the daimyo took their units to their own domains, some to join and others to apologize and submit to the ‘imperial’ armies that advanced from the south. In the spring of 1868, Edo was surrendered by the Bakufu official Katsu Kaishu to an imperial army commanded by Saigo Takamori. But the war was not over, for the fighting known as the Boshin conflict went on until May 1869, when the Tokugawa naval units that had sailed to Hokkaido and held out there under the command of Enomoto Takeaki surrendered.

The fiercest battle of the campaign came at Aizu castle in Wakamatsu, where the men of Matsudaira Katamori, former shugo of Kyoto and for long a thorn in the side of Satsuma and Choshu, fought desperately. The castle was put to the torch, and Aizu lost almost three thousand samurai in the war, more than the...
combined total of the opposition. After its defeat, the domain was broken up, and its ruling family was moved to a niggardly and inhospitable plot of ground unable to support the remnants of its former retainer force. Katamori himself was made a Shinto priest, guardian of the Tokugawa burial shrines. No other domain was treated as harshly, though a number of recalcitrant daimyo were forced into retirement and others into house arrest. Tokugawa Yoshinobu himself was ordered to retire as house-head and withdrew to Numazu in Shizuoka where he did his best to maintain his retainers. By the 1890s he had been received by the Emperor and restored to honor. His successor, Iesato, was the first head of the House of Peers.

The regime that replaced the Bakufu underwent many changes before becoming the Meiji government. Its first institutional probings came in the January meetings that maneuvered Yoshinobu into opposition. The same meeting that declared Bakufu offices abolished established a new three-tier structure of councilors, junior councilors and named Prince Arisugawa sosai in order to make the greatest possible use of imperial legitimacy. Gradually, however, status and office filtered downward to the samurai leaders of the southwestern han whose lords dominated the original table of organization, and as that process matured, the Meiji government took form.

![Fig. 5.1 The Meiji Empire of 1910](image)

The programme of the new government was enunciated as early as the spring of 1868, at a time when the regime was still seeking to reassure the doubtful
and enlist the wavering. In April, one day after Katsu and Saigo negotiated the surrender of Edo, the young emperor was presented with what became known as the ‘Charter Oath,’ five articles that bridged the transition from the Tosa proposals of 1867 to the constitutional order of the modern Japanese state. These articles promised the creation of ‘deliberative councils’ and the determination of policies on the basis of ‘general opinion,’ the cooperation of all classes in carrying out the administration of affairs of state, full opportunity for commoners as well as for officials, and the abolition of ‘evil customs of the past.’ They also proposed basing everything on the ‘just laws of nature.’ Finally, a search for knowledge ‘throughout the world’ would follow in order to ‘strengthen the foundation of imperial rule.’ This was a document couched in terms sufficiently general to conform to the social structure of its day, but it also held out the possibility of changes so basic that it could still be cited as authorization for the democratic institutional changes that followed World War II.

**Conflicts upto the Boshin War (1867)**

During the late Tokugawa Shogunate period, regional civilian uprising became widespread in Japan. Fed up and disappointed with the restraining regime of the Bakufu, feudal lords and even locals began to raise their voice and these quickly took the form of civilian wars. The West, at the same time, was undergoing tremendous technological changes. Rifle with breech-loading and even repeating firearms had emerged and Japanese army imported them from France, Germany, the Netherlands, Britain or the United States. These were being used along with traditional Tanegashima guns. During the Boshin war, most Shogunate vassal troops used Gewehr smoothbore guns. These guns were old and had limited capabilities, with an effective lethal range of about 50 meters, and a firing rate of about two rounds per minute.

The armies directly under the Shogun, the Bakufu troops, had access to the more effective Minie rifles. These were more accurate, lethal, and had a much longer range than the smoothbore Gewehr guns, although, being also muzzle-loading, they were similarly limited to two shots per minute. An ally of the Tokugawa Shogun, the daimyos of Nagaoka, had two Gatling guns and several thousand modern rifles. The Shogunate is known to have placed an order for 30,000 modern Dreyse needle guns in 1866. In 1867, orders were placed for 40,000 state-of-the-art French Chasse pot rifles, a part of which reached Edo by the year end. However, antiquated Tanegashima matchlock guns are also known to have been used by the Bakufu.

Improved breech-loading mechanisms, such as the Snider, developing a rate of about ten shots a minute, are known to have been used by troops of the Tosa domain against the Shogunate’s Shogital, at the Battle of Ueno in July 1868. In the second half of the conflict, in the northeast theater, Tosa province troops are known to have used American-made Spencer repeating rifles. American-made handguns were also popular, such as the 1863 Smith & Wesson Army No 2,
which was imported to Japan by the Scottish trader Thomas Blake Glover and used by the Satsuma forces.

5.3.2 The Constitutional and Social Changes in Meiji Regime

The year 1889 has been described ‘as a turning point in modern Japanese history’. Okuma Shigenobu (1838–1922), the foreign minister, had a leg blown off in an explosion. An attack was made on the czarevitch (an heir of a Russian czar, the eldest son) of Russia on a visit to Japan in 1891. As a result of the unpopularity of the treaties (they were opposed even by Gustave Emile Boissonade de Fontarabie (1829–1910), the French expert who had been retained in 1873 to superintend the modernization of Japanese law), they were not ratified by the first elected Japanese parliament in 1890.

The 1894 general election was fought on the treaty issue. Public opposition to concession strengthened the hand of the Japanese government. So did the cumulative effect of the changes which had intervened since 1868, and which, in the wake of the Iwakura mission, purposely sought to model Japanese legal structures on a western pattern. One of the conclusions of the mission had been that if Japan were to wring concessions from the west, it would have to create institutions recognizably like western ones and hence reassuring to outsiders. Codes of criminal law and of practices for criminal courts were adopted in 1882. Progress with criminal law was of course straightforward, as all were in agreement on the protection of the community against crime. Civil law was more difficult as it affected delicate areas of marriage and property. Hence a draft code, ready in 1879, had to be redrafted, and in turn a redraft of 1889 after a tortuous passage was adopted only in 1898. However, procedures for the civil courts had already been implemented by 1890, and finalization of the law code itself was in sight. From 1894, diplomatic acquiescence from other countries (made possible by these developments) resulted in new treaties radically different from those envisaged in previous negotiations.

The old treaty extraterritorial rights were to be ceded within five years. In return foreigners could reside throughout Japan, and enjoy widespread rights: excluded were only the purchase of land and, if agriculture or mining were the object, its leasing. Japanese freedom in settling customs duties would become complete from 1911. The concessions were prompted more by diplomatic considerations than by any corresponding readiness on the part of foreign residents. A consensus in opposition to the unequal treaties, while creating a sense of national unity, was of no help directly in advancing concrete decisions on internal political structures. The new pattern of authority in 1868 rather repeated the pattern of Tokugawa power two centuries before: de facto government by four han within a legally ambiguous framework. The lack of momentum in creating new constitutional structures contrasted with the rapidity of purely administrative changes. A national system of education was quickly created (easily achieved as it
harked back to a desire expressed in writings from the time of Nakai Chikuzan in the 1780s); the old han administrations were replaced in 1879–80 by prefectures, and new assemblies in prefectures and townships were, moreover, elective.

Samurai in a matter of a few years lost their legal status. This was not of itself difficult, as ideas expressed in late Tokugawa writing and changing practices in han as far apart and as conservative as Choshu and Mito had pointed to ways in which samurai status was beginning to lose its exclusive appeal. Japan’s first national army emerged: it was national in that all male citizens were, if selected by ballot, obliged to serve. Citizens could, however, buy themselves out, which meant that the army quickly became identified with poor regions, and the balance of its composition shifted from west to east. The first generation of officers, however, came predominantly from Choshu and Satsuma. It was a small army: its effective size was a mere 33,544 men in 1877-78 a tiny figure for a country of 33 million, facing a hostile outside environment. Meiji Japan was a society of school teachers and postmen rather than soldiers. Either lack of urge or financial inability held back any tendency to militarise Japanese society; the consequence was that early Meiji Japan perpetuated the non-military character of Tokugawa society, virtually the only country in the world to have been at peace for two and a half centuries.

The government, fortunately perhaps, as it proved in the short term incapable of the constitutional change necessary to legitimize sweeping reform, was constricted in its ambitions by acute fiscal constraints. This was despite the fact that it was richer than any Japanese government in history. The old land levy (the so-called ‘rice tax’) was turned into a real tax payable by all occupiers of land. It was the first national tax. In contrast to the shogunal administration of Tokugawa times, which held only a quarter of the land of Japan even if tenryo and lands allocated to its hatamoto lands are combined (and received a share of rice output solely on tenryo lands), the new government received an income from all of Japan.

Tax Reformation

The effective burden of the new land tax was not much different from the old land ‘tax’: first pitched at three per cent of the capitalized value of land, it had to be quickly reduced to two and a half per cent. In 1874 the land tax provided eighty-three per cent of revenue; other sources of revenue were few; and widespread innovation by a state with weak legal authority would have encountered resistance (the fact that the ikki of late Tokugawa Japan were prompted by resistance to fiscal innovation was painfully fresh in the mind of the first generation of administrators). Next to the land tax, the only source with a large yield proved to be the tax on sake. Foreign trade created a very small income to the state, as the treaties limited customs duties to five per cent. These circumstances acted as a constraint on creating an army, developing Ezo (a region which had defence implications) and supporting infrastructural and industrial development.
5.3.3 Commercialization and Industrialization of Japan

Japan was already highly commercialized in 1868. Entrepreneurs on a substantial scale existed, supplying distant markets within the country (sake, Japan’s alcoholic drink, meriting the accolade of early fiscal attention as a revenue earner); a well-developed putting out system in textiles outside castle towns had deepening roots in late Tokugawa times; and the great business conglomerates of Meiji Japan originated from Tokugawa models. The scale of such houses had been due to the concentrated nature of business through the marketing of rice in Osaka by daimyo and in turn their heavy demand for credit and foreign exchange. In the financial difficulties of Japan in the 1860s some houses failed. Four of the great houses, Konoike, Sumitomo and Masuya (all Osaka) and Mitsui (Edo and Kyoto) survived. Iwasaki Yataro’s Mitsubishi can date its origins to the years just before the Restoration.

The house of Yasuda followed later. The activities of these ranged—with some difference in pattern from house to house—through trade, banking, manufacturing and shipping. Political contacts helped, as in acquiring early steam ship contracts for instance, but success was due primarily to the possession of capital, and in all cases, old or new, to sheer opportunism. They were also beneficiaries from the forced sale by the government in the 1880s deflation (the so-called Matsukata deflation) of its early industrial enterprises. Japan’s rapid and concentrated growth in the 1910s crucially helped their deepening and diversification, especially into manufacturing.

Japan’s entrepreneurs at large did not need government incentives or subsidies, and the state in any event was poorly equipped to supply them. They were moreover motivated by an urge for profit, not by a special ethic (of samurai origin) often attributed to them or stressed in their own self-regarding accounts of their careers. Of course, the bigger businesses developed ties with politicians who had contracts to hand out. From the start, political corruption was a problem. Saigo, in every respect the Garibaldi of Japan, when he resigned in 1873 was already concerned at corruption.

Edo, with its many daimyo residences and temples, had been a city of gardens, and a metropolis of open spaces and beauty. The sale of property, though not unknown, was very restricted in Tokugawa times: in the towns samurai residences, temples and daimyo or shogunal property effectively sterilized huge amounts of land: the absence in the past of a market in sites or land meant that, once total freedom of sale emerged in the Meiji era, social and public restraints such as existed in the west were totally lacking. Unbridled development and speculation followed from 1868, Tokyo becoming a cramped, overbuilt city instead of the garden city it had been. All this change was not divorced from the acquisitiveness and support of political circles: the first generation of politicians on small salaries seems to have ended their lives as rich men. Okuma’s name was surrounded in his early political career by scandal, and much later in the inter-war years, the self-
seeking repute of politicians was a potent asset to the antidemocratic and militarist attackers of the political system.

The elasticity of supply of tea and silk is one example of this. Tea output centered on eastern Japan, especially in and around Shizuoka; silk output in more recent times had expanded in the upland region to the north of the Tokyo plain. The progress of tea and silk in the second half of the Tokugawa era had been a result both of refinement of existing skills, and of growing consumer demand. The commercial ability (much of it derived from the business acumen of Tokugawa times) evident in so many activities made it easy also for modern industry to make headway, once an export trade financed imports of cotton or once new technologies were introduced. Moreover, as far as expansion of its cotton textile industry was concerned, the real strength of Japan was not the external market, but the huge internal market. Population, accelerating only slowly before the Meiji Restoration, grew by fifty per cent between 1872 and 1914.

Though rapid, this was not in itself an exceptional rise; it compared more or less with trends in Western Europe. The real significance of a rise in population was that, taken together with some rise in real incomes, it represented virtually a doubling of the effective domestic market. In Meiji Japan, as in the Japan of the 1970s and 1980s, exports hovered around the relatively low rate of 10 per cent of national income. The driving force of economic expansion was the home market. One consequence was the renewed growth of Osaka; much business had passed in late Tokugawa times to new intermediaries in its own hinterland, and in early Meiji times to Yokohama which became the main centre of export trade. However, Osaka was able to enlarge its industrial role. It was always a trade centre, now it became the main location of the factory cotton textile industry. Moreover, while foreign trade was still in the hands of outsiders, the factory textile industry was a native enterprise. It reflected both a maturing of indigenous enterprise, and a new dynamism of the Osaka region. In the 1890s, the trade of Osaka (or more accurately of its out-port Kobe, formerly known as Hyogo) came to equal the volume of foreign trade conducted in Yokohama. The rise in incomes in Japan was particularly noticeable in the 1890s, and was evident even in poor rural areas. The perceptive reports from British consuls noted the change, and the quickened pace of industrialization and its spread from textiles to iron working, engineering and consumer goods at large, in the first instance, on the internal market; only later did exports begin to become significant. Some goods such as mechanical toys, paper goods and printed matter such as postcards made a world-wide appearance at an early date, partly because they were cheap but equally because they were not greatly inferior to western goods and sometimes their equal or even superior.

Modern industrialization depended on imports of raw materials. Imports came largely from Asia, either directly from British India, or from Shanghai as a gathering point for much of the trade of the orient, and in the foreign community (even in the case of the British community, the largest expatriate one in Meiji
Japan) Chinese heavily outnumbered other nationalities, thus perpetuating or – more accurately – reconstructing a pattern of Tokugawa times in Nagasaki. The trade imbalances of the 1860s, caused by war within Japan and bad harvests, were quickly righted. Exports then rose more rapidly than imports; given the imperfections of early statistics, the early imbalance may have been overstated.

The robustness of the new economy lay in its elastic exports, which were essential to finance imports, and which ensured that reliance on foreign capital was slight except in the very first years or much later in the exceptional circumstances of the Russian war in 1904–05 and its aftermath.

The strength of the export trade lay not in new products (cotton yarn began to appear only in the 1880s and cotton cloth in the 1890s and at first in modest quantities), but in traditional products such as tea and silk. As early as 1862 the British consular report from Kanagawa had noted that ‘the rapid development in the exportation of this valuable staple [silk] at this port is unprecedented in the east’. The export of silk at the outset was prompted by the crisis in the European silk industry, caused by silkworm disease. In the long term, however, the United States was the main market. The success of silk was also helped by the fact that in the western countries, per capita consumption of silk grew more rapidly than that of any other natural fibre from 1875–77 to 1927–29.

Tea was slower at first, but its export then expanded rapidly. Again, and despite rising tea output elsewhere in Asia which was taken by the growing Russian and British markets, it captured the American market. Thus Japan’s ability to fuel its expansion and to pay for the raw materials essential for industrialization depended on two traditional staple products and on their disposal on what was an entirely new market in the hinterland of what had been the tiny coastal strip of the ‘13 colonies’ of pre-1776 American history. In other words, Japan’s export trade depended less on the ending of sakoku itself than on the contemporaneous expansion of the United States. This outcome was in part a consequence of United States trade expansion in the Pacific Ocean once it acquired a Pacific coastline in 1848; headlong population growth and railway building followed to create a huge national market. Had this market not emerged, the effects of the ending by Japan of sakoku would have imposed rigid limits on imports and hence on modern industrialization. Japan has often suffered misfortunes in its history.

Economic diversification as measured by the importance of non-traditional industry in GDP was therefore slight before the 1890s. Manufactured exports were a mere 8 per cent of the total as late as 1888–93, though a healthier 17.3 per cent in 1898–1902 reflected the stirrings of industrialization.

Agricultural Reformation

If Japan’s elastic foreign trade was one factor accounting for Meiji success, equally important one was self-sufficiency in agriculture. Normally there was a surplus in rice. While the bad harvests of 1865 and 1866 led to novel rice imports, the future pattern was normally of surplus, at times a large one. In Osaka, still behind
Yokohama as an export centre (as its new industrial goods did not begin to find foreign markets till after 1890), rice was usually the second largest export. In 1888, because of huge exports of 155,000 tons (1 million koku), it was the port’s largest export. Thus Japan not only had no need of food imports but in most years had an export income, small or large, from rice. As part of its good fortune, in the quarter century following the Meiji Restoration, weather conditions cannot have fallen far short of the legendary Bunka years (1804–18), and for a population almost twice the size. Some years of course fell below the norm, especially in the Tohoku. But only the protracted monsoon of 1889, with severe flooding in much of Japan, led to widespread and severe shortage.

With harvest failures in 1865–66, coastal shipments to Hyogo had contracted dramatically in 1866 to as little as a quarter of their normal level. More strikingly still, some imports from abroad took place in the ports open for foreign trade. For the first time since the port was fully opened to foreign trade in 1859, a significant quantity of rice was imported to Nagasaki. In 1867 at Kanagawa 500,000 koku were imported. In the better organized trade of later years, imported quantities could be much higher in the event of domestic shortfall; in the half year to June 1890 in Osaka they exceeded 100,000 tons (700,000 koku). Imports would compensate for only part of a shortfall of twenty per cent or more in the normal harvest in Meiji times of 36 million koku or so. Yet no famine resulted. The countryside itself was changing, partly as a result of further commercialization, and by the growth of a more differentiated social structure. In particular, the larger farmers were becoming richer and were often involved more directly in marketing. They invested in land, often by foreclosing on mortgages, and also invested in industry. Tenancies had become more common, though the landlords of tenants were usually themselves working farmers, residing in the countryside. The outflow of labour, long a marked feature of advanced regions like the Kinki, became geographically more widespread and in contrast to the migration of Tokugawa times, often followed by return some years later to home districts, it was permanent. Low though wages were in the textile industry and stern the discipline in factory dormitories, they acted like a magnet for many rural girls. The Tohoku still lagged behind other regions, a situation not helped by a rise in its birth rates throughout the Meiji period.

Social Impact of Meiji Period

Birth rates generally rose in the Meiji period. While the rise is partly a mere reflection of better statistical information, it was also in part a real rise, promoted by improved economic circumstances and wider outlets offered by migration. However, in the prefectures of the more developed centre and south of Japan, throughout they remained stable and low compared with the Tohoku. In Aomori in the Tohoku the crude birth rate was 43.2 per 1,000 in 1908, while it was a mere 33.4 per 1,000 in Osaka in the same year. The infant mortality rate, a good indicator of living conditions, was possibly in the region of 176 per 1,000 in 1750–1870 and does not seem to have fallen in the Meiji period: the fall began only as late as the 1920s.
A sharp deterioration of social conditions in 1931 and 1934 after poor harvests showed that the Tohoku, still poor by national standards, had not shaken off its difficult past. As the national railway system came to be completed, Ueno station on the north side of Tokyo became the point of ingress of migrants from the Tohoku. The district around the station remained into modern times visibly poorer and less commercialized than other parts of Tokyo. The station and adjacent Ueno park has become in recent times the point of social contact among illegal or unemployed immigrants from central Asia. Apart from the 1860s, when exports were in their infancy and the need to import ships and armaments on both shogunal and han account created an adverse balance of payments (worsened by problems in adjusting the currency of a formerly isolated country to the demands of international trade), the export sector did not pose real difficulties for Japan.

The idea that the treaties could be re-negotiated to end trade concessions or less sweepingly to confine trade to Nagasaki and a few remote centers—much abroad at the end of the 1850s—was no longer seen as realistic. The accompanying idea of the late 1850s that Japan could restore the old status quo by a build-up of military strength—a belief which had been central to securing what was a broad acquiescence in the treaties—evaporated. This was an inevitable consequence of realistic appraisal of the formidable might of western powers and of Japan’s own puny fiscal, and hence military, resources. Political calculation rather than the brave and brash assumptions of the bolder spirits of the late 1850s held the upper hand. Defence issues remained sensitive, rapidly shifting; however, from the concept of defending Japan itself from encroachment to protecting or securing a stake in continental domains in danger of being overrun by the Westerners.

External issues were at times overshadowed by internal political differences. The messy settlement of 1868 meant on the internal front not only tensions between the great Tozama and the other han, but the perpetuation of divides which had occurred in the 1850s and 1860s within han themselves (two han had in the early 1860s experienced civil war within their boundaries; Choshu briefly, and in a more debilitating fashion, Mito). In post-1868 times risings occurred in Saga (Hizen) and Tosa (1874) and in Satsuma (1877). Only the Satsuma rising—internal strife within Satsuma and revolt against the Meiji government combined—took place on a large scale.

Internal Political Changes

More widespread and lasting than the risings was the emergence of political parties which were intended to harness both support for national constitutional progress and opposition to Choshu and Satsuma dominance. Itagaki Taisuke (1837–1919) of Tosa had admired the views of Saigo on both treaty revision and Korea’s relationship with China, but was not prepared to go as far as armed resistance. He founded political parties in 1873 and 1874. His 1873 party was founded in association with Eto Shimpei (1834–74) of Saga (who, however, in the following year led a revolt). Itagaki, his party interest temporarily interrupted by a return to
government, resumed his activity from 1878 stressing the principle of consultation with the people. In 1881 he founded the Jiyuto (Liberal Party). Another party was formed in 1882 under the name of Rikken Kaishinto (Progressive Constitutional Party) by Okuma of Saga, a member of the governing clique squeezed out of government shortly before this. In the main the support base of the Jiyuto was rural, coming from the larger payers of land tax, which ensured that it was geographically widespread. The Kaishinto was more urban and intellectual, and consciously modeled on the English party pattern. Okuma founded a college, the Tokyo Senmon Gakko (the future Waseda University), in 1882, which became an important centre for training politicians and was very open to outside thought. Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901), writer, journalist and newspaper owner who had already founded a college which later became Keio University, also attached himself to the party, thus further enhancing its urban and intellectual support. He visited the United States three times, was a strong advocate of modernization on Western lines, and his books sold 250,000 copies.

5.3.4 Evolution of Educational Systems

The absence in Tokugawa times of a state higher education system, of an established state religion and of state-promoted cultural values, far from being a handicap, was a major advantage. The Tokugawa School of 1862 had been turned into the Imperial University in 1877, an official university in effect for training the administrators of the new state. However, the first private universities rivaled it in prestige for other employment, and laid the basis for the powerful private sector in Japanese higher education. They also ensured that much of the educational system remained beyond state control. Thus after Kume Kunitake (1839-1931), formerly secretary to the Iwakura mission and professor at the University of Tokyo, lost his post for an article entitled ‘Shinto is Ancient Custom of Heaven Worship’, which in 1891 questioned in intellectual terms the politically inspired emphasis on Shinto, central to the refurbished divinity of the emperor, he found employment in 1899 at Waseda. The private universities not only brought in outside ideas (as all Japanese universities did), but also deviant forms of thought such as in the early 1920s Marxism or socialism. The universities left, despite official alarm caused by socialism’s associations with Russia (the security bugbear of Japan), a powerful imprint on Japanese teaching and intellectual thought.

Impact of Printing Press on Political Structure

It was also a powerful factor in overcoming caution or foot-dragging in regard to the introduction of the constitution, and gave weight to the discontents voiced by political parties. The activity or inactivity of parties, led by ambitious men, did somewhat less than justice to popular expectations. Awareness of this discontent explains why prefectoral and local government from the outset provided for elections and public participation. Public opinion was supported by a vigorous press (the first modern Japanese-language paper appeared in 1871). It covered a broad range of interests; its appeal was added to by the fiction it published, and the work

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Meiji Restoration

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of the great novelists of the end of the century mostly first featured in installments in the press. This aspect points to the fact that the rapid development of the press had been helped by the tradition of *kawaraban*, a form of news-sheet published throughout Tokugawa times by booksellers or woodblock printers, originally largely devoted to scandal or colourful stories (and sometimes engaging in political innuendo) and in the final decades of the Shogunate featuring real political news. Hence, public opinion was not satisfied with formal changes, and grew restive with the dominance of political life by politicians from Choshu and Satsuma which parliamentary institutions made much more visible. The term Satcho (a collective and pejorative word for Satsuma and Choshu) made its appearance in the political vocabulary.

With restiveness over this dominion and rifts within the Satcho alliance itself, the management of political life was bound to prove difficult in the 1890s. Government was now at the mercy of the fickle will of the people and the behaviour of parliamentarians. The lower house in particular had the budgetary powers of modern states, and hence despite some constitutional restraints, had, in theory, the ability to impose its will. To cope with the risks inherent in introducing parliamentary democracy, two steps were taken. The first was to emphasize still further the authority of the emperor (the second, considered later, to protect the continuity of the existing ruling interest). In the constitution, the imperial authority was dealt with in summary fashion, the divine nature of the emperor itself touched on vaguely in an isolated paragraph. However, the imperial re-script on education appeared in 1890. It was not, of course, drafted by the Emperor, and a re-script was exhortatory rather than executive. It emphasized the concept of loyalty to a divine emperor in a few words.

As Marius Jansen has said, however, the document itself ‘seems rather innocuous and platitudinous’. It gained its effectiveness from the general thrust of government policy, marking a further stage in the process, begun in 1868, of manipulating the imperial institution in defence of the legitimacy of power, and its timing was accounted for by the urge to reduce the risks of a leap into the dark with the introduction in 1889 of the novel concept of parliamentary democracy.

From the outset of the Meiji regime, in contrast to the older pattern in which the Emperor rarely if ever left his palace in Kyoto, a sustained program of visits throughout Japan was planned for the Emperor. They were part of the effort to build up the ceremonial functions of the Emperor, and in the process to create a public role for the Emperor unknown in the past history of the institution. As part of this policy, the Emperor also began to participate in the rites at the great shrine in Ise, a step which served both to emphasize his divinity and to strengthen the link with Shinto. The cabinet was far ahead of public opinion. A requirement of registering at Shinto temples proved so unpopular that it had to be abandoned. Policy also represented a break with Japanese intellectual thought. From the 17th century into the 19th century, writers from Razan to Banto had dealt briefly with the question of imperial origins or even had openly expressed skepticism about
the legends. Scepticism was still evident in 1891–92 when doubts cast on Shinto were the occasion of the dismissal of Kunitake. The issue remained a preoccupation of the cabinet. In 1911, in the face of school textbooks failing for decades to say which of two imperial courts in a quarrel in the 14th century had been the legitimate one, the cabinet decreed that the ‘southern’ court was to be identified as the legitimate one and that this was to be stated in school textbooks.

5.3.5 Emergence of Modern Japanese Party System

The ambition of the Meiji constitution makers, whether in exalting the status of the Emperor or in protecting executive office from direct parliamentary or political interference, proved powerless to halt the growth, or more accurately, the revival, of party. The 1890 election itself, with an electorate of nearly half a million functioned satisfactorily. Okuma had already rejoined the Rikken Kaishinto in 1889 in anticipation of the election. Other groupings were brought into activity by the prospect of an election, and Itakagi, reappearing in 1889, laid the basis of a revived Jiyuto. Many of those elected to the lower house already had political experience: more than half of them had been elected at one stage in their career to a local assembly. Nearly half of them too were drawn from the class of economically successful figures at local level: well-off peasants of landlord status, or local businessmen. They laid the basis for a more solid political system, and in turn led to the reliance of the parties on strong local figures for their grass-roots support: the strengths and weaknesses of the modern Japanese party system had begun to emerge (and the early Jiyuto well-illustrated how parties were factions rather than a monolithic structure).

The Matsukata cabinet in 1896-97 and the Okuma cabinet in 1898, in breaching, within the first decade of parliament, the Satcho monopoly of power, meant that even Satcho politicians had to endorse party for the future. Ito became titular chairman of the Jiyuto in 1900: its name now became the Rikken Seiyukai (Constitutional Political Comrades Party). It was a powerful party combining Ito’s authority as one of the founding fathers of Meiji Japan and the politically active rural interests: as the countryside was more politically aware than the towns, its parliamentary base was large. It dominated Japanese life for a decade or more with two of its senior figures, Saionji Kimmochi (1849-1940) and Katsura, alternating in the prime ministership for eight of the years between 1901 and 1913.

Revenue issues had already sharply divided the Diet and government in the 1890s; the costs of the Russian war strained the relationship further. In 1911–13 budgetary and specifically naval expenditure acquired a key significance. When a Saionji cabinet fell in 1911 in an attempt to cut back expenditure, his successor Katsura (a Choshu general) had to deal with army and navy resistance. Faced with blackmail from the navy, which refused to appoint a minister from its ranks, he appointed by imperial re-script a retired officer. This step, though actually intended to confront the vested interests of the navy, led to a barrage of criticism,
prompted by growing resentment of Satcho dominance, against Katsura for highhandedness.

5.3.6 Japan's Relation with Korea

In the 1860s, the British had been apprehensive that the Russians would push their frontier forward in Karafuto, that Japan would be unable to resist, and that the advance would have major consequences even for the British. Throughout the 1860s, tensions over issues of trade and defence in Sakhalin gradually grew into clashes in which some Japanese were killed. For the first time in history, two Japanese gunboats were sent to the northern waters in 1874. Because there was little naval and military power, no time was lost at the outset of the Restoration to hire steamers to carry 3,000 samurai families from the defeated han of Aizu northwards. They were settled on the bleak and under populated Shimotoka peninsula, facing Ezo, at the northern tip of Aomori. Less disloyal, though more miscellaneous and very poor, settlers were dispatched directly into Ezo itself. The population of Ezo was a mere 123,668 in 1872, of whom less than half were Japanese (the rest were Ainu). Security reasons (small army and small budget) and a belief in the economic potential of the region led in effect to the immediate act of the old ambition of Aizawa and Tokugawa Nariaki of settling the front-line lands. For defence on land the concept adopted was that of farmer-soldiers, settlers who would develop land and provide at little cost a defence force on the spot. The defence of the Ezo region was to remain wholly dependent on the farmer-soldiers. However, in the short term people were moved northwards, pell mell, with no resources and little thought as to how to settle them. Some of the pioneers both in Ezo and in Shimotoka died in the harsh spring of 1870. From Niigata, several trips in 1870 by a large American steamer carried a total of 7,569 passengers to the north. Many were not even settled as colonists; they were simply employed building roads; by 1872 some were even being shipped back, and few new ones arrived. Therefore, much depended on the farmer-soldiers introduced in 1873. In 1875 there were 198 families of farmer-soldiers; 509 such families in 1881. The number of soldiers, 1,401 in 1887, was 3,783 by 1896: in the first half of the decade they were rising at a rate of 400 to 500 a year.

Japan's first diplomatic course of action in 1869 had been to regularize its contacts with Korea. Its urgency can be seen in the fact that for the Japanese who since 1811, the date of the last diplomatic mission from Korea, had let the ties lapse, Korea now became a priority. While the Koreans in the past had responded favourably to Japanese overtures, their response in the 1870s was negative. Ignoring the dilemma for the Japanese that both the Shogunate and Tsushima had ceased to exist, they had no wish to depart from the status quo of a small colony of Tsushima men in Pusan, and for the larger issues referred the Japanese to China.

In contrast to Japan, there had been neither past study of the west, nor the sophisticated dialogue which had occurred in Japan for almost a century on the growing foreign threat. As Satow, who had close contacts with the Koreans (in
part because of his curiosity to learn the language) observed, ‘One cannot help remarking the great disposition the Koreans have to abuse each other, in that differing from the Japanese, among whom the feeling of comradeship is in most cases so strong’.

Check Your Progress

3. What was the process of fund operation for Bakufu purchases abroad?
4. Why was the transition from the Bakufu to the Meiji not direct and smooth?
5. State two social impact of Meiji Restoration.

5.4 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS QUESTIONS

1. Two reasons that led to Meiji Restoration were the following:
   (i) The enemies of shogun, particularly the Western class on Satsuma and Choshu, saw their chance and used shogun’s concurrence in the foreigners’ scheme and the imposition of unequal treaties to overthrow the shogun. They came forward, assumed the leadership of the discontented elements within the country and raised the slogan ‘Son-o-jo-i’, ‘revere the Emperor and expel the barbarians.’ It echoed and re-echoed in the country. Violence broke out everywhere and many people lost their lives in the violence. From 1850 to 1868 anti-foreign violence took place at several places. At this juncture the Tokugawa Shogunate proved powerless.
   (ii) The exposure of state’s weakness and inefficiency in the face of foreign aggression caused deep resentments among the samurai whose martial pride was hurt. They blamed the Shogunate for unpreparedness and cowardice and started a movement for the revival of national power. They rose against the foreigners. Their rebellions were suppressed by the Westerners. The wounded pride of the martial samurai now was directed against the Shogunate.

2. The last Shogun agreed to surrender his powers in 1867.

3. For an officially-sponsored trading company that would generate funds for Bakufu purchases abroad. The banker Fleury-Herard was invested as the Bakufu representative in Paris and put in charge of purchasing equipment for a foundry and mint.

4. The regime that replaced the Bakufu underwent many changes before becoming the Meiji government. Its first institutional probing came in the January meetings that manoeuvred Yoshinobu into opposition. The same meeting that declared Bakufu offices abolished established a new three-tier
structure of councilors, junior councilors and named Prince Arisugawa Sosai in order to make the greatest possible use of imperial legitimacy. Gradually, however, status and office filtered downward to the samurai leaders of the southwestern han whose lords dominated the original table of organization, and as that process matured, the Meiji government took form.

5. Meiji restoration had several social effects, such as, rise in the birth rate, drop in infant mortality and sharp deterioration in social conditions.

5.5 SUMMARY

- Japan’s political crisis of the 1860s was preceded by serious internal difficulties and foreign danger. The most spectacular revolt of this period was one led by a model, Confucian samurai official in Osaka. Nevertheless the ambitious, though abortive, plans for more intensive bureaucratic control of society have provided the basis for some historians’ interpretations of the Tempo years as inaugurating late-feudal 19th-century ‘absolutism.’
- The defeat of China in the Opium War of 1838–42 brought this consciousness home to a far larger public.
- Confucian scholarship stressed a hierarchical scheme of obligations in which sovereign came to stand above Shogun.
- Sakoku, begun as a measure to ward off domestic dissidence in the mid-17th century, ended by becoming a criterion of Shogunal loyalty and performance.
- The Bakufu’s first response to the news of the Opium War was to relax its standing orders for the prompt repulse of foreign vessels and to order that supplies be provided for them when they requested them.
- The Commercial Treaty of 1858 negotiated by Townsend Harris marked the real opening of Japan to trade and residence.
- At the outset, ethnic nationalism, retainer loyalty, and imperial reverence could be combined in a devotion that was relatively free of moral dilemma.
- Loyalists as such were brought under control after 1864 and required the cooperation of men who held power. Han policy was set by men of rank with access to the narrow elite that monopolized the highest offices. Those elite seldom moved until it was convinced that the perils of inaction outweighed the risks of participation.
- The entire samurai class of Satsuma and Choshu and the lower ranks in Tosa, many of them rear vassals who had served the previous daimyo, harbored a centuries-old resentment of Tokugawa rule.
The 1862 reforms went on to a series of steps that were cumulatively disastrous to Bakufu primacy. The first of these was the moderation and virtual abolition of the system otsansin kotai, undertaken in order to permit economies to facilitate military preparedness.

Kyoto stuck to Edo policy that the 15th and last Shogun, Tokugawa Yoshinobu, spent his entire period in office in the Kyoto area and never once felt free to take time for a return to Edo. All this added urgency to the Bakufu’s economic problems.

An inevitable effect of the increased attention to court wishes in the rhetoric of 1862 and 1863 was subscription to promises, however ambiguously worded, to get rid of the foreign plague.

In the spring of 1862 the Bakufu sent a mission to Europe to ask for delay in the opening of additional ports, and an attack on the life of Ando Nobumasa, just after the mission had sailed, underscored its assertions about domestic difficulties as grounds for the request.

Bakufu efforts to attack Choshu at each of its borders were poorly coordinated, and the forces were poorly led. While all this was in progress, the young Shogun Iemochi died at Osaka.

Yoshinobu’s younger brother Akitake was sent to France as the Bakufu representative at the Paris Exposition of 1867, and plans called for him to spend years of study there to prepare him for future leadership.

A French military mission arrived in January 1867. Western uniforms were adopted; obsolete forces were disbanded; and steps were taken toward the substitution of a monetized tax on house vassals as the basis for a peasant conscription system.

In 1867, the death of Emperor Komei of smallpox brought changes at the court as well. Though consistently anti-foreign, Komei had usually been well disposed toward the Bakufu as represented by Tokugawa Yoshinobu, with whom he had established relations of considerable trust. With the succession of the boy Mutsuhito, the future Meiji emperor, court nobles had a new field for political manoeuvre.

The Bakufu army was dismantled as the daimyo took their units to their own domains, some to join and others to apologize and submit to the ‘imperial’ armies that advanced from the south.

The Tokugawa School of 1862 had been turned into the Imperial University in 1877, an official university in effect for training the administrators of the new state. The ambition of the Meiji constitution makers, whether in exalting the status of the emperor or in protecting executive office from direct
parliamentary or political interference, proved powerless to halt the growth, or more accurately, the revival, of party.

5.6 KEY WORDS

- **Meiji Restoration**: It refers to both the events of 1868 that led to the 'restoration' of power to the Emperor and the entire period of revolutionary changes that coincided with the Meiji emperor’s reign (1868–1912).
- **Oshio Revolt**: Opposition to the Tokugawa Shogunate by Oshio Heihachiro, a former yoriki (a low-ranking samurai police inspector for the magistrates) and a neo-Confucianism scholar of the Oyomei (Wang Yangming) school in Osaka.
- **Warrior class**: The Japanese warrior class that provided the administrative and fighting aristocracy from the 11th to the 19th centuries.
- **Tempo period**: It is the period between 1603 to 1868 in the history of Japan when Japanese society was under the rule of the Tokugawa Shogunate and the country’s 300 regional daimyo.
- **Rangaku**: It refers to the concerted effort by Japanese scholars during the late Tokugawa period (late 18th-19th century) to learn the Dutch language so as to be able to learn Western technology.

5.7 SELF ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

**Short Answer Questions**
1. What reforms were undertaken by the Meijis?
2. List the features of the Meiji Constitution.
3. Write a short note on industrialization during the Meiji period.
4. Mention the significance of constitutional movement in Japan.

**Long Answer Questions**
1. What caused the Meiji Restoration?
2. Give a detailed account of Meiji reforms.
3. Explain the important events involved in the Boshin War.
4. Analyse Japan’s relation with Korea.
5.8 FURTHER READINGS


UNIT 6  THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR
OF 1894-95

6.0 INTRODUCTION

Conflict between Japan and China resulted in the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95. This also marked the emergence of Japan as a major world power and demonstrated the weakness of the Chinese empire. The war grew out of conflict between the two countries for supremacy in Korea. Although Korea had been China’s most important client state, its strategic location opposite the Japanese islands and its natural resources of coal and iron attracted Japan’s interest. In the meantime, Japan had started adopting the Western technology. In 1875, Japan forced Korea to open itself to foreign, especially Japanese, trade and to declare itself independent from China in its foreign relations. Japanese troops seized the Korean king and had him order the Japanese to expel the Chinese troops from Korea. Thus, the First Sino-Japanese War began. The declaration of the Sino-Japanese war was issued on August 1, 1894.

This unit aims at analysing the causes, course and effects of the First Sino-Japanese War.

6.1 OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit, you will be able to:
- Understand the cause of the First Sino-Japanese War
- Learn Korea’s internal affairs during the period
- Enumerate Chinese interest in Korea
- Analyse Japanese troops’ invasion in Korea
- State the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki
6.2 THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR OF 1894-95: CAUSES, COURSE AND EFFECTS

Let us now study the causes, course and effects of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95.

6.2.1 The First Sino-Japanese War (1894–95)

The First Sino-Japanese War was fought over Korea. After the Tianjin agreement of 1885, Japan’s political and military influence on Korea remained minimal, but its economic influence became very strong. Almost ninety per cent of Korea’s foreign trade was with Japan. Li Hongzhang made all possible efforts to curb Japanese economic influence on Korea and also increased the presence of Chinese military personnel in Korea.

The immediate cause of trouble was a law and order problem in Korea. When a Korean religious-political sect, Donghak, staged a rebellion which the Korean government was not able to suppress, the Korean government sought help from its suzerain, China. China sent troops to Korea and informed Japan as it had been decided in the Tianjin agreement. Japan also dispatched troops in a countermove. However, by the time the Chinese and Japanese troops reached Korea, the Korean government had already suppressed the rebellion. In the notification to Japan, China had mentioned that Korea was her tributary state. Japan protested this assumption and asserted that Japan never recognized Korea as China’s tributary, as was evident from the treaties between Korea and the other powers including Japan. Japan proposed that China and Japan jointly push Korea for internal reforms. China refused to intervene in Korea’s internal affairs and
asserted that Japan had no right to do so either. Neither side was willing to withdraw its troops first. Japan did not agree to the simultaneous withdrawal of troops either. The Korean government pleaded with both China and Japan to leave. Japan then sought a clarification from the Korean government on whether Korea was a tributary state of China. Korea’s reply did not satisfy Japan and thus, Japanese troops seized the Korean king and had him order the Chinese troops from Korea. Thus, the First Sino-Japanese War began. The declaration of the Sino-Japanese war was issued on August 1, 1894.

Japanese troops reached Korea in large numbers and from Korea crossed over to Manchuria, forcing the Chinese troops to retreat. By early 1895, the Japanese forces had reached southern Manchuria, from where they would have proceeded to Beijing. However, Li Hongzhang was forced to plead for peace before Japanese troops reached Beijing. The peace treaty, the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed on April 17, 1895. The main points of the treaty included:

- Recognition of full and complete independence of Korea
- War indemnity of 200,000,000 taels
- A new treaty of commerce
- Most favoured nation status
- Opening of seven new ports
- Ceding to Japan the island of Formosa, the Pescadores and the Liaodong Peninsula in southern Manchuria

Check Your Progress

1. What was the impact of the Tianjin agreement of 1885?
2. What was the immediate cause that led to conflict between China and Japan?
3. Why was Li Hongzhang forced to plead for peace?

6.3 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS QUESTIONS

1. After the Tianjin agreement of 1885, Japan’s political and military influence on Korea remained minimal, but its economic influence became very strong. Almost ninety per cent of Korea’s foreign trade was with Japan. Li Hongzhang made all possible efforts to curb Japanese economic influence on Korea and also increased the presence of Chinese military personnel in Korea.

2. The immediate cause of trouble was a law and order problem in Korea. When a Korean religious-political sect, Donghak, staged a rebellion which the Korean government was not able to suppress, the Korean government
sought help from her suzerain, China. China sent troops to Korea and informed Japan as it had been decided in the Tianjin agreement. Japan also dispatched troops in a countermove.

3. By early 1895, the Japanese forces had reached southern Manchuria, from where they would have proceeded to Beijing. However, Li Hongzhang was forced to plead for peace before Japanese troops reached Beijing. The peace treaty, the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed on April 17, 1895.

6.4 SUMMARY

- The First Sino-Japanese War was fought over Korea. After the Tianjin agreement of 1885, Japan’s political and military influence on Korea remained minimal, but its economic influence became very strong.
- The immediate cause of trouble was a law and order problem in Korea. When a Korean religious-political sect, Donghak, staged a rebellion which the Korean government was not able to suppress,
- Japan proposed that China and Japan jointly push Korea for internal reforms. China refused to intervene in Korea’s internal affairs and asserted that Japan had no right to do so either.
- Japanese troops seized the Korean king and had him order the Japanese to expel the Chinese troops from Korea. Thus, the First Sino-Japanese War began. The declaration of the Sino-Japanese war was issued on August 1, 1894.
- Japanese troops reached Korea in large numbers and from Korea crossed over to Manchuria, forcing the Chinese troops to retreat.
- Li Hongzhang was forced to plead for peace before Japanese troops reached Beijing. The peace treaty, the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed on April 17, 1895.

6.5 KEY WORDS

- **Treaty of Tianjin:** The Treaty of Tientsin, now also known as the Treaty of Tianjin, is a collective name for several documents signed at Tianjin in June 1858. They ended the first phase of the Second Opium War, which had begun in 1856.
- **The Treaty of Shimonoseki:** This was a treaty signed at the Shunpanrō hotel, Shimonoseki, Japan on 17 April 1895, between the Empire of Japan and the Qing dynasty, ending the First Sino-Japanese War.
- **Tael:** A former Chinese monetary unit based on the value of a tael of standard silver.
6.6 SELF ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

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Short Answer Questions
1. Write a short note on Korea's foreign trade with Japan during the period.
2. Briefly mention China's interests in Korea.
3. Write about the note of Li Hongzhang in your own words.
4. Write in short about Japanese troops foray into Manchuria.
5. List the main points of the peace treaty that Li was forced to sign.

Long Answer Questions
1. Discuss the main causes that led to conflict between China and Japan.
2. Analyse Japan's strategy to control Korea and its further expansion to Manchuria in China.

6.7 FURTHER READINGS

UNIT 7 REFORM MOVEMENTS IN CHINA

7.0 INTRODUCTION

After Japan defeated China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95, China was forced to sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki with Japan. The Treaty was another addition to the series of unequal treaties already imposed on China by the imperialist powers. It also imposed a heavy sum of indemnity on China. Under such conditions anti-missionary, anti-imperialist and anti-establishment secret societies mushroomed, including the Yihetuan. Boxers were the members of Yihetuan and blamed foreign imperialists and Christian missionaries for ruining the country, and Chinese Christians and the Qing government for colluding with the foreigners. This gave birth to the Boxer Rebellion which was, though, a short-lived.
The period also witnessed various reform movements in China. The most important aspect of the movements, however, was the effort to strengthen national defence and industrialization. Searching for the reasons of Japan’s success and China’s failure, a group of introspecting Chinese intellectuals called attention to the need for institutional and ideological change. The agenda of the Hundred Days’ Reform covered a broad range of issues in the fields of government administration, economy, national defence, education and law. However, the measures undertaken in the Late-Qing reform were more radical than the ones in the Hundred Days’ Reform. From 1901, sweeping reform measures were promulgated in the fields of government structure, administration, military, law, economy, culture and education. The main reason of failure of the reform initiatives was the apathy and hostility of the conservative faction in the power circle.

In the meantime, some regional bureaucrats formed an organization named Xianyou Hui (the Society of Friends of the Constitution) in mid-1911. The Qing court lost the loyalty of the provinces. Many provinces declared independence from Beijing in late 1911.

This unit aims at analysing various reforms in China and also explains the causes and effects of the Chinese Revolution of 1911.

### 7.1 OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit, you will be able to:

- State various reform movements in China
- Learn the role of the Boxer Rebellion
- Analyse the causes and failures of the Boxer Rebellion
- Identify the agenda for reform movements in China
- Explain the Hundred Days’ Reform
- Enumerate the outcome of the reforms in China
- Explain the Chinese Revolution of 1911

### 7.2 THE BOXER REBELLION

The Boxer Rebellion was a short-lived, patriotic and anti-imperialist uprising. The uprising started in 1899 and was crushed in 1900. The Boxers were members of a secret society called Yihequan. ‘Quan’ indicates defensive calisthenics, which is a form of shadow boxing in Chinese martial art. Therefore, the foreigners called them ‘Boxers’. The secret society was active in north China. The members of Yihequan were largely illiterate peasants and workers. The organization was shrouded in mysticism. The Boxers believed that practising callisthenic rituals imbibed in them certain magical powers and made them unassailable. They believed
that Western weaponry could not kill them. Even if it did, ‘spirit soldiers’ would rise from dead Boxers or descend from the heaven to join their cause. Their mystic practices included violent sword whirling prostration and chanting prayer to Daoist and Buddhist spirits.

After Japan defeated China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95, China signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki with Japan. The Treaty was another addition to the series of unequal treaties already imposed on China by the imperialist powers. As per the established practice, all imperialist powers shared the concession drafted in the Treaty. The Treaty of Shimonoseki allowed foreigners to set up factories in China. This development not only directly exploited the Chinese working class, but also crippled the development of Chinese national economy. The treaty also imposed a heavy sum of indemnity on China. To pay off the indemnity, the government imposed miscellaneous surtax on the already burdened citizens. Official corruption added to the woe of the people. Foreign missionary activities were another factor of anguish. Under the protection of imperialist powers, some missionaries acted aggressively, and openly violated Chinese law. The government kept shielding them fearing repercussion from the imperialist powers. Opium addiction and natural calamities took the hardship of common people to unparalleled level. Hordes of frustrated peasants and workers with lost livelihoods roamed China’s countryside. Under such conditions anti-missionary, anti-imperialist and anti-establishment secret societies mushroomed, including the Yihequan.

Yihequan members blamed foreign imperialists and Christian missionaries for ruining the country, and Chinese Christians and the Qing government for colluding with the foreigners. Their cause was to overthrow the Qing government and expel foreigners from China. They frequently attacked local churches, native Christians and foreign missionaries. They were active in Shandong Province.

Since China’s defeat in the Opium Wars, a critical issue for China was how to regain the lost sovereignty. While the majority of the policy makers in the Qing court preferred to go on with the time-tested policies of the past, some officials advocated at least partial reform to strengthen China. After China’s humiliating defeat by Japan, the pro-reform section managed to get support from the emperor. In 1898, a set of ambitious reform measures was announced, which is known as the Reform Movement of 1898 or Hundred Days Reform. The reforms failed because the Confucian conservatives were vehemently opposed to any change in the system. They undermined modernization projects and sabotaged the reform initiatives. In 1898, the conservative anti-foreigner faction won control of the government.

7.2.1 Rise of Yihequan

The conservatives knew that its military was not in a position to win against the imperialist forces, but wanted them out of the country. Around this time, numerous anti-imperialist uprisings broke out across the country due to immense imperialist exploitation of the country and the people. Yihequan was one of the popular ones
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among them. In a shrewd move, the conservatives in Qing royal house and government utilized the anti-foreigner sentiment of the masses in their favour instead of crushing the mass movements. The idea was to let the two enemies of the government fight, with the winner being almost certainly too weak to deal with the Qing government. The governor of Shandong Province persuaded the Yihetuan members to end their hostility to the government and unite with it in destroying the foreigners. The governor changed their name from Yihetuan to Yihequan, and raised local militia groups with them. With tacit government support, the Boxers acquired a semi-official status.

Now the pro-Qing Yihetuan’s new battle cry was ‘Support the Qing, destroy the foreigners.’ The Boxers had no centralized leadership. Instead, they tapped their nationalist spirit and deep economic frustration to build their army. The basic unit consisted of both men and women. Young and middle aged women formed separate units. The young women’s unit was called the Red Lanterns and the older women’s unit was called the Blue Lanterns as the members of the two units carried red and blue lanterns respectively. During battle, ten soldiers formed a squad and ten squads formed a brigade. There were squad heads and brigade heads, but no blueprint for the future. With government backing, the Boxers committed themselves solely to drive foreigners out of China.

Fig. 7.1 The Boxer Rebels


The year 1900 saw a drought as spring rains failed to arrive. Unable to plant their crops, peasants were unoccupied and frustrated. A large number of peasants enrolled in Yihetuan. At the beginning of 1900, the Boxers spread to China’s countryside from their stronghold in Shandong. By summer, they moved towards cities and managed to infiltrate Beijing and Tianjin.

In May 1900, the Boxers laid siege to the foreign quarter in Beijing. Foreign diplomats, their families and staff lived in a compound near the royal palace. Working
together, they mobilized a small force of military personnel and faced the Boxer attack. Foreign ministers demanded that the Chinese government stop the Boxers. The Qing government did not control the surge of the Boxers, nor did it want to. However, forced to choose sides, the Qing court ordered the foreigners to quit the capital. On June 20, 1900, the Qing court declared war on foreign powers and supported the Boxer siege to the foreign legations in Beijing. To help their compatriots and to protect their interests in China, a coalition force of America, Britain, German, France, Japan, Russia, Italy and Austria-Hungary marched into Beijing to subdue the Boxers. On August 14, 1900, the eight-nation allied forces took control of Beijing and crushed the rebellion.

### 7.2.2 The Boxer Rebellion’s Success and Failure

Let us go through the causes responsible for the success and failure of the Boxer Rebellion

**(i) Causes of the Rebellion’s Success**

In nineteenth century China, population increase, crop failures and natural calamities served as catalysts of many peasant uprisings. Widespread opium addiction only worsened the economic destitution of the masses. The difference this time was the target and the role of the Qing administration.

In its initial stage, the rebellion was directed against native Christians. The Boxers considered the converts as traitors who sought foreign aid and privileged status by embracing a foreign religion. The relationship between native Christians and the rebels worsened because the converts renounced the old ways and showed insufficient respect for the teachings of the venerated sages. The converts also refused to contribute for community rites and festivals since traditional festivals were against their new faith. The Boxers put the blame on the missionaries for this situation. The administration’s indifference towards increasingly aggressive missionaries and their activities made the Boxers angry. The failing Qing administration created a vacuum at the local administration. Church-based foreign organizations were becoming local administrators. Thus, they were direct competition for the Chinese secret societies like the Boxers. As a result, anti-Qing, anti-foreign sentiments grew rapidly. However, the conservative faction in the Qing court was able to turn the group’s ire towards the foreigners. The unofficial support was extremely helpful in the spread of the rebellion.

**(ii) Causes of the Rebellion’s Failure**

The Boxer Rebellion was doomed from the very beginning. There was no central leadership, no vision, no strategy, but just an ill-conceived popular outburst full of irresponsible actions. The Boxers genuinely believed in their immortality. On the face of combined assault of the eight-nation allied forces, the Boxers were completely annihilated. The conservative faction in the Qing government that was responsible for the expansion of the Boxers was equally responsible for the
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rebellion’s failure. The administration only pretended to support the Boxers, but its ultimate motive was to suppress the rebellion. While most uprisings were anti-Qing, the Boxers were actually pro-Qing. The Qing government failed to use the supportive rebels in resisting the foreign imperialist powers. Instead, it waited for the two enemies — the foreigners and the Boxers to fight and perish. Moreover, in a suicidal move, the Qing court miscalculated the military might of the foreign imperialists yet again, and declared war on them.

Check Your Progress

1. Who were called Boxers?
2. How did the Qing government utilize the anti-foreigner sentiment of the masses?

7.3 THE SELF-STRENGTHENING MOVEMENT IN CHINA

Let us study in detail the self-strengthening movement in China.

7.3.1 The Background of the Movement

Empress Dowager Cixi’s project of the Tongzhi Restoration was limited to stabilizing the dynastic rule and strengthening Confucian values as a response to the popularity of Christian ideology spread by the Taipings. On the other hand, Prince Gong and other pragmatic scholar officials started long-term programmes of learning foreign technology. The programmes, which had the same agenda as the Tongzhi Restoration in its initial phase in 1861, went on for three and a half decades until 1895. The programmes were known as the Foreign Matters Movement (Yangwu Yundong) and as the Self-Strengthening Movement (Ziqiang Yundong).

Lin Zexu was the first Chinese scholar official who experienced the superiority of Western military technology during the First Opium War. While Lin was banished for his failure to control the barbarians, his assistant, scholar official Wei Yuan suggested ‘to learn the superior skills of the barbarians in order to control them’ in an essay titled Plans for a Maritime Defense (1842). Twenty years later, scholar official Feng Guifen came up with a somewhat similar proposal, advocating ‘Chinese wisdom as a foundation and Western knowledge for practical application’ in an essay titled On the Adoption of Western Learning (1860). The forceful recommendations of Feng formed the central idea of the Foreign Matters Movement. The movement did eventually bear fruit, but the agenda was so ahead of its time that it faced tremendous opposition from the orthodox section of the ruling clique. Imperialist exploitation, lack of understanding and experience of the leaders, corruption and other domestic problems marred the Movement.
7.3.2 The Patrons and Leaders

Prince Gong was the chief patron of the Self-Strengthening Movement. Prince Gong and Manchu scholar official Wenxiang represented the Qing government in signing the peace treaty with France and England in 1860. Chinese scholar officials Zeng Guofan, Zuo Zongtang, Shen Baozhen, Li Hongzhang and Zhang Zhidong contributed substantially as military generals in suppressing domestic rebellions. They worked closely with Western forces, and used Western weapons to quell anti-establishment uprisings. This was the core group of leaders of the movement. All the ethnic Han Chinese scholar officials were natives of southern coastal provinces. They wanted to learn how to make strong ships and effective guns to enable Chinese military to resist foreign invasion and to suppress domestic rebellions. Although all of them were strong Confucian ideologists, they also favoured limited reforms for practical knowledge. As the movement proceeded to the second phase, Li Hongzhang emerged as the main leader. He was also the most influential public official after the death of Zeng Guofan. The Qing court entrusted him with the responsibility of negotiating peace treaties with foreign countries, which he did until his death in 1901.

7.3.3 Agenda of the Movement

The movement can be divided into three phases. The first phase lasted from 1861 to 1872. The second phase lasted from 1872 to 1885. The third and last phase lasted from 1885 to 1895. The first phase concentrated on setting up Western-style arsenals and other military related enterprises. The slogan for the first phase was ‘self-strengthening’ (ziqiang). China’s relatively stable foreign relations got disturbed in 1870 when a number of French and Russian citizens were killed in a riot in Tianjin. The souring of relations with the Western nations marked the end of the movement’s first phase. During the second phase, the focus was on creation of wealth in order to strengthen the country. The emphasis was on setting up non-military industries. The slogan was ‘wealth and power’ (fuqiang). The third phase was characterized by a lack of passion due to the marginalization of Prince Gong and his supporters in 1884 by the conservative section, led by Empress Dowager Cixi. However, the court favoured the idea of industrialization and national defence. Therefore, the nation building activities continued. The third phase focused on building a navy and Western-style iron and steel works.

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Fooschow_Arsenal.jpg
The movement encompassed a range of nation building activities in the fields of education, military training, communication, trade and foreign relations. In a major change of Chinese world outlook, Prince Gong established a foreign relations office in Beijing in 1861. Its official name in Chinese, Zongli Guego Shiwu Yamen (abbreviated as Zongli Yamen) literally meant ‘office in charge of affairs of all nations’. The Qing court dispatched diplomatic missions abroad to maintain peaceful relations with other countries and set up Chinese legations abroad. Schools and translation departments were set up to learn foreign languages, translate foreign books and publish them in Chinese. In 1862, the first government school for teaching Western languages, Tongwen Guan (the School of Combined Learning) was set up in Beijing under the supervision of the Zongli Yamen. Tongwen Guan produced a large number of translated works of international law, science and world history, among others. The government started sending Chinese students abroad to study in foreign educational institutions and to train in Western military and naval technology. The government also allowed missionary schools in China so that students could learn subjects like science and mathematics. As was practiced by foreign countries, the Qing government appointed a Chinese superintendent of trade to supervise foreign trade. As the movement progressed to the second and third phases, financial institutions such as bank and stock exchange were set up, infrastructure development works such as lighthouse and coastal shipping, postal service, construction of telegraph lines and railways were taken up.

The most important aspect of the movement, however, was the effort to strengthen national defence and industrialization. Setting up arsenals, shipyards, military and naval schools, modernization of the navy and purchasing weapons from Western countries were the main agenda for strengthening national defence. Setting up of industrial enterprises, mainly coal and iron mines, cotton mills, paper mills and textile industry were facilitated to industrialize the country. During the first two phases, private entrepreneurs financed and operated businesses under the direct control of government officials. In some cases, the government provided subsidies. China Merchants’ Steam Navigation Company (1872), Kaiping Coal Mines (1877), Shanghai Cotton Cloth Mill (1878) and Imperial Telegraph Administration (1881) were ventures of this type. Li Hongzhang supervised over 90 per cent of the modernization projects. In the third phase, joint government and merchant enterprises, such as Guizhou Ironworks (1891) and Hubei Textile Company (1894) came into being. The building of the navy included modernization of regional fleets such as the Beiyang, Nanyang, Fujian and Guangdong fleets.

Check Your Progress

3. What was the objective of the Tongzhi Restoration?
4. When was the first government school for teaching Western languages set up in Beijing?
Let us now study the Hundred Days’ reform.

7.4.1 The Background

China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-1895 brought about a string of extraordinary challenges for China. Facing a bankrupt economy and an intense social crisis, the once regional superpower was now reduced to a semi-colony. China’s very existence was at stake because of the spheres of influence resulting from the scramble for concession that started in 1887. The Chinese had exhausted their traditional strategies. The strategies of instigating foreigners against each other, using force and persuasion, followed by negotiation and concession—all had proved to be futile. As you studied in the previous section, the Chinese even attempted to learn from foreigners, albeit partially, to strengthen the country for almost three and a half decades. The prolonged Self-Strengthening Movement also failed. The failure of the movement could be gauged by the fact that a former tributary state Japan successfully learned from the same foreigners and exercised her newfound power on the Qing Empire, convincingly establishing her military superiority over China in the war of 1894-95.

Searching for the reasons of Japan’s success and China’s failure, a group of introspecting Chinese intellectuals called attention to the need for institutional and ideological change. Repeated petitions to the throne convinced Emperor Guangxu of the benefits of reform. On June 11, 1898, the emperor issued the first reform decree. The emperor went on to issue a large number of reform decrees in quick succession for the next three months. The reform initiatives lasted precisely for 103 days, from June 11 to September 21, 1898. This earned it the name, the Hundred Days’ Reform. The radical content of the decrees created panic in the conservative political circles of the Qing court including in the extremely conservative Empress Dowager Cixi, because the reforms threatened their ideology as well as authority.

The reforms ended with a coup by Cixi on September 21, 1898. Cixi’s trusted troops seized the reform documents and captured the Emperor. Cixi declared that the emperor was ill, so she had to take over the regency again. She ordered the withdrawal of the reform edicts and arrest and execution of the reformers. Though Emperor Guangxu remained the figurehead, he spent the rest of his life confined in his palace with no real power. The emperor died on November 14, 1908, and Empress Dowager Cixi died the next day.

7.4.2 The Patrons and Leaders

The devastating defeat in the war with Japan in 1895 and the national crisis that emerged out of the scramble for concessions by the imperialist powers created a clamor in China for reforms of the existing system that had proven to be unable to
face these imperialist challenges. Scholar officials and non-official scholars started voicing their concerns through memorandum to the court appealing to the emperor to initiate reform, through establishing associations and study groups to raise awareness, and through extensive writings including publishing articles, books and monographs propagating the necessities of reform.

Weng Tonghe, Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, Lin Xu, Kang Guangren, Tan Sitong, Yang Shenxiu, Yang Rui, Zhang Zhidong and Liu Guangdi were the most prominent of the reformers. Most of them were scholar officials. Some were appointed in important positions by the emperor in 1898. Most of these leaders founded or joined study circles, lectured and participated in discussions on the need to reform the existing socio-political system between 1895 and 1898. For example, in 1898, Yang Shenxiu founded an academic club named Guanxue Hui with like-minded scholars and Tan Sitong established Nanxue Hui (Southern Academy) and Kang Youwei founded Qiangxue Hui (Society for the Study of Strengthening the Nation) in 1895 and Baoguo Hui (Society for Protecting the Nation) in 1898. Yang Rui and Yang Shenxiu joined Kang Youwei’s Baoguo Hui in 1898.

Of all leaders, Weng Tonghe was the closest to the Qing throne. He was the tutor of child emperors — Tongzhi and Guangxu. Besides being the imperial teacher, Weng also held a number of important positions in the Qing government including member of the Grand Council and Hanlin Academy. Emperor Guangxu formed an emotional bond with him. Zhang Zhidong was an active leader of the Foreign Matters Movement. He promoted the idea of Western-style industrialization. However, he wanted the reforms to take place without disturbing the existing feudal system and China’s Confucian culture and tradition, in accordance with the slogan of ‘Chinese wisdom as a foundation and Western knowledge for practical application’. Many officials including Yang Rui who worked under Zhang Zhidong subscribed to this view. This group of officials came to be known as the conservative or moderate reformers as against the radical group, which wanted sweeping reforms including establishing a constitutional monarchy. Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao were the most prominent leaders of the radical group.

Kang Youwei was a zealous nationalist and radical political thinker. In October 1888, he submitted a memorial to the throne for the first time, urging reform in various fields. The Imperial College refused to forward his memorial to the emperor because he was not a qualified official. However, Kang did not lose hope. On the one hand, he continued to submit memorials to the throne, and on the other, organized study circles, published newspapers and magazines, and wrote extensively to spread his message. Kang opened a new school at Canton named Wannu Caotang in 1891. Here he indoctrinated students in his ideology. It is here that he taught Liang Qichao and Lin Xu. In May 1895, Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao collected signatures of more than one thousand candidates of the national civil services examination on a memorial when they arrived at Beijing, and submitted it to the emperor. The memorial urged the court to reject the peace treaty signed...
with Japan and suggested a series of reforms. Kang Youwei later cleared the national level civil service examinations. It was only after he cleared the examinations that some of his memorandums were forwarded to the emperor, while others were still blocked by the censoring authorities because they considered them to be too radical. Since Kang’s rank in the government was rather low, there was no chance for him to have an audience with the emperor. Therefore, he kept sending memorandums to the throne. By 1898, Kang had submitted seven memorandums to the throne.

The patron of the Hundred Days’ Reform was Emperor Guangxu himself. In 1889, Emperor Guangxu attained maturity. Empress Dowager Cixi gave up political power and retired to her Summer Palace. Although the Confucian value system gave her moral authority over the emperor due to her status as the mother figure, the emperor started to rule formally. Weng Tonghe introduced Kang Youwei to Emperor Guangxu in January 1898. Finally having an audience with the emperor, Kang was able to impress upon him the need for urgent reform. From then on, Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao and other radical reformers became principle advisers to Emperor Guangxi, sidelining the moderate faction of the government officials.

After removing Emperor Guangxu from power in a coup, Cixi put to death Tan Sitong, Kang Guangren, Lin Xu, Yang Shexiu, Yang Rui and Liu Guangdi on September 28, 1898. The six reformers who were executed are known as the Six Gentlemen of Wuxu or the Six Martyrs of the Hundred Days’ Reform (Wuxu liu jun zi). After the coup, Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao fled to Japan. In 1899, Kang Youwei established an organization called Baohuang Hui to work for the establishing a constitutional monarchy in China.

7.4.3 Agenda of the Hundred Days’ Reform

The agenda of the Hundred Days’ Reform covered a broad range of issues in the fields of government administration, economy, national defence, education and law.
The agenda of administrative reform included downsizing the bureaucracy by abolishing the positions that had little practical relevance but were eating up government funds, removal of corrupt officials and planning for a national budget. Most radically, the reformers suggested a changeover from the existing absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy. In the economic front, the suggested reforms included infrastructure development by building railway and postal services, development of agriculture, industry and trade, and government encouragement to new invention in industry and agriculture. The main programmes for strengthening the national defence included organizing the country’s army and navy on Western models, forming a national militia, establishing training schools for the military and sending defence officers abroad to learn Western military technology and skills. The reformers also urged the emperor to take a tough stand against imperialist advances in China by cancelling extraterritoriality and other such humiliating clauses that were stipulated by the unequal peace treaties. The educational reform included the opening of schools where the syllabi would be a combination of Chinese and Western learning, and opening of an imperial university in Beijing. The reformers also called for remodelling the civil service examination system by abolishing the traditional eight-legged essay in the civil service examinations and replacing the requirement of the knowledge of Confucian classics with that of current affairs.

Check Your Progress

5. What brought about a string of extraordinary challenges for China?
6. Who was the patron of the Hundred Days’ Reform?

7.5 THE LATE-QING REFORM

Let us now study the Late-Qing reform.

7.5.1 The Background

The Cixi-led conservative section of the ruling clique, who felt threatened by the 1898 reforms, held that foreign ideas were responsible for the corrosion of the Confucian value system that the reformers were promoting. While Empress Dowager Cixi reacted sharply to the radicalism of the Hundred Days’ Reform, she took no measure to control the growing anti-foreign and anti-Christian activities of numerous secret societies that seemed to spring up almost every day. Cixi calculated that the ruling clique would benefit from the clash between these secret societies and the foreigners, as both enemies would be weakened. This was actually a part of the traditional Chinese strategy of playing one enemy against another. However, during the height of the Boxer Rebellion, when Cixi was forced to choose sides, she supported the Boxers and declared war on the foreigners in 1900. When the foreign forces took control of Beijing on August 14, 1900, the court was forced to flee Beijing in a repeat of 1860.
That the eight-nation allied force easily crushed the Boxers and the Qing defence proved once again the military superiority of the foreign imperialists. The humiliating peace treaties signed in 1901 reduced the Qing Dynasty to a puppet in the hands of the imperialist powers. The Boxer debacle also revealed that regional governments were slipping out of the control of the central government. Some regional governors became so powerful that they ignored the centre’s orders. There was an urgent need to arrest the political decentralization. The centre also needed to control the mushrooming anti-establishment popular uprisings. Some conservatives finally woke up to the dire need to change the existing system. Cixi had no other option but to proclaim a set of institutional reforms to save her rule and prestige in 1901. The measures that she adopted were more radical than the reform edicts of 1898, which she had opposed tooth and nail. The reform is known as the Late-Qing Reform. However, the reforms came too late to save the dynasty. They failed and the dynasty collapsed in 1911.

7.5.2 The Measures Undertaken in the Late-Qing Reform

The measures undertaken in the Late-Qing reform were more radical than the ones in the Hundred Days’ Reform. From 1901, sweeping reform measures were promulgated in the fields of government structure, administration, military, law, economy, culture and education. Under the reforms, the nature of governance was changed from absolute monarchy to constitutional monarchy. Administrative reform measures included reduction in workforce (such as merging of overlapping responsibilities in government departments and dismissing corrupt officials), stoppage of sale of official posts, abolition of traditional civil and military public examinations and creation of new, centralized political organs (such as Ministries of Education, Commerce, Justice, Foreign Affairs, etc.) to supervise and implement reforms.

The main agenda regarding military reform included downsizing and revamping of army units (such as the Green Standard Army), establishment of military academies and military training bureaus, and centralization of local armies to form a strong national army with the emperor as the supreme commander. The Confucian notion of law changed. A new legal code based on the Japanese legal code was also introduced. Corporal punishment and slavery were abolished. Law schools and a new system of courts were established. Economic reform measures included giving encouragement to domestic industrial enterprises, setting up modern financial institutions (such as bank) and currency unification. In a break from age-old tradition and culture, foot binding was banned. The centuries old cultural divide between Manchu and Han was bridged by lifting the ban on marriage between Manchu male and Chinese female. Opium smoking was banned. In the field of education, ground-breaking reform measures were initiated; provincial academies (shuyuan) were converted into Western-style schools. A new curriculum combining Western subjects and traditional Chinese classics were adopted. In government examinations, essay topics were based on current affairs replacing the eight-legged essay. Students were also sent abroad for further studies.
7.5.3 Outcome of the Reforms

After fifty years of reform efforts through the three government initiatives, some far-reaching changes did take place. The most ground-breaking one, which later changed the destiny of China, was the crack in the traditional Confucian way of life and adoption of Western socio-political-economic system. However, all the three initiatives failed to achieve their goal of strengthening China.

The main reason of failure of the reform initiatives was the apathy and hostility of the conservative faction in the power circle. Empress Dowager Cixi played an important role in the failure. She was a dictator, extremely conservative and power hungry person. She put her own interest above the interest of the country and the people. She sabotaged and suppressed all three initiatives only because some of the reform measures were a threat to her supreme authority. During the Self-Strengthening Movement, she diverted funds meant for economic and military development into rebuild her Summer Palace. During the Hundred Days’ Reform, she staged a coup and crushed the initiative. She reluctantly issued some reform edicts sporadically since 1901, but tried to stop the implementation of her own edicts. Since Cixi was the supreme authority, no initiative could have succeeded without her support. Another common reason for the failure of the reforms was that those who supported the reforms were far too less in number than those who opposed them. The vast majority of the conservative gentry did not cooperate with the reformers during the Self-Strengthening and Hundred Days’ Reform movements.

Certain agendas of the Self-Strengthening Movement such as industrialization and building railroad under the slogan ‘wealth and power’ ran counter to traditional Chinese beliefs. According to Confucian beliefs, increased productivity and ensuing consumerism would unleash the evils of greed and avarice, which would endanger social harmony. The conservatives opposed railways because they believed that the noisy railway would disturb the traditional geomancy (feng shui). Other major reasons for failure of the Self-Strengthening Movement were shortage of natural and human resources, corruption in high office, lack of legal and administrative structures for the development of industry, lack of coordination among the reformers, lack of understanding of the West, over-reliance on foreigners and imperialist compulsion.

The Hundred Days’ Reform encountered a different kind of problem. There was a clash among the moderate and the radical factions of reformers, and an intense power struggle between the emperor and the empress dowager. The emperor and his supporters lacked military and political power. The reform measures were revolutionary, but the edicts were issued in haste, and conservative officials did not take interest in implementing them. Thus, most of the measures remained on paper only.
In effect, the agendas of the Hundred Days’ Reform were implemented during the Late-Qing reform. However, the reform measures gave rise to conditions that ultimately caused the dynasty’s downfall. Overseas Chinese students, modern intellectuals, ordinary citizens, provincial scholar-gentry and regional armies all turned against the corrupt and power hungry Manchu political clique. Anti-Manchu nationalist and revolutionary activities took place frequently by the mid-1900s. Of them, the Revolution of 1911 finally overthrew the Qing Dynasty.

Check Your Progress
7. What is known as the Late-Qing Reform?
8. What was the common reason for failure of the reform initiatives?

7.6 THE CHINESE REVOLUTION OF 1911: CAUSES, COURSE AND EFFECTS

Let us study the causes, course and effects of the Chinese Revolution of 1911.

7.6.1 Background of the Revolution

While the Qing court initiated radical reforms to revive the dynasty, its pillars of strength started to crumble. The main forces of reform in the government, scholar officials Li Hongzhang and Zhang Zhidong died in 1902 and 1909, respectively. Emperor Guangxu died on November 14, 1908. Empress Dowager Cixi proclaimed the late emperor’s nephew, three-year-old Puyi, as the successor the same day. Cixi died the next day, on November 15, 1908. Puyi ascended the throne as Emperor Xuantong in December 1908. Puyi’s father and Emperor Guangxu’s half-brother Zaifeng (Second Prince Chun of the First Rank) was appointed the regent. He was inexperienced and lacked vision. He continued the reforms that started in 1901, but committed strategic blunders that alienated the powerful political and military support base at a time when the Qing court needed it most to deal with numerous popular uprising all over China.

First, in the process of political reform, Zaifeng concentrated power in the hands of Manchu officials, breaking the old policy of appointing equal numbers from Manchu and Han ethnicities. Han officials did not like to be powerless advisers. In protest, some regional bureaucrats formed an organization named Xianyou Hui (the Society of Friends of the Constitution) in mid-1911. Thus, the Qing court lost the loyalty of the provinces. Many provinces declared independence from Beijing in late 1911.
Secondly, Zaifeng dismissed Yuan Shikai, who was extremely powerful militarily and politically. Yuan’s troops were loyal to Yuan, not to the Qing court. By alienating Yuan, Zaifeng actually lost the only centralized military capable of quelling large-scale revolts. He failed to appreciate that on the face of widespread revolts and growing power of regional gentry-generals, Yuan Shikai’s support was the single lifeline for the survival of the dynasty. When extensive revolt broke out in late 1911, the Qing court had to call back Yuan Shikai. However, Yuan was shrewd and opportunistic. He utilized the helpless condition of the Qing rulers and extracted additional power for himself.

Thirdly, as part of the late-Qing reform, members of the wealthy gentry and merchants invested in railroad construction in southern provinces. The Qing court wanted a centralized railway system. The Qing government attempted to nationalize the railways by buying up provincial railway rights with foreign loans. This scheme hurt the financial interest of the investors. Anti-Qing sentiments grew stronger among the gentry-merchant leaders. In Sichuan, members of gentry, business community and students formed a railway protection league to protest against the sell-out of the railways to foreigners. In response, the provincial governor of Sichuan arrested some important leaders of the league. This led to armed action. The mass protest against nationalization of railways came to be known as Railway Protection Movement or Railway Rights Protection Movement (Boal Yundong). This movement was the catalyst of the Wuchang Uprising.

7.6.2 The Wuchang Uprising

Units of the Qing government’s New Army were distressed by the turmoil in the country. Soldiers harboured anti-Manchu feelings. Revolutionaries infiltrated the New Army and fanned revolutionary ideas. Officers and soldiers were charged with revolutionary spirit. They formed study groups to discuss political alternatives. Two such revolutionary groups, Wenxue She (Literary Society) and Gongjin Hui (variously translated as Progressive Association and Association of Common
Advancement) were particularly involved with the Railway Protection Movement in Hubei Province.

Initially, Qing’s soldiers were in charge of quelling the movement. In the late summer of 1911, the government appointed some Hubei New Army units for the task. Hubei New Army units owed their origin in the Hubei Army raised by scholar official Zhang Zhidong during the Taiping Rebellion. It was fiercely anti-Manchu. The Hubei Army soldiers were actively involved in the Railway Protection Movement and supported the revolutionary cause. On September 24, 1911, the leaders of Wenxue She and Gongjin Hui convened a meeting in Wuchang, capital of Hubei Province, along with some representatives of local New Army units. They planned an uprising on October 6, 1911, taking advantage of the fact that the attention of the government was on quelling the Railway Protection Movement in neighbouring Sichuan. Later, due to inadequate preparation, they postponed the date of the uprising. On October 9, when the New Army revolutionaries were making bombs for the proposed uprising, a bomb went off accidentally. Fearing capture by the government, the revolutionaries rose to revolt the next day. The revolutionaries quickly seized the main Wuhan arsenal. The mutiny was successful. The revolutionaries announced the establishment of the Military Government of Hubei of the Republic of China (Hubei Junzhenfu) in Hubei with army officer Li Yuanhong as the governor of the temporary government.

Sun Yat-sen’s Tongmeng Hui had a great role in the success of the revolt, although it did not have a direct role in organizing the uprising. Many Tongmeng Hui members infiltrated the provincial armies, and lectured in the revolutionary study groups organized by the army units. The social composition of the Hubei New Army was another important factor in the success of the revolt. Zhang Zhidong carefully recruited literate men in his Hubei Army. As a result, compared to other provincial forces, there were more educated soldiers in the Hubei Army. Thus, the revolutionaries, who later joined the rank and file of the provincial armies, could indoctrinate the Hubei Army better. It was the ordinary soldiers who staged the Wuchang uprising. The Wuchang Uprising is known in history as the Revolution of 1911. The uprising ultimately paved the way for overthrowing the Qing Dynasty and establishment of the Republic of China.

7.6.3 The Formation of the Republic of China

The Qing court negotiated a truce with the revolutionaries in December 1911. Some representatives favoured Li Yuanhong (as the leader of the provisional Military Government of Hubei of Republic of China) and some favoured Huang Xing (as the most visible leader of the leading revolutionary group Tongmeng Hui, recognized by Qing court) as candidates for the presidency. To end the deadlock, both sides agreed on Sun Yat-sen. Thus, Sun was elected as the provisional president of the newly established republic in Nanjing on January 1, 1912.

Within one and a half months of the Wuchang Uprising, fifteen of the twenty-four provinces declared independence. However, there was no unity in the vastly
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Self-Instructional Material

different composition of the cash-starved and militarily weak revolutionaries and the wealthy and powerful provincial gentry-military rulers. Besides, overthrowing the dynasty was not possible because it was under the protection of Yuan Shikai’s Beiyang Army. Sun realized that the infant republic could not be sustained for long without a strong financial and military support. Moreover, the need of the hour was to unify China and project a united image of China to the foreign imperialist powers. But, the revolutionaries only controlled southern China.

As a solution, Sun negotiated with Yuan Shikai and offered him the presidency in return of the latter’s military support to the infant republic and peaceful abdication of the boy emperor. Yuan accepted the offer. At this time he was the premier of the Qing Dynasty. Yuan persuaded the Manchu royals to abdicate peacefully. On February 12, 1912, the six-year old emperor abdicated his throne. On March 10, 1912, Yuan Shikai was sworn as the second provisional president of the Republic of China. The seat of the government was then shifted to Beijing. The Republic of China was recognized as the legitimate government of China internationally.

7.6.4 Sun Yat-Sen’s Contribution to the Revolution of 1911

Although Sun Yat-sen or Tongmeng Hui did not take part in the Wuchang Uprising, its revolutionary efforts had contributed in the uprising’s success. Tongmeng Hui worked relentlessly to spread the revolutionary message and to popularize the notions of republicanism and democracy. They exposed the conservative and backward nature of the Qing rule. This prepared people to expect a change of government with a new ideology. Tongmeng Hui revolutionaries succeeded in infiltrating the New Army ranks. As a result, revolutionary ideas spread within the government’s most modern army, and prepared the ground for outbreak of military revolts against the dynasty. Thus, the victory of the Wuchang mutiny was largely the victory of Sun Yat-sen’s Tongmeng Hui even though Sun did not directly organize it.

Sun Yat-sen’s hard work to raise fund and mobilize support of overseas Chinese students as well as foreigners contributed to the smooth transition of China to a republic. While overseas Chinese students contributed financial and human resources for Tongmeng Hui’s revolutionary activities, Sun’s persuasion convinced a number of foreign governments that the republican revolution would not be another anti-imperialist anti-Qing uprising like the Boxer Rebellion. As a result, unlike in 1900, when the eight-nation allied force suppressed the Boxer Rebellion, in 1911, the foreign imperialist powers were neutral which ensured the success of the Revolution of 1911. Moreover, in his mission to unite the anti-Qing elements active in China, Sun did not differentiate between non-intellectual peasant bandits and intellectuals.

Sun was the first leader in modern China to work out systematic ways to save the country through a political philosophy called Sanmin Zhuyi. The three doctrines: are Nationalism (Minzu), Democracy (Minquan) and People’s Livelihood (Minsheng). These principles provided comprehensive programmes to deal with
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7.6.5 Significance of the Revolution of 1911

The Revolution of 1911 was a decisive break with the monarchical form of government in China. It ended the imperial system that started with the Qin Dynasty more than two thousand years before.

The end of the imperial era ended the need of the rulers to use Confucianism for political legitimacy. Confucianism also lost its usefulness as a political belief, which was now replaced by Sun Yat-sen’s Sanmin Zhuyi. The abolition of imperial civil service examinations and introduction of Western subjects in school curriculum reduced the importance of Confucianism in Chinese society. During the May Fourth Movement of 1919, Confucianism as a way of life came under attack. Thus, the 1911 political revolution paved the way for the intellectual revolution in 1919.

Another offshoot of the Revolution was the establishment of China’s first major political party, Guomindang on August 25, 1912 with Sun Yat-sen as chairperson and Huang Xing as his deputy. After overthrowing the direct foreign rule, the attention of the Chinese intellectuals shifted to the evils of foreign imperialism. After the Revolution of 1911, modern Chinese nationalism gradually focused on anti-imperialism. However, despite the success of the revolution and establishment of the republic, China’s basic problems remained. Socially, the revolution could not change the traditional social order. The revolution was limited to urban China. While cities were modernized, the vast countryside remained unchanged. The effects of the revolution did not reach the village. Politically, the composition of the ruling class did not change. The emperor was removed and constitutional form of government was established at the centre. In practice, conservative military general Yuan Shikai remained influential in the central government. An equally conservative landlord-military-gentry class ruled the provinces. The revolutionaries and intellectuals in the government were powerless. Besides, the central government failed to arrest the trend of political decentralization that started during the late Qing period. Eventually, China slipped into the era of rule by warlords. China also lost territories. Taking advantage of the independence spree, Outer Mongolia and Tibet declared independence from China after 1911. Thus, the new republic remained weak and divided from the beginning. Consequently, foreign control of China increased after 1911.

Check Your Progress

9. What do you mean by the Wuchang Uprising?
10. What was Sun Yat-sen’s political philosophy?
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7.7 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

QUESTIONS

1. The Boxers were members of a secret society called Yihequan. ‘Quan’ indicates defensive calisthenics, which is a form of shadow boxing in Chinese martial art. Therefore, the foreigners called them ‘Boxers’. The secret society was active in north China. The members of Yihequan were largely illiterate peasants and workers. The organization was shrouded in mysticism. The Boxers believed that practising calisthenic rituals imbued in them certain magical powers and made them unassailable. They believed that Western weaponry could not kill them. Even if it did, ‘spirit soldiers’ would rise from dead Boxers or descend from the heaven to join their cause. Their mystic practices included violent sword whirling prostration and chanting prayer to Daoist and Buddhist spirits.

2. In a shrewd move, the conservatives in Qing royal house and government utilized the anti-foreigner sentiment of the masses in their favour instead of crushing the mass movements. The idea was to let the two enemies of the government fight, with the winner being almost certainly too weak to deal with the Qing government. The governor of Shandong Province persuaded the Yihequan members to end their hostility to the government and unite with it in destroying the foreigners. The governor changed their name from Yihequan to Yihetuan, and raised local militia groups with them. With tacit government support, the Boxers acquired a semi-official status.

3. Empress Dowager Cixi’s project of the Tongzhi Restoration was limited to stabilizing the dynastic rule and strengthening Confucian values as a response to the popularity of Christian ideology spread by the Taipings.

4. In 1862, the first government school for teaching Western languages, Tongwen Guan (the School of Combined Learning) was set up in Beijing under the supervision of the Zongli Yamen. Tongwen Guan produced a large number of translated works of international law, science and world history, among others. The government started sending Chinese students abroad to study in foreign educational institutions and to train in Western military and naval technology.

5. China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-1895 brought about a string of extraordinary challenges for China. Facing a bankrupt economy and an intense social crisis, the once regional superpower was now reduced to a semi-colony. China’s very existence was at stake because of the spheres of influence resulting from the scramble for concession that started in 1887. The Chinese had exhausted their traditional strategies. The strategies of instigating foreigners against each another, using force and persuasion, followed by negotiation and concession—all had proved to be futile.
6. The patron of the Hundred Days' Reform was Emperor Guangxu himself.

7. Cixi had no other option but to proclaim a set of institutional reforms to save her rule and prestige in 1901. The measures that she adopted were more radical than the reform edicts of 1898, which she had opposed tooth and nail. The reform is known as the Late-Qing Reform. However, the reforms came too late to save the dynasty.

8. The common reason for the failure of the reforms was that those who supported the reforms were far too less in number than those who opposed them. The vast majority of the conservative gentry did not cooperate with the reformers during the Self-Strengthening and Hundred Days' Reform movements. Certain agendas of the Self-Strengthening Movement such as industrialization and building railroad under the slogan 'wealth and power' ran counter to traditional Chinese beliefs.

9. The Wuchang Uprising is known in history as the Revolution of 1911. The uprising ultimately paved the way for overthrowing the Qing Dynasty and establishment of the Republic of China.

10. Sun was the first leader in modern China to work out systematic ways to save the country through a political philosophy called Sanmin Zhuyi. The three doctrines are Nationalism (Minzu), Democracy (Minquan) and People’s Livelihood (Minsheng). These principles provided comprehensive programmes to deal with the burning political, social and economic problems of China. They formed the basis of the republican government. But for Sun Yat-sen’s political acumen of taking Yuan Shikai into confidence, the unification of China would not have been as smooth.

7.8 SUMMARY

- The Boxer Rebellion was a short-lived, patriotic and anti-imperialist uprising. The uprising started in 1899 and was crushed in 1900. The Boxers were members of a secret society called Yihequan. 'Quan' indicates defensive calisthenics, which is a form of shadow boxing in Chinese martial art. Therefore, the foreigners called them 'Boxers'.

- After Japan defeated China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95, China signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki with Japan. The Treaty was another addition to the series of unequal treaties already imposed on China by the imperialist powers.

- Empress Dowager Cixi’s project of the Tongzhi Restoration was limited to stabilizing the dynastic rule and strengthening Confucian values as a response to the popularity of Christian ideology spread by the Taipings.

- The most important aspect of the movement, however, was the effort to strengthen national defence and industrialization. Setting up arsenals,
shipyards, military and naval schools, modernization of the navy and purchasing weapons from Western countries were the main agenda for strengthening national defence.

- The reform initiatives lasted precisely for 103 days, from June 11 to September 21, 1898. This earned it the name, the Hundred Days’ Reform.
- The devastating defeat in the war with Japan in 1895 and the national crisis that emerged out of the scramble for concessions by the imperialist powers created a clamor in China for reforms of the existing system that had proven to be unable to face these imperialist challenges.
- The educational reform included the opening of schools where the syllabi would be a combination of Chinese and Western learning, and opening of an imperial university in Beijing.
- The measures undertaken in the Late-Qing reform were more radical than the ones in the Hundred Days’ Reform. From 1901, sweeping reform measures were promulgated in the fields of government structure, administration, military, law, economy, culture and education.
- Units of the Qing government’s New Army were distressed by the turmoil in the country. Soldiers harboured anti-Manchu feelings. Revolutionaries infiltrated the New Army and fanned revolutionary ideas.
- Within one and a half months of the Wuchang Uprising, fifteen of the twenty-four provinces declared independence. However, there was no unity in the vastly different composition of the cash-starved and militarily weak revolutionaries and the wealthy and powerful provincial gentry-military rulers.
- Although Sun Yat-sen or Tongmeng Hui did not take part in the Wuchang Uprising, its revolutionary efforts had contributed in the uprising’s success. Tongmeng Hui worked relentlessly to spread the revolutionary message and to popularize the notions of republicanism and democracy.
- The Revolution of 1911 was a decisive break with the monarchical form of government in China. It ended the imperial system that started with the Qin Dynasty more than two thousand years before.
- Another offshoot of the Revolution was the establishment of China’s first major political party, the Guomindang on August 25, 1912 with Sun Yat-sen as chairperson and Huang Xing as his deputy. After overthrowing the direct foreign rule, the attention of the Chinese intellectuals shifted to the evils of foreign imperialism.
- Taking advantage of the independence spree, Outer Mongolia and Tibet declared independence from China after 1911. Thus, the new republic remained weak and divided from the beginning. Consequently, foreign control of China increased after 1911.
7.9 KEY WORDS

- **Yihetuan Movement**: The Boxer Rebellion, Boxer Uprising, or Yihetuan Movement was an anti-imperialist, anti-colonial, and anti-Christian uprising that took place in China between 1899 and 1901, toward the end of the Qing dynasty.

- **The Tongzhi Restoration**: This was an attempt to arrest the dynastic decline of the Qing dynasty of China by restoring the traditional order.

- **The Late Qing Reform**: The New Policies, or New Administration of the late Qing dynasty, also known as the Late Qing Reform, were a series of cultural, economic, educational, military, and political reforms that were implemented.

- **The Hundred Days’ Reform**: This was a 103-day national, cultural, political, and educational reform movement from 11 June to 22 September 1898 in late Qing dynasty China. It was undertaken by the young Guangxu Emperor and his reform-minded supporters.

- **The Wuchang Uprising**: This was an armed rebellion against the ruling Qing dynasty that took place in Wuchang, Hubei, in China. It was the first successful uprising led by elements of the New Army, influenced by revolutionary ideas from Tongmenghui.

- **Confucianism**: It is stated as tradition, a philosophy, a religion, a humanistic or rationalistic religion, a way of governing, or simply a way of life.

- **The Guomindang**: The Guomindang (Kuomintang), or Chinese Nationalist Party, was China’s largest revolutionary and republican party – at least until the late 1930s. The Guomindang’s primary mission was to unify China under a republican government.

7.10 SELF ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

**Short Answer Questions**

1. Write a short note on the Boxer Rebellion in China.
2. Mention the leadership structure of the Boxers in China.
4. Briefly mention the Confucian value system in China during this period.
5. What was the significance of the Wuchang Uprising in China?
6. Comment on Sun Yat-sen’s contribution to the revolution of 1911 in China in your own words.
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**Long Answer Questions**

1. Discuss the impact of Yihequan in China during the period.
2. Analyse the causes of the Boxer Rebellion's failure in China.
3. Describe the formation of the Self-Strengthening Movement in China.
4. Discuss the various measures undertaken in the Late-Qing reform in China during the period.
5. Analyse the significance of the Revolution of 1911 in China.

**7.11 FURTHER READINGS**

UNIT 8  CHINA BETWEEN 1912 AND 1920

Structure
8.0 Introduction
8.1 Objectives
8.2 Role of China in World War I
  8.2.1 The Twenty-One Demands of Japan
  8.2.2 Negotiations Between the Imperial Government and China
8.3 Answers to Check Your Progress Questions
8.4 Summary
8.5 Key Words
8.6 Self Assessment Questions and Exercises
8.7 Further Readings

8.0 INTRODUCTION

Taking forward its expansionist plan in China, Japan attacked the Germany interests in China during the World War I. It is estimated that twenty thousand Japanese soldiers landed at Longkou, and then attacked Qingdao. On 6 October, 2014, Japanese took over Jinan train station, arrested German staff, and expelled Chinese staff. Reinsch, American legation envoy, who arrived in China in the wake of President Yuan Shi-kai’s expulsion of KMT from the Parliament in 1913, ‘warned Washington of Japan’s menacing ambitions when the Japanese army seized the German areas of influence in China, in Shandong Province. On 8 January, 1915, Japan first raised Twenty-One Demands which were to force China into an equivalent semi-vassal status by taking advantage of European countries’ entanglement in World War I. These demands required that China immediately cease its leasing of territory to foreign powers and to ascent to Japanese control over Manchuria and Shandong (Shantung) among other demands. The US in particular was wary of Japanese intentions in the Pacific. The effects of the ‘Twenty-one Demands’ were subsequently annulled by the Washington Conference of 1921-22, when Japan agreed to withdraw its troops from Shandong and to restore sovereignty to China.

This units aims at analysing the role of China during the World War I and discusses Japan’s twenty-one demands to gain regional ascendancy over China.
8.1 OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit, you will be able to:

- Understand the role of China in World War I
- Analyse Sun Yat-sen’s plan
- Enumerate various provisions in the twenty-one demands of Japan
- Explain Japanese ultimatum to China

8.2 ROLE OF CHINA IN WORLD WAR I

Tang Degaug pointed out that Russia and Japan signed three secret treaties, with such clauses as dividing Manchuria Mongolia, should China’s revolution lead to national instability. Fortunately, 1911 Xiu Hai Revolution ended in a matter of less than 3 months, while the second revolution was even shorter in duration.

World War I broke out on 28 July, 1914. On 15 August, 1914, Japan issued an ultimatum to Germany to cede Jiaoshou-wan Bay to Japan and Chinese sovereignty. 15 September, 1914. Jiaoshou-wan Bay was first leased to Germany for 99 years on 6 March 1898 in the aftermath of the death of two German missionaries. One month before the ultimatum was to expire, Japan, on 23 Aug 1914, attacked the Germany interests in China. Twenty thousand Japanese soldiers landed at Longkou, and then attacked Qingdao. Yuan Shí-kai, to maintain neutrality, had to carve out an area for the two parties to fight. Though China designated the area to the east of Weixian county train station, Japanese, having declined German request for handover of leased territory to China, would go west to occupy the Jiao-Ji (Qingdao-Jinan) Railway on the pretext that the railway was a Sino-German venture. On 6 October, Japanese took over Jinan train station, arrested German staff, and expelled Chinese staff. Reinsch, i.e., American legation envoy who arrived in China in the wake of President Yuan Shí-kai’s expulsion of KMT from the Parliament in 1913, ‘warned Washington of Japan’s menacing ambitions when the Japanese army seized the German areas of influence in China, in Shandong Province,’ states Mike Billington.

Reinsch, supportive of Yuan’s government in Peking and intent on implementing Dr Sun Yat-sen’s plan laid out in ‘The International Development of China’, had tried to circumvent pro-British and pro-Japan Morgan consortium by soliciting help from Frank Vanderlip head of National City Bank of the American International Corporation (AIC) in 1915 and John Abbott of the Continental and Commercial Trust and Savings Bank in Chicago.

On 8 January, 1915, Japan first raised Twenty-One Demands which were to force China into an equivalent semi-vassal status by taking advantage of European countries’ entanglement in World War I. Japan intended to force China
into signing a ‘national defense treaty’, with stipulations that Japan could migrate millions of its citizens into their spheres of influence in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia; that Japan hold exclusive control over coastal China (especially Fujian province); that Japan could lease Port Arthur for 99 years; that Japan inherit German interest in Shandong; that Japanese be appointed important posts in various levels of Chinese government; that Japan and China co-host the police bureaus in all Chinese provinces, and that Japan and China co-build the weapons manufacturing plants in cities along the Yangtze River line. Gu Weijun was ordered to appeal to US and Britain (British ambassador John Newell Jordan) for assistance; however, Japanese spies followed Gu Weijun’s move, and demanded that Gu Weijun be dismissed from the negotiation team. Tang Degang claimed that Gu Weijun still managed to disclose Japan’s 21 demands to Britain and US in a delicate way though he was excluded from diplomatic meetings; Gu disguised himself and slipped into the embassies in February of 1915. Tang further stated that Japan’s demands were in same spirits as the memorandum of Japan’s ‘black dragon society’ dated 29 Oct., 1914 or the later ‘Secret Tanaka Memorial’. Taking advantage of Sun Yat-sen’s rebellion, Japan threatened Yuan Shi-kai with possible support for the KMT rebels. (Tang Degang pointed out that there were two ‘treacherous’ letters by Sun Yat-sen, i.e., 11 May, 1914 letter to Japanese prime minister and 14 March, 1915 letter to foreign ministry.)

Seizing the opportunity which emerged by the onset of war in 1914, and by its status as an Allied power, Japan presented China with a secret ultimatum in January 1915 designed to give Japan regional ascendancy over China. The ultimatum was backed up by the threat of war.

8.2.1 The Twenty-One Demands of Japan

The Twenty-one Demands—comprising five groupings—required that China immediately cease its leasing of territory to foreign powers and to ascent to Japanese control over Manchuria and Shandong (Shantung) among other demands.

The Japanese government, following revision of the demands on 26 April, 1915, sent a final demand requiring agreement of the demands on 7 May, 1915. The following day, the Chinese government, aware of its inability to wage war against Japan, reluctantly agreed to Japan’s demands, although the intervention of both Britain (an ally) and the U.S. annulled demands by Japan that China accept government policy ‘advisors’. The U.S. in particular was wary of Japanese intentions in the Pacific.

The provisions of the ‘Twenty-one Demands’ were subsequently annulled by the Washington Conference of 1921-22 when Japan agreed to withdraw its troops from Shandong and to restore sovereignty to China.

Now we shall discuss these five groupings which incorporate numerous articles. These are the following:
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Group I

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, being desirous to maintain the general peace in the Far East and to strengthen the relations of amity and good neighbourhood existing between the two countries, agree to the following articles:

**Article 1**
The Chinese Government engage to give full assent to all matters that the Japanese Government may hereafter agree with the German Government respecting the disposition of all the rights, interests and concessions, which, in virtue of treaties or otherwise, Germany possesses vis-à-vis China in relation to the province of Shantung.

**Article 2**
The Chinese Government engage that, within the province of Shantung or along its coast, no territory or island will be ceded or leased to any other Power, under any pretext whatever.

**Article 3**
The Chinese Government agree to Japan’s building a railway connecting Chefoo or Lungkow with the Kiaochow Tsinanfu Railway.

**Article 4**
The Chinese Government engage to open of their own accord, as soon as possible, certain important cities and towns in the Province of Shantung for the residence and commerce of foreigners. The places to be so opened shall be decided upon in a separate agreement.

Group II

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, in view of the fact that the Chinese Government has always recognized the predominant position of Japan in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, agree to the following articles:

**Article 1**
The two contracting Parties mutually agree that the term of the lease of Port Arthur and Dairen and the term respecting the South Manchuria Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway shall be extended to a further period of 99 years respectively.

**Article 2**
The Japanese subjects shall be permitted in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia to lease or own land required either for erecting buildings for various commercial and industrial uses or for farming.

**Article 3**
The Japanese subjects shall have liberty to enter, reside, and travel in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and to carry on business of various kinds commercial, industrial, and otherwise.
Article 4
The Chinese Government grant to the Japanese subjects the right of mining in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. As regards the mines to be worked, they shall be decided upon in a separate agreement.

Article 5
The Chinese Government agree that the consent of the Japanese Government shall be obtained in advance:

1. whenever it is proposed to grant to other nationals the right of constructing a railway or to obtain from other nationals the supply of funds for constructing a railway in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and

2. whenever a loan is to be made with any other Power, under security of the taxes of South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.

Article 6
The Chinese Government engage that whenever the Chinese Government need the service of political, financial, or military advisers or instructors in South Manchuria or in Eastern Inner Mongolia, Japan shall first be consulted.

Article 7
The Chinese Government agree that the control and management of the Kirin-Chungchun Railway shall be handed over to Japan for a term of 99 years dating from the signing of this treaty.

Group III
The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, having regard to the close relations existing between Japanese capitalists and the Han-Yeh-Ping Company and desiring to promote the common interests of the two nations, agree to the following articles:

Article 1
The two Contracting Parties mutually agree that when the opportune moment arrives the Han-Yeh-Ping Company shall be made a joint concern of the two nations, and that, without the consent of the Japanese Government, the Chinese Government shall not dispose or permit the Company to dispose of any right or property of the Company.

Article 2
The Chinese Government engage that, as a necessary measure for protection of the invested interests of Japanese capitalists, no mines in the neighbourhood of those owned by the Han-Yeh-Ping Company shall be permitted, without the consent of the said Company, to be worked by anyone other than the Said Company; and further that whenever it is proposed to take any other measure which may likely affect the interests of the said Company directly or indirectly, the consent of the said Company shall first be obtained.
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Group IV
The Chinese Government engage not to cede or lease to any other Power any harbour or bay on or any island along the coast of China.

Group V
Article 1
The Chinese Central Government to engage influential Japanese as political, financial, and military advisers.

Article 2
The Chinese Government to grant the Japanese hospitals, temples, and schools in the interior of China the right to own land.

Article 3
In the face of many police disputes which have hitherto arisen between Japan and China, causing no little annoyance; the police in localities (in China), where such arrangements are necessary—to be placed under joint Japanese and Chinese administration, or Japanese to be employed in police office in such localities, so as to help at the same time the improvement of the Chinese Police Service.

Article 4
China to obtain from Japan supply of a certain quantity of arms, or to establish an arsenal in China under joint Japanese and Chinese management and to be supplied with experts and materials from Japan;

Article 5
In order to help the development of the Nanchang-Kiukiang Railway, with which Japanese capitalists are so closely identified, and with due regard to the negotiations which have been pending between Japan and China in relation to the railway question in South China, China to agree to give to Japan the right of constructing a railway to connect Wuchang with the Kiukiang-Nanchang and Hangchou and between Nanchang and Chaochou;

Article 6
In view of the relations between the Province of Fukien and Formosa and of the agreement respecting the non-alienation of that province, Japan to be consulted first whenever foreign capital is needed in connection with the railways, mines, and harbour works (including dockyards) in the province of Fukien.

Article 7
China to grant to Japanese subjects the right of preaching in China.
8.2.2 Negotiations Between the Imperial Government and China

The first reason why the Imperial Government opened the present negotiations with the Chinese Government is to remove the complications arising out of the war between Japan and China, and secondly to attempt to solve those various questions which are detrimental to the intimate relations of China and Japan with a view to solidifying the foundation of cordial friendship subsisting between the two countries to the end that the peace of the Far East may be effectually and permanently preserved. With this object in view, definite proposals were presented to the Chinese Government in January of this year, and up to today as many as twenty-five conferences have been held with the Chinese Government in perfect sincerity and frankness.

In the course of negotiations, the Imperial Government consistently explained the aims and objects of the proposals in a conciliatory spirit, while on the other hand the proposals of the Chinese Government, whether important or unimportant, have been attempted without any reserve. It may be stated with confidence that no effort has been done to arrive at a satisfactory and amicable settlement of those questions. The discussion of the entire corpus of the proposals was practically at an end at the twenty-fourth conference; that is on the 17th of the last month.

The Imperial Government, taking a broad view of the negotiation and in consideration of the points raised by the Chinese Government, modified the original proposals with considerable concessions and presented to the Chinese Government on the 26th of the same month the revised proposals for agreement, and at the same time it was offered that, on the acceptance of the revised proposals, the Imperial Government would, at a suitable opportunity, restore, with fair and proper conditions, to the Chinese Government the Kiaochow territory, in the acquisition of which the Imperial Government had made a great sacrifice.

On the first of May, the Chinese Government delivered the reply to the revised proposals of the Japanese Government, which is contrary to the expectations of the Imperial Government. The Chinese Government not only did not give a careful consideration to the revised proposals but even with regard to the offer of the Japanese Government to restore Kiaochow to the Chinese Government, the latter did not manifest the least appreciation for Japan's good will and difficulties. From the commercial and military point of view Kiaochow is an important place, in the acquisition of which the Japanese empire sacrificed much blood and money, and, after the acquisition the Empire incurs no obligation to restore it to China.

But with the object of increasing the future friendly relations of the two countries, they went to the extent of proposing its restoration, yet to her great regret, the Chinese Government did not take into consideration the good intention of Japan and manifest appreciation of her difficulties. Furthermore, the Chinese
Government not only ignored the friendly feelings of the Imperial Government in offering the restoration of Kiaochow Bay, but also in replying to the revised proposals they even demanded its unconditional restoration; and again China demanded that Japan should bear the responsibility of paying indemnity for all the unavoidable losses and damages resulting from Japan’s military operations at Kiaochow; and still further in connection with the territory of Kiaochow, China advanced other demands and declared that she has the right of participation at the future peace conference to be held between Japan and Germany.

Although China is fully aware that the unconditional restoration of Kiaochow and Japan’s responsibility of indemnification for the unavoidable losses and damages can never be tolerated by Japan, yet she purposely advanced these demands and declared that this reply was final and decisive. Since Japan could not tolerate such demands the settlement of the other questions, however compromising it may be, would not be to her interest. The consequence is that the present reply of the Chinese Government is, on the whole, vague and meaningless. Furthermore, in the reply of the Chinese Government to the other proposals in the revised list of the Imperial Government, such as South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, where Japan particularly has geographical, commercial, industrial and strategic relations, as recognized by all nations, and made more remarkable in consequence of the two wars in which Japan was engaged, the Chinese Government overlooks these facts and does not respect Japan’s position in that place.

The Chinese Government even freely altered those articles which the Imperial Government, in a compromising spirit, have formulated in accordance with the statement of the Chinese representatives, thereby making the statements of the Representatives an empty talk; and on seeing them conceding with the one hand and withholding with the other, it is very difficult to attribute faithfulness and sincerity to the Chinese authorities.

As regards the articles relating to the employment of advisers, the establishment of schools and hospitals, the supply of arms and ammunition and the establishment of arsenals and railway concessions in South China in the revised proposals, they were either proposed with the proviso that the consent of the Power concerned must be obtained, or they are merely to be recorded in the minutes in accordance with the statements of the Chinese delegates. Thus they are not in the least in conflict either with Chinese sovereignty or her treaties with the Foreign Powers, yet the Chinese Government in their reply to the proposals, alleging that these proposals are incompatible with their sovereign rights and treaties with Foreign Powers, defeat the expectations of the Imperial Government.

However, in spite of such attitude of the Chinese Government, the Imperial Government, though regretting to see that there is no room for further negotiations, yet warmly attached to the preservation of the peace of the Far East, is still hoping for a satisfactory settlement in order to avoid the disturbance of the relations. The Twenty-One Demands were annulled in 1922 at the Washington Conference by
China’s allies; Japan reluctantly agreed to recognize China as a sovereign State. To some extent, the implications of this seven-year-old treaty humiliated China and weakened its global position and support among her allies.

**Check Your Progress**

1. Why did Japan issue ultimatum to Germany on 15 August, 1914?
2. When did Japan first raise Twenty-One Demands?
3. How did Gu Weijun disclose Japan’s Twenty-One Demands?
4. What was the purpose of twenty-one demands of Japan?
5. What did Article 4 of Group V contain?
6. What were China’s demand for the restoration of Kiaochow Bay?
7. When and where was twenty-one demands annulled?

**8.3 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS QUESTIONS**

1. On 15 August, 1914, Japan issued an ultimatum to Germany to cede Jiaoshouwan Bay to Japan and Chinese sovereignty by 15 September, 1914.
2. On 8 January, 1915, Japan first raised Twenty-One Demands which were to force China into an equivalent semi-vassal status by taking advantage of European countries’ entanglement in World War I. Japan intended to force China into signing a ‘national defense treaty’, with stipulations that Japan could migrate millions of its citizens into their spheres of influence in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia.
3. Tang Degang claimed that Gu Weijun still managed to disclose Japan’s 21 demands to Britain and US in a delicate way though he was excluded from diplomatic meetings; Gu disguised himself and slipped into the embassies in February of 1915.
4. The Twenty-one Demands—comprising five groupings—required that China immediately cease its leasing of territory to foreign powers and to ascend to Japanese control over Manchuria and Shandong (Shantung) among other demands.
5. Article 4 of Group 5 contained the following: China to obtain from Japan supply of a certain quantity of arms, or to establish an arsenal in China under joint Japanese and Chinese management and to be supplied with experts and materials from Japan.
6. China demanded that Japan should bear the responsibility of paying indemnity for all the unavoidable losses and damages resulting from Japan’s
military operations at Kiaochow; and still further in connection with the
territory of Kiaochow, China advanced other demands and declared that
she has the right of participation at the future peace conference to be held
between Japan and Germany.

7. The Twenty-One Demands were annulled in 1922 at the Washington
Conference by China’s allies; Japan reluctantly agreed to recognize China
as a sovereign State.

8.4 SUMMARY

- Tang Degaug pointed out that Russia and Japan signed three secret treaties,
  with such clauses as dividing Manchuria Mongolia, should China’s revolution
  lead to national instability.
- Seizing the opportunity which emerged by the onset of war in 1914, and by
  its status as an Allied power, Japan presented China with a secret ultimatum
  in January 1915 designed to give Japan regional ascendancy over China.
  The ultimatum was backed up by the threat of war.
- The Twenty-one Demands—comprising five groupings—required that China
  immediately cease its leasing of territory to foreign powers and to ascend to
  Japanese control over Manchuria and Shandong (Shantung) among other
demands.
- The Japanese government, following revision of the demands on 26 April,
  1915, sent a final demand requiring agreement of the demands on 7 May,
  1915. The following day, the Chinese government, aware of its inability to
  wage war against Japan, reluctantly agreed to Japan’s demands.
- The two Contracting Parties mutually agree that when the opportune moment
  arrives the Han-Yeh-Ping Company shall be made a joint concern of the
  two nations.
- The first reason why the Imperial Government opened the present
  negotiations with the Chinese Government is to remove the complications
  arising out of the war between Japan and China.
- The discussion of the entire corpus of the proposals was practically at an
  end at the twenty-fourth conference; that is on the 17th of the last month.
- The Chinese Government even freely altered those articles which the Imperial
  Government, in a compromising spirit, have formulated in accordance with
  the statement of the Chinese representatives, thereby making the statements
  of the Representatives an empty talk.
- The Twenty-One Demands were annulled in 1922 at the Washington
  Conference by China’s allies; Japan reluctantly agreed to recognize China
as a sovereign State. To some extent, the implications of this seven-year-old treaty humiliated China and weakened its global position and support among her allies.

8.5 KEY WORDS

- The Allies of World War I: This is the term commonly used for the coalition that opposed the Central Powers of Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria during the First World War.
- The Washington Conference 1921-1922: Between 1921 and 1922, the world’s largest naval powers gathered in Washington, D.C. for a conference to discuss naval disarmament and ways to relieve growing tensions in East Asia.
- The Kiaochow-Tsinanfu Railway: According to treaty provisions, the Chinese Government consents to Japan’s building a railway from Chefoo or Lungkow to join the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu Railway.
- Kiaochow Bay: The Kiaochow Bay Leased Territory was a German leased territory in Imperial and Early Republican China which existed from 1898 to 1914.

8.6 SELF ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

Short Answer Questions
1. Mention the conflict between Japan and Germany on Jiaoshou-wan Bay.
2. Write in brief about Germany’s leased territory in China.
3. What was Gu Weijun’s role in disclosing Japan’s 21 demands to Britain and US?

Long Answer Questions
1. Discuss issues that led to conflict between Japan and Germany during the World War I in China.
2. Analyse the significance of Sino-German ventures during the period.
3. What was the main objective of Dr Sun Yat-Sen’s plan?
4. Analyse in detail the purpose of twenty-one demands of Japan.
5. Examine the process which led to the annulment of twenty-one demands.
8.7 FURTHER READINGS


9.0 INTRODUCTION

The Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance was the first treaty between a European power and an Eastern country, against a Western rival. The treaty was signed on January 30, 1902. In the backdrop of escalating Japanese imperialism, British commercial interests and the Russian interests in China faced immense threat. The treaty provided Japanese with the assurance that if either Japan or England became involved in war with any rival, the other country would not interfere and if the rival nations were more than one in number in case either Japan or England were attacked, the other country would provide help. So, Japan had garnered protection for itself in case Russia attacked in conjunction with Germany or France. Britain accepted Japan's domination of Korea.

In reality, the British had given the go-ahead to the Japanese to be aggressive in Korea and challenge the Russians. This actually happened in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, which made Japan the dominant force in Manchuria. The major theatres of operations were the Liaodong Peninsula and Mukden in Southern Manchuria and the seas around Korea, Japan and the Yellow Sea. The war concluded with the Treaty of Portsmouth, mediated by US President Theodore Roosevelt. The complete victory of the Japanese military surprised world observers.

9.1 OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit, you will be able to:

- Explain the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902
- Analyse Japan’s domination of Korea
- Discuss Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05
- Explain Russia’s multiple defeats by Japan

9.2 ANGLO-JAPANESE TREATY OF 1902

The first treaty between a European power and an Eastern country, against a Western rival was the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance. It was signed on 30 January, 1902. At that time, the foreign secretary of Britain was Henry Petty-Fitzmaurice, 5th Marquess of Lansdowne. He was a high-minded, charming aristocrat who persuaded the British to do away with its policy of ‘splendid isolation’.

The first outcome of this change was the treaty with Japan, which was negotiated between Lansdowne and the Japanese ambassador in London, Hayashi Tadasu in 1901. The restoration of the Meiji emperor in Japan in 1868 had brought about westernization and industrialization in Japan and for the British, the Japanese were considered a polite, methodical, competent, trustworthy nation – completely opposite of the Chinese. In the backdrop of escalating Japanese imperialism, British commercial interests and the Russian interests in China faced immense threat. Joseph Chamberlain expressed it thus: “our interests in China are so great, our proportion of the trade is so enormous and the potentialities of that trade are so gigantic that I feel no more vital question has ever been presented”.

At the same time, the Japanese were under pressure from the Russians in Korea, and Hayashi expressed this concern to Lord Lansdowne. He felt that the protection of Japan’s interests in Korea was ‘Japan’s first and last wish’. The treaty provided Japanese with the assurance that if either Japan or England became involved in war with any rival, the other country would not interfere and if the rival nations were more than one in number in case either Japan or England were attacked, the other country would provide help. So, Japan had garnered protection for itself in case Russia attacked in conjunction with Germany or France. Britain accepted Japan’s domination of Korea. However, veteran politicians like Ito Hirobumi were not happy with this arrangement and advocated that Japan should instead have made a pact with Russia wherein Russia got a free hand in Manchuria in return for Japanese domination in Korea. Ito felt that Britain’s imperial power was not as strong as before, but the Army Chief, a strong personality did not agree with Hirobiumi. The Army Chief, Yamagata Aritomo, argued that the Russians
will not be satisfied with Manchuria and eventually ask for more. He felt that Japan needed to intimidate Russia through powerful allies because Russia was bound to want to expand its territory in near future. Ito even went to St Petersburg in late 1901 to warn the Russians, but it didn’t yield anything. The treaty was eventually signed in London. The Japanese public, on the whole was jubilant at this development. In reality, the British had given the go-ahead to the Japanese to be aggressive in Korea and challenge the Russians. This actually happened in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, which made Japan the dominant force in Manchuria. The treaty was renewed in 1911 and the Japanese joined the Allied side in the First World War, but the alliance with Britain lapsed in 1923.

**Check Your Progress**

1. Why is Anglo-Japanese Treaty so important in the history of East Asia?
2. What had brought about westernization and industrialization in Japan?
3. Why was Ito Hirobumi not happy with this treaty?

### 9.3 RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR OF 1904-05: CAUSES, COURSE AND EFFECTS

The Russo-Japanese War was fought during 1904-1905 between the Russian Empire and the Empire of Japan over rival imperial ambitions in Manchuria and Korea. The major theatres of operations were the Liaodong Peninsula and Mukden in Southern Manchuria and the seas around Korea, Japan and the Yellow Sea.

Russia sought a warm-water port on the Pacific Ocean for its navy and for maritime trade. Vladivostok was operational only during the summer, whereas Port Arthur, a naval base in Liaodong Province leased to Russia by China, was operational all year. Since the end of the First Sino–Japanese War in 1895, Japan feared Russian encroachment on its plans to create a sphere of influence in Korea and Manchuria. Russia had demonstrated an expansionist policy in the Siberian Far East from the reign of Ivan the Terrible in the 16th century. Seeing Russia as a rival, Japan offered to recognize Russian dominance in Manchuria in exchange for recognition of Korea as being within the Japanese sphere of influence. Russia refused and demanded Korea north of the 39th parallel to be a neutral buffer zone between Russia and Japan. The Japanese government perceived a Russian threat to its plans for expansion into Asia and chose to go to war. After negotiations broke down in 1904, the Japanese Navy opened hostilities by attacking the Russian Eastern Fleet at Port Arthur, China, in a surprise attack.

Russia suffered multiple defeats by Japan, but Tsar Nicholas II was convinced that Russia would win and chose to remain engaged in the war; at first, to await the outcomes of certain naval battles, and later to preserve the dignity of
Russia by averting a “humiliating peace”. Russia ignored Japan’s willingness early on to agree to an armistice and rejected the idea to bring the dispute to the Arbitration Court at The Hague. The war concluded with the Treaty of Portsmouth, mediated by US President Theodore Roosevelt. The complete victory of the Japanese military surprised world observers. The consequences transformed the balance of power in East Asia, resulting in a reassessment of Japan’s recent entry onto the world stage. It was the first major military victory in the modern era of an Asian power over a European one. Scholars continue to debate the historical significance of the war.

Check Your Progress

4. Which were the major theatres of operations during the Russo-Japanese War?
5. What were the effects of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05?

9.4 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS QUESTIONS

1. The Anglo-Japanese Treaty occupied an important place in the history of East Asia. It was of greater importance because the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance was the first treaty between a European power and an Eastern country, against a Western rival.

2. The restoration of the Meiji emperor in Japan in 1868 had brought about westernization and industrialization in Japan and for the British, the Japanese were considered a polite, methodical, competent, trustworthy nation—completely opposite of the Chinese.

3. Veteran politicians like Ito Hirobumi were not happy with this arrangement and advocated that Japan should instead have made a pact with Russia wherein Russia got a free hand in Manchuria in return for Japanese domination in Korea. Ito felt that Britain’s imperial power was not as strong as before.

4. The major theatres of operations were the Liaodong Peninsula and Mukden in Southern Manchuria and the seas around Korea, Japan and the Yellow Sea.

5. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 concluded with the Treaty of Portsmouth, mediated by US President Theodore Roosevelt. The complete victory of the Japanese military surprised world observers. The consequences transformed the balance of power in East Asia, resulting in a reassessment of Japan’s recent entry onto the world stage. It was the first major military victory in the modern era of an Asian power over a European one. Scholars continue to debate the historical significance of the war.
9.5 SUMMARY

- The first treaty between a European power and an Eastern country, against a Western rival was the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance. It was signed on 30 January, 1902.
- The first outcome of this change was the treaty with Japan, which was negotiated between Lansdowne and the Japanese ambassador in London, Hayashi Tadasu in 1901.
- The treaty provided Japanese with the assurance that if either Japan or England became involved in war with any rival, the other country would not interfere and if the rival nations were more than one in number in case either Japan or England were attacked, the other country would provide help.
- The Army Chief, Yamagata Aritomo, argued that the Russians will not be satisfied with Manchuria and eventually ask for more. He felt that Japan needed to intimidate Russia through powerful allies because Russia was bound to want to expand its territory in near future.
- The treaty was eventually signed in London. The Japanese public, on the whole was jubilant at this development. In reality, the British had given the go-ahead to the Japanese to be aggressive in Korea and challenge the Russians.
- Since the end of the First Sino–Japanese War in 1895, Japan feared Russian encroachment on its plans to create a sphere of influence in Korea and Manchuria. Russia had demonstrated an expansionist policy in the Siberian Far East from the reign of Ivan the Terrible in the 16th century.
- Russia suffered multiple defeats by Japan, but Tsar Nicholas II was convinced that Russia would win and chose to remain engaged in the war; at first, to await the outcomes of certain naval battles, and later to preserve the dignity of Russia by averting a “humiliating peace”.
- The complete victory of the Japanese military surprised world observers. The consequences transformed the balance of power in East Asia, resulting in a reassessment of Japan’s recent entry onto the world stage. It was the first major military victory in the modern era of an Asian power over a European one. Scholars continue to debate the historical significance of the war.

9.6 KEY WORDS

- The Meiji Emperor: Emperor Meiji, or Meiji the Great, was the 122nd Emperor of Japan according to the traditional order of succession.
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- **Ivan the Terrible**: Ivan IV Vasilyevich, commonly known as Ivan the Terrible or Ivan the Fearsome, was the Grand Prince of Moscow from 1533 to 1547.

- **Tsar Nicholas II**: Nicholas II or Nikolai II, known as Saint Nicholas the Passion-Bearer in the Russian Orthodox Church, was the last Emperor of Russia, ruling from 1 November 1894 until his forced abdication on 15 March 1917.

- **The Treaty of Portsmouth**: This treaty formally ended the 1904–05 Russo-Japanese War. It was signed on September 5, 1905 after negotiations lasting from August 6 to August 30, at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Kittery, Maine, United States.

9.7 SELF ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

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9.8 FURTHER READINGS


Anglo-Japanese Treaty and Russo-Japanese War

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UNIT 10 EXPANSION OF JAPAN
(1905-1921)

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10.0 INTRODUCTION

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which aimed at containing the Russian expansion in East Asia, was further renewed in 1905 and 1911. Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War changed the power equation of the imperialist block in East Asia. Japan annexed Korea in 1910. However, the strengthening of Japanese imperialism in China and Korea changed the American attitude towards Japan. Japan became a bigger competitor than Russia. The United States was concerned that Japan’s victory over Russia would threaten American interests in the Philippines. The United States wanted to break the Japanese monopoly in the resource-rich Manchuria. Since it was not wise to engage Japan or Russia in war, the new policy was to create influence by breaking the financial monopoly of Japan. However, the United States plan was a total failure in that it actually strengthened the sphere of influence of Japan and Russia in Manchuria.

The First World War gave Japan an opportunity to neutralize German influence in Japan’s vicinity, expand her sphere of influence in China and also strengthen her international standing. After the end of the First World War, Japan and the United States started engaging in a more intense rivalry over China. In the Paris Peace Conference following the end of the war, the United States vociferously opposed Japan. To the United States, Japan was the main competitor after the war, as her interests clashed with Japan in East Asia. To counter Japan, the United States adopted a two-prong strategy of international alliances and individual diplomatic moves. The combination of the bilateral and multinational treaties brought down the scope of Japanese imperialist expansion while the United States secured agreements that strengthened her position vis-à-vis Japan.
In this unit, you will study about Japan’s expansion during 1905-21 and explains the rise of Japan till the World War II broke out.

10.1 OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit, you will be able to:
- State the expansion of Japan during the period of 1905-1921
- Learn the rise of Japanese in the 1990s
- Analyse Japan’s expansion in 1910s
- Explain Lansing-Ishii Agreement between Japan and the United States
- Enumerate acts of the imperialist powers in the 1920s
- Know Japan’s imperialist designs in the 1930s

10.2 RISE OF JAPAN IN THE WORLD WAR I

The twentieth century began with a major diplomatic success for Japan. On January 30, 1902, Japan and Britain concluded the Anglo-Japanese Alliance prompted by a common interest—Russian expansion in East Asia. The alliance was renewed in 1905 and 1911.

10.2.1 The 1900s: The Beginning of Japanese Imperialism

In the early 1900s, Russian advance in Manchuria was a common concern for all major imperialist powers; Japan in particular was concerned about Russian advance in Korea. Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War changed the power equation of the imperialist block in East Asia. Another significant consequence of Japan’s victory was the beginning of Japanese imperialism in Korea and Manchuria. In 1905, Japan made Korea a Japanese protectorate and in 1910 annexed Korea.

The United States mediated the Treaty of Portsmouth between Japan and Russia as a friendly country in 1905. However, the strengthening of Japanese imperialism in China and Korea changed the American attitude towards Japan. To the United States, Japan became a bigger competitor than Russia. The United States was concerned that Japan’s victory over Russia would threaten American interests in the Philippines. In July 1905, the United States Secretary of War William Howard Taft and the Japanese Prime Minister Katsura Taro concluded a secret agreement. According to the agreement, the United States acknowledged Japan’s position in Korea and Japan recognized U.S. control of the Philippines. In 1907, France and Russia signed agreements with Japan. After Japan’s victory over Russia, Japan had gained control of southern Manchuria while the northern part was under Russian control. However, the two countries often failed to maintain a workable relationship in Manchuria due to their old enmity. France seized this opportunity to extend friendship to Japan. France had been a party to the Triple Intervention in...
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1895 along with Russia and Germany to oppose the cession of Liaodong peninsula to Japan, which Japan had tried to extract from China after the Sino-Japanese War of 1895. France was an ally of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War as well. However, in view of Japan’s victory, France now wanted good relations with Japan. Therefore, France signed an agreement with Japan and helped Russia to sign one as well. The Franco-Japanese agreement pledged to maintain peace and territorial integrity of the provinces that were their spheres of influence in China. The Russo-Japanese agreement consisted of a public and a secret convention. The public convention stipulated the usual oft repeated open door policy of commitment to China’s territorial integrity and equal enterprise for all powers in China. The secret one demarcated the limits and rights of the two in Manchuria. The United States was alarmed by the new guardians of peace and integrity in China who challenged the United States open door policy.

The United States wanted to break the Japanese monopoly in the resource-rich Manchuria. Since it was not wise to engage Japan or Russia in war, the new policy was to create influence by breaking the financial monopoly of Japan. In 1909, the United States proposed to Britain to neutralize the Russian and Japanese owned railways in Manchuria by providing China a loan to buy them back, and in case that move failed, the two countries would jointly finance a railroad project in Manchuria. This proposal is known as the Knox Neutralization Proposal since the United States Secretary of State Philander Knox put forward the proposal. The United States policy of replacing belligerence with finance is known as dollar diplomacy. The United States took the proposal of neutralizing foreign-owned railways officially to the governments of Russia, Japan, France, Britain and China. Japan and Russia came up with another agreement in July 1910, one public and one secret convention. Unlike the 1907 public convention, the present one did not mention the adherence to the open door policy. It rejected the proposal of neutralization of railways in Manchuria and declared that in case the status quo in Manchuria was disturbed, they would take any measure that they deemed fit to maintain the status quo. They warned China to consult the two before taking any decision concerning Manchuria. The secret convention reaffirmed the 1907 terms and proposed joint action in case of military intervention in Manchuria by any power. Britain and France officially backtracked. The United States plan was a total failure in that it actually strengthened the sphere of influence of Japan and Russia in Manchuria instead of destroying it, besides ending any prospect of financing any project in Manchuria.

10.2.2 The 1910s: Another Turning Point for Japan

The First World War was another major turning point for Japan. The war was predominantly a European affair with no immediate military threat to Japan. Still Japan joined the war, citing her obligation to honour the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902. According to the terms of the alliance, as an ally, Japan was bound to join any war in which Britain needed her help. In fact, Japan had a larger political and
Japan joined the First World War in support of the British Empire on the Allied side and declared war on Germany on August 23, 1914. By the end of 1914, Japan had captured all German holdings in China and also ousted the German residence completely from China. Japan also captured the German-held islands in the Pacific, north of the equator. As you studied previously, after Germany was completely defeated in China, China ended the war zones in January 1915. Using the ending of the war zones as an excuse, Japan presented a list of twenty-one demands to China. Japan sought to enforce her policy on China when the major Western powers were engaged in Europe. The United States was the only power that was in a position to act if she wished to, and she did. The United States protested, albeit taking care not to antagonize Japan, for the violation of the American open door policy. The United States declared that she would not recognize the special privileges Japan was extracting from China through the demands. This had no real impact on Japan; she only revised some of the atrocious demands that she had made. In May 1915, China accepted the modified demands and signed a treaty with Japan. France and Russia were not opposed to Japan’s policy, and Britain indicated that so long as Japan’s actions did not jeopardize British interest, Britain would not oppose Japan. The United States was not confident enough to challenge Japan openly under such circumstances. However, the United States was successful in stalling Japan’s move to obtain the exclusive control of Beijing. Even without Beijing, Japan’s gains were considerable.
As the war continued to drag on, the Western powers’ financial position weakened considerably. Only the United States and Japan were in a position to control China through the channels of financial imperialism. The two countries increased their competition for financial monopoly in China. The two sides met in Washington D.C. and signed an agreement called the Lansing-Ishii Agreement on November 2, 1917. According to the agreement, both countries pledged to uphold the open door policy in China. The United States acknowledged Japan’s ‘special interests’ in China due to her geographic proximity. This was, in effect, a contradiction of the open door policy. A secret protocol was attached to the public agreement. The secret protocol stated that Japan and the United States would not seek special rights or privileges in China taking advantage of the preoccupation of other nations in the First World War. The agreement was publicized to put to rest rumours of Japanese-American rivalry in China, and as evidence of friendly relations between them. To Japan, the agreement was a major diplomatic victory, as the United States agreed that Japan had special interests in China.

After the end of the First World War, Japan and the United States started engaging in a more intense rivalry over China. In the Paris Peace Conference following the end of the war, the United States vociferously opposed Japan. The Japanese delegation had two proposals: the inclusion of a racial equality clause in the League of Nations Charter and the transfer of all former German concessions to Japan. On the issue of racial equality, the United States President Woodrow Wilson, who chaired the Conference, ruled that a unanimous vote was required knowing fully well that Britain and Australia did not support the idea. As a result, the proposal was defeated despite a majority of votes supporting the measure. On the issue of the transfer of German concessions to Japan, the United States strongly
supported the territorial integrity of China. Due to Japan’s previous secret agreements with Britain, France and Italy mutually recognizing each other’s imperialist interests and Japan’s promise of military aid in the First World War, Japan managed to obtain the German concession of the Shandong peninsula in the Treaty of Versailles of 1919. However, it was only one-half of the rights that belonged to Germany. As a result, Japan became a member of the League of Nations, but walked out of the conference. The defeat of Japanese proposals turned Japan away from collaboration with the West. She started charting out a more nationalistic course of action in the next two decades.

10.2.3 The 1920s: Treaties to Curb the Japanese Influence

The destruction caused by the First World War did not stop the belligerent acts of the imperialist powers. The United States, Britain and Japan started a naval race soon after the conclusion of the peace treaties. The race had its root in Japan’s imperialist desires and the West’s pursuit to restrain Japan. One of the reasons behind it was a general conviction in Britain, France, Canada and the United States that Japan used the war to advance her hegemony in China rather than destroying German militarism. Secondly, the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 had outlived its purpose, as Russia no longer posed a threat to either Japanese or British interests. The United States and Canada were almost convinced that the alliance was directed towards them, despite repeated British assurances. These powers were in favour of replacing the alliance with a new and broader agreement covering other countries in the Pacific. To the United States, Japan was the main competitor after the war, as her interests clashed with Japan in East Asia. To counter Japan, the United States adopted a two-prong strategy of international alliances and individual diplomatic moves.

In a bid to stop Japan from strengthening her navy, the United States floated the idea of world peace and the immediate need for disarmament in 1921. Britain was comparatively financially weak so the idea was favourable to her. Japan was no threat to Britain. Moreover, considering the Unites States’ superior financial strength compared to Japan, Britain knew that the United States would surpass Japan eventually in the ongoing naval race. Britain also had no desire to allow Japan to grow more powerful. Therefore, Britain decided to switch sides and strengthen her relations with the United States. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 could not be terminated unless either of the signatories desired to. Japan certainly did not wish to terminate the alliance. Therefore, responding to the informal overtures of the United States, Britain proposed a naval agreement with the United States. The United States was amicable to the idea immediately. Since the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was scheduled for second revision in 1922, Britain communicated the proposal to Japan as well. China, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Portugal and Italy were also invited, as all these countries were directly or indirectly affected by the issues that the conference proposed to discuss. On November 11, 1921, the nine countries met in Washington D.C. to confer over East Asian issues. This
meeting is known as the Washington Conference or the Washington Naval Conference. There were two phases of the Conference. The first involved the issue of the limitation of naval armaments, and the second involved the issue of conflicting interests of the powers in the Pacific, which included China, Siberia and also Japanese mandated islands in the Pacific. Notably, neither the Far Eastern Republic of Siberia nor Russia was invited to the conference.

Japan had grown extremely powerful by the 1920s. According to competent naval experts of the day, to wage a successful naval war with Japan, a power would require at least double her naval strength and that too by operating from fortified naval bases closer to Japan. The Western powers could only corner her by threatening her militarily from the Pacific side, directed against the main islands of the Japanese archipelago and Formosa.

Three multilateral treaties were concluded after the end of the deliberations: the Four-Power Treaty, the Five-Power Treaty (also known as Washington Naval Treaty), and the Nine-Power Treaty. The signatories of the Four-Power Treaty, signed on December 13, 1921, were the United States, France, Britain and Japan. This treaty replaced the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. The signatories agreed to consult with each other before taking action in case of future crisis in East Asia. The signatories of the Five-Power treaty, signed on February 6, 1922, were the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy. It called for slashing of naval strength through controlled tonnage of each navy’s capital warships and deferment of building capital ships for ten years. The signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty, signed on February 6, 1922, were the United States, Britain, Japan, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal and China. In addition to the three multilateral treaties, a number of bilateral agreements were also concluded. Japan and China signed the Shandong Treaty, which stipulated that Japan would restore Shandong Province to China. The United States and Japan formed an agreement stipulating equal access of broadcasting facilities on the Japanese-controlled island of Yap. The combination of the bilateral and multinational treaties brought down the scope of Japanese imperialist expansion while the United States secured agreements that strengthened her position vis-à-vis Japan.

The United States Immigration Act of 1924 was another instrument to curb the Japanese influence. The Act limited the number of immigrants into the United States by a quota of two per cent of the total number of people of a particular country in the United States as of the 1890 national census. It thus restricted immigrants from Asia.

10.2.4 The 1930s: Japan’s Aggressiveness

Japan signed the treaties that emerged out of the Washington Naval Conference in the spirit of cooperation in world affairs despite losing some hard-earned privileges. This spirit of cooperation of the 1920s, however, gave way to excessive belligerence in the 1930s. Japan’s domestic politics and international inaction fuelled her imperialist designs in the 1930s. After the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution
and formation of Diet during the Meiji Period, political parties became increasingly important in administration. During the early Taisho Period (1912–1926), parliamentary democracy based on party politics started maturing as Japan changed its direction toward a democratic system of government. But the success was temporarily. The 1920s also witnessed political struggle between the liberals and leftists on one side, and the ultraconservatives on the other. After the Meiji era reformers retired, the civil-military collegiality was also lost. In the 1930s, the political parties were eclipsed by the ultranationalist military groups, which undermined the representative democracy of Japan.

The behaviour of the Western imperialist powers, such as racial discrimination and the restriction of naval expansion gave rise to ultra-nationalism in Japan. The civilian government lost control of administration and the military started acting autonomously. Despite government opposition, the Japanese army independently took the decision to invade Manchuria in 1931. Between 1932 and 1936, military officers ruled Japan. Japan’s declining economy was a major factor for Japan’s aggressive imperialism. During the First World War, Japan did brisk business supplying war equipment to the warring states. After the end of the war, this business died down. The rise of economic nationalism in the West in the 1920s also affected the Japanese economy. Coupled with the Great Depression and a devastating earthquake, Japan’s national economy was in shatters in the 1930s and resulted in spiraling prices, rising unemployment, falling exports and social unrest. In regular intervals, Japanese political leaders were assassinated. Manchuria was a source for raw materials and a way to increase security from the Soviet Union in the north. Therefore, the Japanese army with vivacious mass support intensified aggression in Manchuria.

The beginning of the decade of 1930s with attacks on Mukden (September 1931) and the founding of the Manchu Kingdom independent of China (February 1932) proved that the United States could not sufficiently reign in Japan. Japan withdrew from international agreements one after the other and refused to be dictated by any other power. It almost seemed that international protests encouraged Japan’s aggressiveness. In March 1933, Japan withdrew from the League of Nations and in December 1934, gave notice that she intended to withdraw from the Washington Naval Treaty. In the second half of the decade, Japan became even more aggressive after signing an Anti-Comintern pact with Germany (November 1936). The pact stipulated cooperation in defence against communist influence, but the secret provisions of the pact were directed against the Soviet Union. In 1937, Japan invaded the rest of China, violating the Nine Power Treaty. Within two years, major Chinese cities including Beijing, Nanjing and Shanghai came under Japanese control. A lack of effective action by Western powers emboldened Japan. The continental expansion that Japan undertook in Manchuria in September 1931 was the kind of military adventure that could not be restrained within the borders of Manchuria. After establishing the Manchu Kingdom, the Japanese had planned to create an independent state in northern China. By the
late 1930s Japanese ambitions of global leadership went beyond China. Japan announced the policy of ‘A New Order in East Asia’ in 1938. The concept of a ‘Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere’ emerged, which called for an Asian unification against Western imperialism under Japanese leadership, leading to a bloc of self-sufficient Asian nations. The new policies stemmed from the stalemate in the Second Sino-Japanese War, in which Japan took control of big cities, but faced stiff resistance in the countryside. Japan’s war against China merged into the Second World War.

Check Your Progress
1. What was the major consequence of Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War?
2. Why did the United States want to break the Japanese monopoly in Manchuria?
3. Why was the First World War regarded as turning point for Japan?
4. Why did the United States oppose Japan in the Paris Peace Conference?
5. How was Japan the main competitor of the United States after the war?
6. Who were the signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty?
7. Why is the early Taisho Period significant in Japan?
8. What was the concept of a ‘Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere’?

10.3 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS QUESTIONS

1. Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War changed the power equation of the imperialist bloc in East Asia. Another significant consequence of Japan’s victory was the beginning of Japanese imperialism in Korea and Manchuria. In 1905, Japan made Korea a Japanese protectorate and in 1910 annexed Korea.

2. The United States wanted to break the Japanese monopoly in the resource-rich Manchuria. Since it was not wise to engage Japan or Russia in war, the new policy was to create influence by breaking the financial monopoly of Japan. In 1909, the United States proposed to Britain to neutralize the Russian and Japanese owned railways in Manchuria by providing China a loan to buy them back, and in case that move failed, the two countries would jointly finance a railroad project in Manchuria. This proposal is known as the Knox Neutralization Proposal since the United States Secretary of State Philander Knox put forward the proposal.
3. The First World War was another major turning point for Japan. The war was predominantly a European affair with no immediate military threat to Japan. Still Japan joined the war, citing her obligation to honour the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902. According to the terms of the alliance, as an ally, Japan was bound to join any war in which Britain needed her help. In fact, Japan had a larger political and military purpose in joining the war. Germany’s concessions in Shandong Province, which she had extracted from China in 1898 was a threat to Japan’s security. The war gave Japan an opportunity to neutralize German influence in Japan’s vicinity, expand her sphere of influence in China and also strengthen her international standing.

4. In the Paris Peace Conference following the end of the war, the United States vociferously opposed Japan. The Japanese delegation had two proposals: the inclusion of a racial equality clause in the League of Nations Charter and the transfer of all former German concessions to Japan. On the issue of racial equality, the United States President Woodrow Wilson, who chaired the Conference, ruled that a unanimous vote was required knowing fully well that Britain and Australia did not support the idea. As a result, the proposal was defeated despite a majority of votes supporting the measure. On the issue of the transfer of German concessions to Japan, the United States strongly supported the territorial integrity of China.

5. To the United States, Japan was the main competitor after the war, as her interests clashed with Japan in East Asia. To counter Japan, the United States adopted a two-prong strategy of international alliances and individual diplomatic moves.

6. The signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty, signed on February 6, 1922, were the United States, Britain, Japan, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal and China. In addition to the three multilateral treaties, a number of bilateral agreements were also concluded.

7. During the early Taisho Period (1912–1926), parliamentary democracy based on party politics started maturing as Japan changed its direction toward a democratic system of government. But the success was temporarily. The 1920s also witnessed political struggle between the liberals and leftists on one side, and the ultraconservatives on the other. After the Meiji era reformers retired, the civil-military collegiality was also lost. In the 1930s, the political parties were eclipsed by the ultranationalist military groups, which undermined the representative democracy of Japan.

8. The concept of a ‘Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere’ emerged, which called for an Asian unification against Western imperialism under Japanese leadership, leading to a bloc of self-sufficient Asian nations. The new policies stemmed from the stalemate in the Second Sino-Japanese
Expansion of Japan
(1905-1921)

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10.4 SUMMARY

- The twentieth century began with a major diplomatic success for Japan. On January 30, 1902, Japan and Britain concluded the Anglo-Japanese Alliance prompted by a common interest—Russian expansion in East Asia. The alliance was renewed in 1905 and 1911.
- The United States mediated the Treaty of Portsmouth between Japan and Russia as a friendly country in 1905. However, the strengthening of Japanese imperialism in China and Korea changed the American attitude towards Japan.
- The Russo-Japanese agreement consisted of a public and a secret convention. The public convention stipulated the usual oft repeated open door policy of commitment to China’s territorial integrity and equal enterprise for all powers in China.
- The United States wanted to break the Japanese monopoly in the resource-rich Manchuria. Since it was not wise to engage Japan or Russia in war, the new policy was to create influence by breaking the financial monopoly of Japan.
- The First World War was another major turning point for Japan. The war was predominantly a European affair with no immediate military threat to Japan. Still Japan joined the war, citing her obligation to honour the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902.
- As the war continued to drag on, the Western powers’ financial position weakened considerably. Only the United States and Japan were in a position to control China through the channels of financial imperialism. The two countries increased their competition for financial monopoly in China.
- After the end of the First World War, Japan and the United States started engaging in a more intense rivalry over China. In the Paris Peace Conference following the end of the war, the United States vociferously opposed Japan.
- Japan became a member of the League of Nations, but walked out of the conference. The defeat of Japanese proposals turned Japan away from collaboration with the West. She started charting out a more nationalistic course of action in the next two decades.
- The destruction caused by the First World War did not stop the belligerent acts of the imperialist powers. The United States, Britain and Japan started a naval race soon after the conclusion of the peace treaties. The race had its root in Japan’s imperialist desires and the West’s pursuit to restrain Japan.
In a bid to stop Japan from strengthening her navy, the United States floated the idea of world peace and the immediate need for disarmament in 1921. Britain was comparatively financially weak so the idea was favourable to her. Japan was no threat to Britain. Moreover, considering the United States’ superior financial strength compared to Japan, Britain knew that the United States would surpass Japan eventually in the ongoing naval race.

Three multilateral treaties were concluded after the end of the deliberations: the Four-Power Treaty, the Five-Power Treaty (also known as Washington Naval Treaty), and the Nine-Power Treaty.

The United States Immigration Act of 1924 was another instrument to curb the Japanese influence. The Act limited the number of immigrants into the United States by a quota of two per cent of the total number of people of a particular country in the United States as of the 1890 national census. It thus restricted immigrants from Asia.

Japan signed the treaties that emerged out of the Washington Naval Conference in the spirit of cooperation in world affairs despite losing some hard-earned privileges. This spirit of cooperation of the 1920s, however, gave way to excessive belligerence in the 1930s.

During the First World War, Japan did brisk business supplying war equipment to the warring states. After the end of the war, this business died down. The rise of economic nationalism in the West in the 1920s also affected the Japanese economy.

In March 1933, Japan withdrew from the League of Nations and in December 1934, gave notice that she intended to withdraw from the Washington Naval Treaty. In the second half of the decade, Japan became even more aggressive after signing an Anti-Comintern pact with Germany (November 1936).

After establishing the Manchu Kingdom, the Japanese had planned to create an independent state in northern China. By the late 1930s Japanese ambitions of global leadership went beyond China.

10.5 KEY WORDS

- **Knox Neutralization proposal**: The United States Secretary of State Philander Knox proposed neutralization plan of all railways in Manchuria.

- **The Washington Naval Treaty**: It is also known as the Five-Power Treaty, the Four-Power Treaty, and the Nine-Power Treaty. This was a treaty signed during 1922 among the major nations that had won World War I, which agreed to prevent an arms race by limiting naval construction.
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- **Taisho Period**: The Taisho period, or Taisho era, is a period in the history of Japan dating from 30 July 1912, to 25 December 1926, coinciding with the reign of the Emperor Taishô.

- **The League of Nations**: This was an intergovernmental organisation founded on 10 January 1920 as a result of the Paris Peace Conference that ended the First World War. It was the first worldwide intergovernmental organisation whose principal mission was to maintain world peace.

- **The Anti-Comintern Pact**: This was an anti-Communist pact concluded between Germany and Japan on November 25, 1936, and was directed against the Communist International.

- **The Second Sino-Japanese War**: This was a military conflict fought primarily between the Republic of China and the Empire of Japan from July 7, 1937, to September 2, 1945. It began with the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in 1937 in which a dispute between Japanese and Chinese troops escalated into a battle.

10.6 SELF ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

**Short Answer Questions**

1. Write a short note on the Japanese imperialism in Korea and Manchuria.
2. Briefly mention the Franco-Japanese agreement.
3. Mention the United States’ strategy to counter Japan.
4. What was the significance of the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution?
5. What was the impact of Japan’s withdrawal from international agreements?

**Long Answer Questions**

1. Discuss the significance of Manchuria for the Western powers and Japan.
2. Analyse the purpose of agreements which France and Russia signed with Japan.
3. Examine the scope of the Washington Naval Conference.
4. “In the early 1930s, a lack of effective action by Western powers emboldened Japan.” Justify this statement.
5. Discuss the continental expansion of Japan from 1905 to 1921.
10.7 FURTHER READINGS


UNIT 11 WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

NOTES

11.0 INTRODUCTION

Although the new League of Nations replaced the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, a common refrain was that it might be of little help in addressing the problems of Asia. Nitobe Inazo, who was named Under Secretary-General, pointed out that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union, Japan’s most important neighbors, were members, and that the organization provided a forum for the weak that seemed to limit the influence of Japan, which was the only major power in Asia. Doubts had already been raised by nationalists about the benefits of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, but the new organization seemed to remove from Japan whatever protection that alliance had conveyed. The conference produced a network of interrelated agreements that can be described as the ‘Washington Conference system’; it set the parameters of Pacific policy and security for the rest of the decade.

The rise of militant forces in Japan resulted not from a seizure of power by a new political party but from the growing influence of such elements at the top of political hierarchy. During the mid-1930s, the influence of the military and extreme nationalists over the government steadily increased. In the late 1920s, a new and frequently lethal form of factionalism developed through associations formed by classmates of the military academy.

Political tensions in Japan increased in 1928 when Zhang Xueliang, son and successor of the Japanese puppet Marshall Zhang Zuolin resisted Japanese threats and decided to integrate Manchuria into the Nanjing republic.
In this unit, you will study about Japan’s growing status after the Washington Conference, Japanese clamour for a new international order, the rising militarism and the Manchurian crisis.

### 11.1 OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit, you will be able to:

- State Japan’s position at the Washington Conference
- Learn Japan’s growing status in the world
- Analyse the benefits of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance
- Explain the rise of militarism in Japan
- Enumerate the various facets of Manchurian crisis

### 11.2 THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE AND THE ERA OF INTERNATIONALISM

Japan occupied a place of honor in the new League of Nations, which now replaced the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in Japanese diplomacy. It was a mark of Japan’s growing status that Nitobe Inazo, the Sapporo student and Tokyo educator mentioned earlier, was named Under Secretary-General, thereby symbolizing an era of internationalism. A new generation of intellectuals, teachers, and students shared fully in the world-wide hope that this new era would find Japan taking its rightful place at world conference tables. Others, and perhaps most, of the Meiji generation found the new international order badly flawed and regretted that in the absence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance there was no secure special place for Japan. Even so, the optimistic, committed and internationalist Nitobe noted that the new League of Nations might be of little help in addressing the problems of Asia. He pointed out that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union, Japan’s most important neighbors, were members, and that the organization provided a forum for the weak that seemed to limit the influence of Japan, which was the only major power in Asia. Even before this, however, there had been voices urging caution before subscribing to an Anglo-American view of the world.

Konoe Fumimaro (1891–1945), scion of Japan’s most distinguished aristocratic house and descendant of the Fujiwaras, was invited by Saionji Kinmochi to accompany him to the Paris Peace Conference. To Saionji’s consternation, the young prince, who had recently graduated from the Philosophy Faculty of Kyoto Imperial University, published a short essay in which he voiced his misgivings about the prospect of an ‘Anglo-American peace.’ He raised the distinction between ‘have’ and ‘have-not’ powers. The Western allies now so intent on peace, he pointed out, already had everything they wanted and were chiefly interested in sustaining the status quo. It was easy for them to blame everything on German
aggression, for that had come later than their own. A disconcerted Saionji warned the young man to keep his views to himself, but the fact is that many Japanese were full of doubts about the benefits of the new international system. Doubts had already been raised by nationalists about the benefits of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, but the new organization seemed to remove from Japan whatever protection that alliance had conveyed. It was not, that much could be expected of the old alliance in the future, for the increasingly close cooperation between the United States and Great Britain raised doubts about the utility of the English alliance. It was clear that Britain would not support Japan in a possible struggle with the United States, but it was also clear that Japan lacked the strength to challenge both powers.

Other voices resisted this parochialism and spoke for internationalism, and the Washington Conference on naval limitations was one result. First, and most important, was the fact that all participating nations had embarked on massive programs of naval build-up during the war; none could sustain these in peace, but each needed the assurance that limitations on building would not disadvantage it in future competition. Second, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance came up for renewal or replacement in 1922. It was obvious that Britain would never join Japan in a war against the United States, and therefore, some new structure of security was required to replace it. And finally the turbulent state of Chinese politics made it incumbent on the powers to agree on cooperative steps in dealing with the floundering Chinese republic. Military equipment, so recently plentiful in Europe, was now flooding into Asia. There was thus every reason to convene a conference to address these problems. Ozaki Yukio, a confirmed political maverick, had returned from a post-war trip to Europe convinced that security could not be maintained without a cooperative agreement for arms retrenchment. A motion he filed in the House of Representatives was defeated by a crushing vote, but he then took the issue to the people by traversing the country to address large audiences about disarmament. In a crude public opinion poll he distributed postcards at all his meetings, and of the 31,519 that were returned to him, 92 per cent favored his proposals. Clearly many Japanese were in favor of international cooperation. At the Washington Conference, Japan was represented by Ambassador to the United States Shidehara Kijuro, Tokugawa Iesato, and Admiral Kato Tomosaburo. The conference produced a network of interrelated agreements that can be described as the ‘Washington Conference system’; it set the parameters of Pacific policy and security for the rest of the decade.

The famous Tanaka Memorial was a document submitted to the Japanese emperor in 1927 by Baron Tanaka, the premier of Japan. This document outlined in detailed steps a program of Japanese imperialist expansion, beginning with establishment of Japanese control in Manchuria and leading eventually to domination of all China, Indonesia, the South Sea Islands, the Maritime Provinces of USSR and, eventually, India and the whole Pacific basin.
11.2.1 Treaties for Naval Limitation

A Four Power Pact, with the United States and France included, replaced the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Its members pledged themselves to respect the status quo in the Pacific and to consult if the security of any one power was threatened. Naval limitation was at the center of the negotiations that followed. In Japan a ‘fleet faction’ had advocated the construction of eight battleships and eight cruisers. The Anglo-American counter proposal was for a moratorium on all construction of capital ships—battleships and heavy cruisers—and adoption of a tonnage ratio of 10 for the United States and Great Britain to 6 for Japan. Japanese negotiators argued vainly for a 10/7 ratio, but accepted the smaller figure under the condition that substituted several newer ships for others to be decommissioned. The essential security for Japan, however, lay in the guarantee that additional bases would not be built in the Pacific Ocean sites, with exceptions made for Hawaii, Singapore, and Japan itself. Japan’s fleet faction was discontented with this, but Admiral Kato’s prestige was great enough to quiet vocal naval opponents (though not, it will be noted, Prime Minister Hara’s assassin). These arms limitation agreements had no real precedent and seemed to bring an assurance of peace in the Pacific. It has to be remembered that they affected capital ships only, and that the extension of this to smaller ships at the London Conference in 1930 was far more rancorous. Aircraft carriers were still things of the future and not regulated, but the Japanese, who had more confidence in the future of air power, managed to refit several battleships under construction and slated for ‘scraping’ as aircraft carriers.

The last treaty signed, the Nine Power Treaty, was designed to protect Chinese sovereignty. The powers profiting from ‘unequal treaties’ with China pledged to respect China’s territorial sovereignty, maintain the ‘Open Door’ in trade, and cooperate in helping China achieve unity and stability. In the early 1920s Japan moved to live up to the commitments it had made at Washington. The former German holdings in Shantung were returned to China. Japanese troops were withdrawn from Siberia and Northern Sakhalin, and under the leadership of Goto Shinpei normalization of relations with the new Soviet government was worked out. Japan lived up to the commitments it had made with respect to naval limitations, and it was for some time a full participant in cooperative efforts to work out new tariff and customs arrangements for China. In each of these cases, however, opinion within Japan was far from united; Prime Minister Hara lost his life to an assassin, the armed services had factions that sought a larger army and navy, and some argued the case for expansion, but there were reasons to think that Japanese leaders would be able to see the advantages of the new international order.

11.2.2 The Rise of Militarism in Japan

The rise of militant forces in Japan resulted not from a seizure of power by a new political party but from the growing influence of such elements at the top of political hierarchy. During the 1920s, a multi-party system based on democratic practices...
appeared to be emerging. Two relatively moderate political parties, the Minseito and the Seiykai, dominated the Diet and took turns providing executive leadership in the cabinet. Radical elements existed at each end of the political spectrum, but neither militant nationalists nor violent revolutionaries appeared to present a threat to the stability of the system. In fact, the political system was probably weaker than it seemed at the time. Both of the major parties were deeply dependent on campaign contributions from powerful corporations and conservative forces connected to the military or the old landed aristocracy were still high influential behind the scenes. As in the Weimar Republic in Germany during the same period, the actual power base of moderate political forces was weak, and politicians unwittingly undermined the fragility of the system by engaging in bitter attacks on each other.

Political tensions in Japan increased in 1928 when Zhang Xueliang, son and successor of the Japanese puppet Marshall Zhang Zuolin resisted Japanese threats and decided to integrate Manchuria into the Nanjing republic. ‘You forget’, he told one Japanese official, ‘That I am Chinese’. Appeals from Tokyo to Washington for a US effort to restrain Chiang Kai-shek were rebuffed. Already suffering from the decline of its business interests on the mainland after 1929 Japan began to feel the impact of the Great Depression when the United States and major European nations raised their tariff rates against Japanese imports in a desperate effort to protect local businesses and jobs. The value of Japanese exports dropped by 50 percent from 1929 to 1931 and wages dropped nearly as much. Hardest hit were the farmers as the price of rice and other staple food crops plummeted. At the same time, militant nationalists, outraged at Japan’s loss of influence in Manchuria, began to argue that the Shidehara policy of peaceful cooperation with other nations in maintaining the existing international economic order had been a failure. It was undoubtedly launched in Mukden in the early fall of 1931.

During the early 1930s civilian cabinets sought to cope with the economic challenges presented by the Great Depression. By abandoning the gold standard, Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi was able to lower the price of Japanese goods on the world market and exports climbed back to earlier levels. But the political parties were no long able to stem the growing influence of militant nationalist’s elements. Despite its doubts about the wisdom of the Mukden incident, the cabinet was too divided to disavow it, and military officers in Manchuria increasingly acted on their own initiative.

In May 1932, Inukai Tsuyoshi was assassinated by right-wing extremists. He was succeeded by a moderate, Admiral Saito Makoto, but ultra-nationalists patriotic societies began to terrorize opponents, assassinating business men and public figures identified with the policy of conciliation toward the outside world. Some, like the publicist Kita Ikki, were convinced that the parliamentary system had been corrupted by materialism and Western values and should be replaced by a system that would return to traditional Japanese values and imperial authority.
His message, ‘Asia for the Asians’, had not won widespread support during the relatively prosperous 1920s but increased in popularity after the Great depression, which convinced many Japanese that capitalism was unsuitable for Japan.

During the mid-1930s, the influence of the military and extreme nationalists over the government steadily increased. Minorities and left-wing elements were persecuted and moderates were intimidated into silence. Terrorists tried for their part in assassination attempts portrayed themselves as selfless patriots and received light sentences. Japan continued to hold national elections and moderate candidates continued to receive substantial popular support, but the cabinets were dominated by the military or advocates of Japanese expansionism. In February 1936, junior officers in the army led a coup in the capital city of Tokyo, briefly occupying the Diet building and other key government installations and assassinating several members of the cabinet. The ringleaders were quickly tried and convicted of treason, but widespread sympathy for the defendants strengthened the influence of the military in the halls of power even further.

11.2.3 The Manchurian Crisis

On the night of 18 September, 1931, a section of the South Manchuria Railway near Mukden was blown up by explosives planted along the tracks. Almost simultaneously Japanese forces invested and occupied the Manchurian capital. This was part of a carefully prepared plan, put into operation by the Japanese military without prior consultation with the government at Tokyo, thereby producing a chain of crises which led ultimately to the Pacific War. Professor Liang’s study of the Mukden Incident, as it is called, is the latest volume of the Asia in the Modern World Monograph Series, prepared under the auspices of the Center of the Asian Studies of St. John’s University; he has made an admirable job not only of reconstructing the incident in minute detail, but also of placing it within a broad historical perspective. He does this by tracing the rising militarist spirit among the younger Japanese army officers, by probing the various clandestine conspiracies in which these young officers were involved, and by analyzing the impact of the incident and its aftermath. Let us discuss the key features of the Manchurian crisis. These are the following:

A. Manchuria: The Centre of Japanese expansion

The three north-eastern provinces of China—Liaoning (or Fengtien), Kirin, and Heilungkiang—were the homeland of China’s ruling Manchus. Non-Chinese often referred to the area as ‘Manchuria.’ Manchu legislation had tried to prevent Chinese immigration into this area, but those restrictions had become a dead letter in the nineteenth century. The area, together with the province of Jehol, lay immediately north of the Great Wall, and the Shanhaikuan mountain pass served as entry to the province of Hopei, in which the capital of Peking was located. In the twentieth century Japanese references to the ‘Manchurian-Mongolian problem’ (Man-Mo
mondai) referred also to the Manchu dependency of Inner Mongolia, of which the most important part was the province of Chahar. After the fall of the CH'ing in 1911, it was common to speak of the area as though it had become a political vacuum, unstable, under populated, and poorly defended against the new Soviet state to the north. As early as 1823 the political economist Sato Nobuhiro (1769–1850) wrote that Japanese expansion should begin with ‘the place we can most easily take, Manchuria, which we can seize from China. It will not be difficult for us to take advantage of China’s decline.’ In his time this was blustery expansive rhetoric, but a century later there was more to the argument.

B. The Japanese presence in Manchuria

The Japanese presence in Manchuria had been won from Russia in the Treaty of Portsmouth of 1905 and bolstered by extensions of the lease won under the Twenty-one Demands a decade later. South Manchuria, as it was known, consisted of the Liaotung Peninsula tip of Liaoning Province with the defensive site of Port Arthur and the port of Dairen (Dalian) and that portion of the former Chinese Eastern Railway extending south from Changchun to Dairen, henceforth known as the South Manchurian Railroad. The administration of this area was divided into a complex pattern of overlapping jurisdictions. Beginning with general Foreign Ministry primacy, the structure changed to the advantage of the military during and after World War I with a largely unified military command, only to revert to civilian leadership during the administration of Prime Minister Hara. The leased area of Liaotung Peninsula was administered by a bureaucracy headed by a governor appointed by the throne. In some ways, however, the most strategic position was that of head of the South Manchurian Railroad (SMRR), an organization capitalized by impressive government and private sources but government controlled. Its first head was Goto Shinpei, earlier an architect of empire in Taiwan (after the 1923 earthquake, Goto was charged with the reconstruction of Tokyo.) The SMRR became the economic engine of imperialism in Northeast China. It controlled coal mines at Anshan, Fushun, and Yentai in addition to other mining, electrical, and warehousing enterprises. Along the railway Japan controlled police, taxation, public facilities, and education. Its generous funding included provision for research activities that grew constantly in importance and enrolled the talents of some of Japan’s best scholars. In the cities there were also police, responsible to the consuls. The consulates established in the principal cities and particularly ports were under the control of the Foreign Ministry. Manchuria was testing ground for the careers of many future leaders. The future diplomat and postwar Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru won his spurs as consul in Manchuria.

Matsuoka Youseke (1889–1946), a diplomat whose flamboyant style distinguished Japan’s crisis years, and who entered the Foreign Ministry within a year of Yoshida, served as executive and president of the SMRR before becoming foreign minister. He was credited with coining the phrase that Manchuria and
Mongolia was Japan’s ‘lifeline’, a term that came into wide use. Security was entrusted to the Kwantung Army, literally ‘east of the barrier,’ in reference to the Shanhaikuan pass between China proper and the eastern provinces. This force also experienced a number of changes in administrative accountability, but by 1931 its commander was responsible to the army minister and the Imperial Army General Staff. Its strength was calculated on a ratio of men per mile of railway track. The Kwantung Army consisted of one division that was rotated from regional regiments in Japan every two years, and six independent garrison battalions. The army had shrunk slightly during the military retrenchment carried out under Army Minister General Ugaki Kazushige in 1925, but Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi had restored its strength in consequence of the return of Soviet forces to Eastern Asia. Kwantung Army staff officer Colonel Komoto Daisaku had engineered the murder of the warlord Chang Tso-lin in 1928. It will be recalled that Tanaka had promised Emperor Hirohito to investigate that incident, and that his government had fallen because of his failure to keep that commitment. Komoto had meanwhile been succeeded by two quite extraordinary officers; they, in turn, were due for rotation back to Japan in 1931.

Colonel Itagaki Seishiro (1885–1948), like his colleague Lt. Colonel Ishiwara Kanji (1889–1949), was far removed from the old Choshu mainline of army leaders. He was born in northern Iwate, and Ishiwara in Yamagata. Both excelled in the Military Academy and the War College. Itagaki, somewhat senior, headed the Kwantung Army’s Staff Planning section; later he was posted to commands in China before Prime Minister Prince Konoe Fumimaro called him back to be his war minister in 1937. Later, now promoted to general, he returned to China as Chief of Staff of the China Expeditionary Force. After Japan’s surrender he was listed as a major, Class A suspect by the International Tribunal that met in Tokyo and, after the trial, executed in 1948 as a war criminal. His younger colleague Ishiwara was a more interesting nonconformist. He had graduated second in his class at the War College and received the cherished ‘imperial sword.’ His commitment to Nichiren Buddhism may have been a factor in the apocalyptic vision of war he developed. Personal knowledge of the destruction caused by World War I in Europe moved some civilians like Ozaki Yukio to call for disarmament and internationalism, but other Japanese, army students of war, came to sharply different conclusions. In three years of study in Germany Ishiwara drew on the writings of Frederick the Great, Napoleon, and von Moltke to work out views that he delivered as lectures in the Army War College upon his return. What he saw coming was a series of ever greater wars that would culminate in a final, titanic struggle between Japan, as hegemony of Asia, and the United States as leader of the Western world. That, however, would not come until technology had advanced to the point where airplanes could circle the globe without refuelling. In the meantime the need was for the conquest of Manchuria in order to develop it as a resource base in preparation for war with the Soviet Union.
C. The Manchurian Incident

In 1937 Ishiwara, then on duty in the General Staff, opposed the China War as a diversion from this larger strategic plan. His non-conformist demeanour and crusty independence blighted his army career, but that in turn probably helped save him from greater responsibility. After the war was over, and he was being questioned by interrogators for the International Tribunal, he lashed back by lecturing his questioners with the reminder that it was Commodore Perry, whose opening of Japan to the dangers of a pitiless international system, who was to be blamed for Japan’s war with America. The Manchurian Incident was by no means the product of insubordination on the part of free-wheeling military activists. It was the product of meticulous planning and preparation, carried out in a context of complex personal and group affiliations. To begin with, Soviet announcement of a Five-Year Plan in 1928 brought with it fears of a resurgent enemy to the north. Chinese Communist forces contributed to this insecurity by restructuring party control in parts of Manchuria. Chang Hsueh-liang had inherited the power of his father, Chang Tsol-in, in Fengtien, and his accession to Kuomintang rule in 1928 and Shidehara’s recognition of the Kuomintang government of Chiang Kai-shek the following year added fears of erosion of Japanese autonomy in the leased area of Liaotung. Along the Korean border, in the Chientao region, hostility between Chinese and Korean settlers, many of them refugees from Japanese rule, provided room for charges of ‘outrages’ against Japanese subjects.

Japanese settlers in South Manchuria, particularly a Youth League, were vociferous in calling for protection. In the summer of 1929 Itagaki and Ishiwara convened a study group and organized reconnaissance tours for Kwantung Army staff officers. Ishiwara lectured them about his theories of coming war. Out of this came a full proposal, printed by the Kwantung Army, for Japanese takeover of Manchuria in three stages. Other military officers, however, were at work with more sweeping plans to revamp the central government. Prime Minister Hamaguchi had selected General Ugaki, who had carried out retrenchment a half-decade earlier, as his army minister, and he, in turn, set out to strengthen his control of army policy by a series of personnel shifts. As the rotation date for Kwantung Army staffers approached, junior officers in Tokyo misread Ugaki’s position, and began to see him as a possible leader for a military takeover of the central government. In the 1931 March Incident, a group of field-grade officers (members of a ‘Cherry Blossom Society’), and General Staff figures (Koiso Kuniaki and Tatekawa Yoshitsugu), encouraged by civilian right-wing theorists (Okawa Shumei), hoped that by attacking the prime minister’s office (occupied by Shidehara, Hamaguchi having already been fatally wounded) and headquarters of the political parties and organizing a crowd of thousands, they would be able to get the army to declare martial law as prelude to the appearance of Ugaki, as the man on horseback, to restore order. It was not to be. Ugaki held back, military leaders thought Manchuria more urgent, and the crowd did not materialize. The affair
remained a secret; the planners were reassigned, and some to the Kwantung Army, whose turn came next.

In April, Prince Saionji had to propose a new prime minister to succeed Hamaguchi, who had succumbed to his assassin’s bullet. Fearful that a complete turnover might lead to additional violence, he secured the appointment of Wakatsuki Reijiro as prime minister. Shidehara was still foreign minister, but he too was experiencing difficulties. Negotiations with the Kuomintang government at Nanking had been going well until Saburi Sadao, Shidehara’s emissary who was trusted by the Chinese, died under mysterious circumstances, either suicide or, more probably, murder. Ugaki, the failed hero of the March Incident, was succeeded by General Minami Jiro as army minister, and he in turn began to struggle with additional budget cuts ordered by Finance Minister Inoue Junnosuke. Rumors of army restiveness alarmed the Foreign Ministry, and Prince Saionji made it clear to Army Minister Minami that the palace expected discipline and restraint. On the other hand Mori Kaku, a Seiyukai leader, was in full sympathy with Manchurian agitation and advised all party representatives to utilize the Manchurian-Mongolian ‘problem’ in their rhetoric.

D. Efforts to limit the Incident

Plotters had better success in Manchuria. In the days preceding the explosion that triggered the Manchurian Incident an unsavory group of Japanese had collected at Kwantung Army headquarters. Amakasu Masahiko, who had murdered Osugi Sakae in 1923, was there with money sent by Japanese rightists. Even better financed was Colonel Komoto Daisaku, who had arranged for Chang Tso-lin’s murder. Arrogance, avarice, and dishonesty found shelter under the claims of crisis. Kwantung Army officers were in touch with associated figures in the Tokyo General Staff, but those men, doubting the timing though personally favoring the coup, dispatched Tatekawa Yoshitsugu, freshly disappointed that March, to the scene to urge caution and delay. Kwantung Army plotters, aware of Tatekawa’s mission, deflected him when he arrived with a round of partying that delayed his appearance at headquarters. When he was ready to resume his mission the next morning, a bomb had already gone off on the South Manchurian tracks at Liutiaokou, just north of Mukden; and few bodies in Chinese uniforms bore witness to the vigilance of Kwantung Army guards charged with policing the SMRR right of way. The dead Chinese soldiers, it would be said, had imperiled Northeast Asia by planting the bomb. The damage was slight, for the next south-bound train managed to arrive in Mukden on schedule. Nevertheless the ‘Incident’ had taken place.

Ishiwara had been worried about the reaction of Kwantung Army commanding General Honjo Shigeru, fearful that he might, despite his personal desires, be receptive to orders for caution from Tokyo. He need not have been. Honjo had just completed inspection trips to Kwantung Army posts, but Ishiwara had managed to insulate him from contact with Foreign Ministry officials at Mukden.
for Honjo’s cooperation was essential to the plan. Chang Hsueh-liang, who had a much larger Fengtien Army force under his command, was also a possible problem, but in the event Chang helped the cause by issuing orders to his commanders they were under no circumstances to return Japanese fire, in order to avoid provocation. When Ishiwara pressed Honjo for action pleading the need for resolution, the commander reflected briefly and then said, ‘Yes, let it be done on my responsibility.’

Within hours the Kwantung Army had achieved its initial military objectives against the Fengtien Army. Once the forces were engaged, pleas of military necessity were used as justification for additional moves, giving the lie to promises from the Tokyo civilian government that these were steps taken to preserve order and that no further expansion was contemplated. Those in positions of responsibility were anxious to limit the Incident and regain control of events, while the field and junior grade officers that peopled the General Staff and Army Ministry were jubilant that the Manchuria-Mongolia ‘problem’ was finally being addressed. In Tokyo the atmosphere was electric with rumors of plots to take on the home government. A nervous government did its best to hush things up to avoid destabilizing the situation, but this had the effect of magnifying rumors. The reality was bad enough.

A few weeks after violence broke out in Manchuria Lieutenant Colonel Hashimoto Kingoro of the Second Division, General Staff, and stalwarts of the Cherry Blossom Society conceived a bizarre plan to wipe out the entire government by aerial bombardment of a cabinet meeting; a crowd of rightists would then surround the War Ministry and General Staff headquarters and demand the creation of a military government. For this ‘October Incident,’ which never took place, Hashimoto received twenty days’ confinement from superiors who did their best to deny that anything untoward had taken place. Hashimoto’s name was to surface again later in the decade in connection with the shelling of an American ship, the Panay, on the Yangtze.

It is remarkable that indiscipline and terrorism on this scale could threaten Japan’s stability so suddenly. But one has to factor in deep currents of underground dissatisfaction that characterized Japanese society in the 1920s. We have noted sporadic violence against individual capitalists, and military insubordination in Manchuria in 1928. The Imperial Army had deep fissures between those who conceived and carried out retrenchment, like General Ugaki, and others who deplored such steps. Right-wing ideologues feared a rise in social radicalism as a result of rapid industrialization at the same time that they justified their own direct action as measures to ‘save’ the villages. Constant talk of a ‘China problem’ and criticism of the government’s ‘weak’ diplomacy prepared many for relief that something was finally being done to address those matters. Young hotheads like Hashimoto could get nowhere without the support of staff officers like Ishiwara and Itagaki, and they in turn needed at least tacit approval from their superiors. Fear of even worse violence combined with military bonding to produce quiet approval or at least tolerance.
Demands for ‘reform’ at home reverberated with calls for ‘solution’ abroad. Army activists served as point men for widespread doubts about the health and direction of Japanese society and polity. Guardians of that polity, the aging Saionji and colorless senior statesmen who were struggling with problems of economic depression and international opprobrium retreated while giving as little ground as possible, hopeful that the tide would turn their way again in days to come. These tactics, if they can be so described, led to bizarre confrontations.

On 8 September 1932, General Honjo and his staff were treated like conquering heroes at the imperial palace. Horse-drawn carriages provided by the Imperial Household met them at the station and carried them across the famous ‘Double Bridge’ onto the palace grounds. After lunch, in the unstructured questions that followed Honjo’s report on military matters in Manchuria, Emperor Hirohito startled his guests by asking whether there was any substance to stories that the ‘Incident’ was actually a plot by certain individuals. A silence fell on the gathering; Honjo rose, bowed, and then stood at attention. ‘I too,’ he said, ‘have heard it said that this had been engineered by some army men and divisions, but I assure Your Majesty that neither the Kwantung Army nor I were involved in anything of the sort.’ Ishiwara, who was among those present, is said to have muttered, ‘Someone’s been talking out of turn to His Majesty.’ In Manchuria the Kwantung Army continued its advance; aerial bombardment and rapid advance brought all three eastern provinces under Japanese control.

E. Violation of the Nine Power Pact

Japan was now in clear violation of the Nine Power Pact and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of Paris. Other developed economies were reeling under the impact of the world depression, however; readers were inured to stories of civil war and banditry in China, and condemnation of Japan was by no means certain. What made it so was the steady series of failures by civil officials to get the military to abide by the assurances they offered other governments, the drumbeat of violence within Japan as well as overseas, and the pointless truculence and hyperbole of Japanese officials in international contexts. Civilian and diplomatic spokesmen sensed that acceptability to the army was gradually becoming a criterion for selection, and this resulted in rhetoric designed for Japan as much as for the outer world. By the time General Honjo received his welcome in the imperial palace momentous steps had been taken for the Northeastern Provinces. On 13 December 1931, the hapless Wakatsuki government was replaced by a Seiyukai cabinet under the veteran Inukai Tsuyoshi.

On 3 January 1932, the Kwantung Army took Chinchow, which it had earlier promised not to occupy. A few days later representatives of the Foreign Ministry, army, and navy agreed on the establishment of an independent state in Manchuria. The next day a Korean threw a bomb at the Emperor’s carriage outside the palace gate, bringing Prime Minister Inukai’s offer—which was
rejected—of resignation. The following week several Japanese Buddhist priests were killed in Shanghai, leading to hostilities between Japanese naval and marine forces and the Chinese Communist Ninth Route Army that was withdrawing from the Peking area. Prime Minister Inukai called for elections to the House of Representatives. Seiyukai speakers were urged to emphasize the importance of reaching a solution to the Manchuria-Mongolian issue, and won a solid majority over the Minseito. There was additional violence. Inoue Nissho, a Nichiren priest, organized a Blood Brotherhood Band on January 31, recruiting volunteers to assassinate prominent persons as symbols of the capitalist-internationalist order. Former minister of finance Inoue Junnosuke (on February 9) and Mitsui chairman Baron Dan Takuma (on March 5) fell victim to its members, others of whom went on to collaborate with navy officers returned from the fighting at Shanghai to gun down Prime Minister Inukai in his residence on May 15. During all this the Kwantung Army tightened its grip on Manchuria by taking Harbin on February 5. On March 1, just after the arrival of the Lytton Commission, which the League of Nations dispatched to make an on-the-scene investigation of the affair, the announcement of the ‘independent’ state of Manchukuo was made. The capital of the new state was to be at Hsinking (the former Changchun), and the head of the new state was to be Hsuan Tung, the last Ching emperor (known in the West as Henry Pu Yi), who had taken refuge in Tsinan after being expelled from the Forbidden City by warlord conflict.

On September 15 Japan extended diplomatic recognition to the new state. In the Imperial Diet the House of Representatives had gone on record with a unanimous vote advocating such recognition three months earlier, and Uchida Yasuya, who had been Japanese representative to the Pact of Paris and was now appointed foreign minister, had assured the Diet that Japan was prepared to carry out a ‘scorched-earth diplomacy’ against those who stood in its way. Japanese internationalism, the Shidehara China policy, and indeed the entire Washington Conference order that had structured East Asia for a decade were thus seemingly at an end. A Japan that had warned against the Ch’ing Empire in 1894 as a representative of modernity and progress was now proposing to re-create that rule under its own auspices in north-eastern China.

F. The Lytton Commission Report

By the time the Lytton Commission submitted its report on October 2, in other words, Japan was well committed to an independent course and matters were no longer negotiable. Matsuoka Yosuke returned to Geneva; also there, largely to monitor him, was Lt. Colonel Ishiwara, who had organized the entire ‘Incident.’ The Lytton Commission had visited Japan and China and spent six weeks in Manchuria trying to sort things out. Its verdict, while damaging to Japan’s case, was by no means completely hostile to the Japanese cause. Matsuoka, however, would brook no criticism and led his delegation out of the hall when he saw the certainty of a defeat in the League’s General Assembly. Before doing so he
astonished his hearers by depicting Japan as crucified by world opinion, and predicted that verdicts on Japan would change just as they had on Jesus of Nazareth. Japan announced its withdrawal from the League, although its representatives continued to work with the many specialized agencies of that organization. In a matter of weeks the goals that Japanese diplomacy had pursued since 1868—gaining equality through cooperation with the largest of the Great Powers—were thrown to the wind. It is not difficult to understand the dilemma that faced liberal and conservative leaders who had come to maturity under the goals of the old order.

Most of them hesitated, hoping that the climate of opinion would change once again. To this end it was important to persuade the West that Japan had not completely or permanently abandoned its policies of international cooperation, and simultaneously to assure Japanese that the Western condemnation did not mean a permanent severance of ties. A group of distinguished diplomats with wide foreign contacts sent reassuring messages to the London Times and other organs of opinion. The ailing Nitobe Inazo, once under-secretary of the League who had vowed never to visit America so long as the Immigration Law stood, changed his mind to embark, despite ill health, on a lecture tour from which he never returned. When the government’s hasty translation of the Lytton report seemed stark and provocative to a group of liberal academics, they worked throughout the night with George Sansom, the distinguished English diplomat and scholar, to rework it in the vain hope that milder wording would help their cause. At every point, however, the military seemed to carry the day. In January 1933 Japanese forces seized the mountain barrier of Shanhai Kuan that controlled the Peking plain, and a month later Chinese forces evacuated the province of Jehol in response to an abrupt Japanese ultimatum. The borders of Manchukuo were not yet clearly defined, but Japan was committed to its creation and defense.

11.2.4 Manchukuo: Eastward Course of the Empire

Once the Kwantung Army had occupied all of Manchuria, the question arose of what to do with it. Kwantung Army planners had made up their minds and prepared plans for a semiautonomous state before they could precipitate hostilities. A ‘colony’ on the lines of Taiwan or Korea would be needlessly provocative, and it would furthermore be under the control of the colonial bureaucracy of the Tokyo government. A semi-autonomous state, on the other hand, could be billed as ‘independent’ and allied with Japan. Ishiwara saw this as essential to his larger strategic goals, and at one point even speculated about abandoning his Japanese citizenship to accept that of the new Manchurian state. He himself might have voted for a republican arrangement there, but the advantages of having a Manchu ruler were compelling.

The last Manchu ruler, Pu yi, who had reigned as a child from 1909 to 1912, was prevailed upon to return as head of state of Manchukuo in 1932. Two
years later he was enthroned as emperor of the ‘Manchukuo Imperial Government’ with the reign title Kang-te (Prosperity and Virtue). Full imperial status for Pu yi might have seemed a challenge to that of Hirohito, but what made that approval count was the diffusion of mass media that had developed between the wars. No doubt much of this was market driven, but its impact and significance is none the less for that. The great dailies Osaka Mainichi and Asahi, with their metropolitan editions and suburban satellites, blanketed the country with exciting headlines and jubilant extras. As their circulation grew they developed into joint stock companies, handsomely capitalized and capable of buying airplanes that could carry correspondents to the front and rush copy and photographs back. Until paper shortages and rationing prevented it, magazines without number detailed the opportunities of the new frontier, and the popular Kodansha house ‘turned its string of magazines into cheering sections for the Kwantung Army.’ Radio supplemented this, and in an era of rapid electrification of the countryside supplemented the staccato rattle of infantry fire. The army had only recently suffered from currents of antimilitarism, and in seeking to reverse those it launched what was probably the first drive to contact ordinary Japanese. Officers back from the front were sent on lecture tours, symposia on Manchuria enlisted knowledgeable scholars and travellers, and surveys revealed the impact of these tactics on even hitherto sceptical university students. What was most effective was a campaign to show the need for a ‘national defense state’. The whirl of the printing press and the rhetoric from lecture podiums drove home the dangers of Soviet Russian resurgence on the continent, the facts of Japan’s resource-poor state, its disadvantage in a world of unfairly critical ‘have’ nations, and the history of Western aggression and exploitation that began with Perry’s black ships. Intellectuals were not left out of this campaign; in many ways they helped to lead it. Prospects for employment for university students, so recently darkened by depression, rose with the prospect of challenges in the new empire. The tide of explicitly Marxist analysis in social science that had been prominent in the 1920s changed under the pressures of orthodoxy and intimidation, but assumptions of state and bureaucratic leadership in economic development fit smoothly with the army’s drive for planned growth in Manchukuo. A Five-Year Plan was announced in 1936 in a backhanded compliment to that of the Soviets in 1928. There were new challenges and new opportunities.

Moreover, the facade of Manchukuo independence seemed to offer a path by which to transcend the old imperialism. It was as modern as Soviet planning, Italian corporatism, German state socialism, and the American New Deal. Planning involved close study of society and economy, and research institutes proliferated at home and abroad. Graduates of reputable institutions were sure of employment. More surprising, in some ways, was the fact that Manchurian institutes, particularly the enormous enterprise sponsored by the South Manchurian Railroad, were hospitable to Marxist and left-wing scholars who were being targeted by the thought control police at home. Until those purges extended to Manchuria after the opening of the Pacific War in 1941, many who were advocates of revolutionary change
and social planning at home found employment on the continent. Manchuria held out a role for every talent. Urban planners cramped by Japan’s narrow space and crowded streets laid out boulevards and parks in the new capital. Academic builders had their chance in the ‘Nation-Building University’ in Hsinking. Transportation experts could lay out new broad-gauge lines to supplement the South Manchurian and Chinese Eastern (which was purchased from the Soviet Union in 1934). Tourist hotels, beginning with the luxurious Yamato in Dairen, sprang up along the major lines, and the ‘Asia Express’ with its up-to-the-minute rolling stock, much of it more elegant than anything to be found in Japan itself, carried Japanese tourists along routes that had once transported Manchurian soybeans and little else.

Manchuria absorbed immense quantities of capital investment in the drive to develop a heavy industry base. It became, in Louise Young’s words, a sinkhole for capital, and resources at a time when immense armament programs were also being carried out in Japan. Much of this capital was in the form of state-guaranteed bonds; private enterprise regarded the new equities more warily. The major zaibatsu firms had to carry a heavy part of this load, but ‘new’ zaibatsu, especially Nissan, whose head Ayukawa enjoyed close relations with the military, were particularly active in the growth of iron and steel works. Inevitably there were contradictions and conflicts along the way as well. Textile exporters relied heavily on the Chinese market, but anti-Japanese boycotts reduced them to the much less important sector of Manchuria. Here their interests conflicted directly with those of Kwantung Army planners; the Japan-based firms wanted low tariffs to maximize their exports, while Manchukuo authorities were in desperate need of tariff income to finance heavy industry. As the continental planners had their way what began as a favorable trade balance became a drain instead, and the businessmen were frequently and openly critical and even contemptuous of the programs produced by military planners.

Behind the orderly ports, sleek trains, and luxurious hotels the visitors saw there was also a harsher reality. The Kwantung Army advance took care of organized resistance, but the struggle for security of the interior lay ahead.

A. Manchukuo Army and Police Force

A ‘Manchukuo’ army and police force was organized, but for most of the decade that followed it required continual effort to control guerrillas and ‘bandits,’ many of them Communists from across the border. To combat this the Japanese organized secure and ‘purified’ villages with road and telephone contact with local constabulary units, and also emphasized propaganda about the benefits of the ‘kingly way’ (wang tao, or Japanese Odo) that was supposed to be the answer to nationalism and radicalism. As the 1930s wore on these efforts were increasingly, though never completely, successful; the harsh climate made it possible to separate guerrillas from their food supply in winter, and Japanese organizational efficiency, with its plethora of reports, charts, and surveys, gradually overcame the problem of security. The porous borders that made it possible for insurgents to obtain arms...
served Japanese purposes to the west and south in the form of opium distribution methodically pursued as a source of income. It was a pattern developed by splinter warlord regimes and Chinese rightists under the protection of treaty port extraterritoriality (which had itself, of course, come into being through the Opium War), but Japanese rule made possible a new scale, with official protection, that covered routes from Inner Mongolia to North and Central China. Meticulous records published only recently make it possible to trace the orderly flow of opium from the new territories as well as from Iran, the latter in Mitsui and Mitsubishi steamers. There was heavy Japanese migration to Manchukuo, almost all of it urban.

Jobs in administrative and transport facilities were tempting, and the Japanese population in the urban areas grew steadily. Kwantung Army planners, however, wanted settlers who could build a wall of defense villages, particularly along the northern border. Early Meiji settlement of Hokkaido had been based on similar *tondenhei*, or militia, units. But it was not as easy to persuade farm families to go north as it had once been to attract them to Hawaii and America’s West Coast. Propaganda campaigns worthy of Jay Hill’s blandishments about a northern plains ‘banana belt’ along the Northern Pacific Railroad sought out tenant and landless farmers. Visions of a ‘paradise’ with ownership of farms and woodlots adequate to support family and animals were held out, with subsidy for travel provided. Those who accepted found themselves on land their new government had taken from Chinese, frequently at an extortionate price or by mislabelling it as untilled, unaccustomed to the climate and terrain and unable to obtain the mechanized tools they had been promised. Many resorted to hiring Chinese farmers as laborers or even tenants.

Agricultural production grew, but far more slowly than had been hoped. As the war situation worsened and a Soviet invasion became probable the government callously drafted able-bodied male settlers while leaving their families defenceless along the border. Remarkably, bureaucratic inertia kept the program going long after it had once been to attract them to Hawaii and America’s West Coast. Propaganda campaigns worthy of Jay Hill’s blandishments about a northern plains ‘banana belt’ along the Northern Pacific Railroad sought out tenant and landless farmers. Visions of a ‘paradise’ with ownership of farms and woodlots adequate to support family and animals were held out, with subsidy for travel provided. Those who accepted found themselves on land their new government had taken from Chinese, frequently at an extortionate price or by mislabelling it as untilled, unaccustomed to the climate and terrain and unable to obtain the mechanized tools they had been promised. Many resorted to hiring Chinese farmers as laborers or even tenants.

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B. Soldiers and Politics

The Meiji leaders’ concern for their own position as the emperor’s chief advisers resulted in provisions that put him in personal command of the armed forces. The 1882 *Imperial Precepts to Soldiers and Sailors* had warned them to steer clear of politics, but the institutional structure made it even more certain that civilians’
decisions would not interfere with the military. The exception, and it was an important one, concerned budget allocations, which were in the hands of the Imperial Diet; demands for funding additional divisions and warships became constantly more pressing as Japan expanded its strategic interests. The Emperor could not, however, be trusted with military decisions, and an elaborate structure of advisers developed. They reported to him, but he was expected to legitimize their decisions and not to direct them. This structure included first of all the army and navy chiefs of staff who, after reporting to the emperor, transmitted his orders to the cabinet through the minister of the army and the minister of the navy. An additional advisory body was the Supreme War Council, made up of field marshals, fleet admirals, the service ministers, the chiefs of staff, previous holders of those posts, and additional military councillors selected by the Emperor from the generals and admirals.

There was also a Conference of Field Marshals and Fleet Admirals that came into play in times of crisis. After decisions had been reached, a Liaison Conference between army and navy chiefs prepared the agenda for an Imperial Conference. Throughout all this the emperor traditionally remained silent. Despite all the talk of ‘direct command,’ authority and responsibility were fragmented. No single person was really in charge, for the Meiji Constitution, by giving supreme command to the sovereign, denied it to anyone else. This was satisfactory only as long as a small and reasonably cohesive group of senior advisers was in the background to coordinate opinion, but by the 1930s that was no longer the case. Civilians were not involved at any point in this process of military decision making until they reached the very highest level, but military men, through outside ‘politics,’ played a major role in politics through their ability to break cabinets. The 1900 ordinance had seen to it that service ministers would be professionals on the active duty list, but it did not end there, and even when that requirement was relaxed in the 1920s military men and issues remained important. Between 1885 and 1945 there were 43 cabinets headed by 30 prime ministers, of whom half were military figures: 9 generals and 6 admirals.

Again, of the 494 civilian posts in those cabinets, 115 were occupied by generals and admirals. The military proportion was high in Meiji, lower in Taisho, and up again in pre-surrender Showa, with 62 of 165 posts. The Ministry of Finance, however, was never infiltrated by the military. A list of cabinets between that of Inukai Tsuyoshi and Suzuki Kantaro, who presided over the decision to surrender, illustrates this growing military influence. The chart gives evidence of instability rooted in insubordination, errors in judgment of the international system, and inability to build a dependable base of support in the Imperial Diet. Inukai was murdered. Okada escaped his would-be assassins, but his position was hopelessly compromised by the disgrace of the revolt. Saito and Hayashi were unable to handle a Diet that felt it was being denied its due, Hirota and Hayashi incurred the wrath of the army, and Konoe gave up in frustration, first when his policies in China were failing, and then when he was unable to stop or even slow the drift toward the war that his rhetoric had helped encourage.
Until his death in 1940 it fell to Saionji Kinmochi, the last genro, to suggest prime ministers. Saionji was now in his eighties, and made a point of consulting with senior court officials, among them Privy Seal Makino Shinken and Kido Koichi, whose steady advance through appointive posts brought him to palace prominence. In this he was dealing with the true political elite of the modern state; Makino was the son of O kubo Toshimichi while Kido was the grandson of Kido Takayoshi. Other senior court officials came in for consultation, as did, in less direct ways, former prime ministers, collectively thought of as ‘senior statesmen’, the ministers of the army and navy, and heads of political parties. The Seiyukai had won a decisive victory in elections Inukai had called in February 1932. When the prime minister was murdered in May the party selected Suzuki Kisaburo as his successor as party head, and it had every reason to expect that he would be named prime minister.

Saionji, however, neither liked nor trusted Suzuki, whom he considered extreme in his views, and the service ministers were opposed to another party cabinet altogether. The Minseito, now the opposition party, was also unenthusiastic about a Seiyukai cabinet led by Suzuki. Saionji moved toward an alternative: a retired admiral, Saito Makoto, a former governor general of Korea, was asked to form a ‘national unity’ cabinet. He would have reasonable Diet support from elements of both parties, and politics would be less partition at a time of national crisis. The decision to form a non-party cabinet proved to have momentous consequences, for there would not be another until after World War II. Yet at the time, in view of the crises occasioned by Manchuria, Shanghai, assassination, and international opprobrium, Saionji’s decision seemed reasonable to most Japanese. One can thus conceive of Saionji and other members of the ‘old guard’ giving ground, but slowly and reluctantly, to the demands of the military. They were also determined to avoid more direct imperial intervention in the process. At the outset, at least, Hirohito was upset and concerned by what was being done and probably willing to utilize his prestige and aura. There were two problems about this for Saionji: the first was adherence to his understanding of the role of a constitutional monarch; imperial intervention, he argued, would be contrary to the spirit of the Meiji Constitution. The other was Saionji’s awareness of currents of radicalism in the army. He did not like what he heard about disrespectful mutterings among young officers, and feared for the preservation of the monarch, or even the monarchy itself. This was a factor that would have absolute priority for him. Strong tides of factionalism, sectionalism, and ideology made the Imperial Army contentious and problematic.

A regional faction centered on Choshu and led by Yamagata Aritomo had dominated the high command since the early Meiji period. Yamagata lived until 1922; he remained powerful to the last, but the men who seemed to be his chosen successors fared poorly. Katsura Taro died after his attempt to form a third cabinet in the 2nd year of Taisho, and Terasaki Masatake, who seemed next in line, proved a dismal failure as prime minister and died in 1919. Leadership then passed to
Tanaka Giichi, who had, as has been mentioned, Russian experience before serving in Manchuria during the Russo-Japanese War. Tanaka led in organizing the army reserve and youth groups and served in the General Staff and as army minister in the Hara cabinet before assuming the presidency of the Seiyukai in 1925. He was associated with the planning of continental policy, but died in 1929 after incurring Emperor Hirohito’s displeasure for failing to keep his promise to investigate the murder of Chang Tso-lin. Leadership of the faction now passed to Ugaki Kazushige (Kazunari, 1868–1956). Ugaki was actually from Okayama and not from Choshu, but carried on Tanaka’s pattern of cooperating with the political parties, in his case the Kenseikai/Minseito, serving as army minister in the cabinets of Kato Takaaki and Hamaguchi Osachi before withdrawing to become governor general of Korea. The plotters in the March 1931 Incident had expected him to support their efforts and emerge as prime minister of an emergency government, but by failing to follow through he alienated them permanently. When he was authorized to form a cabinet in 1937 he was blocked by army opposition. The next year Ugaki served briefly as foreign minister under Prince Konoe, but resigned in protest against bureaucratic changes that weakened and compromised the Foreign Ministry. The long ascendancy of the Choshu faction aroused the antipathy of outsiders who rejected its dominance and condemned it as conservative and politically partisan. If resentment of Choshu monopolization of senior posts was one source of army factionalism, disagreement about spending priorities also divided army from navy. After the Russo-Japanese War navy leaders reconditioned some of the ships that had been captured from the Russians, but they soon realized that with the appearance of the British Dreadnought more basic steps would be required and demanded a large-scale building program. The army’s counter was to demand two additional divisions to handle its new responsibilities on the continent, a demand that brought down the Saionji cabinet in 1912 and lay behind the ‘Taisho political crisis’ that brought down Katsura. The scandals in navy procurement that brought down the Yamamoto cabinet in 1914 gave the army new advantages, and World War I, which opened new continental opportunities (the Twenty-one Demands, Terauchi’s ‘Nishihara’ loans to northern warlords, and especially the Siberian intervention), marked the end of the old pattern of cautious control.

In 1914 Prime Minister Admiral Yamamoto secured relaxation of the requirement that service ministers be selected from generals and admirals on the active list, making it possible to appoint retired officers to those posts. In response the army high command strengthened the powers of the General Staff to offset possible political interference in military affairs. World War I, however, brought defections at the center as well as a weakening of support throughout Japanese society. The international currents of anti-militarism and demobilization in which Japan shared have already been described. These might unite army factions, but internal disputes centered on the issue of army modernization to bring it up to standards that had been developed by the combatants in Western Europe. Tanaka Giichi, who had strongly supported the army’s demands for two additional divisions
and the Siberian intervention from his post in the General Staff, now realized that Japan would have to make choices in the troubled interwar years. His choice was for modernization combined with manpower limitations to make it possible to fund growth, and his alliance with the leadership of the Seiyukai—as the party became more favorable to heavy industry—followed the logic of that situation. Ugaki, though he cast his lot with the opposition political party, shared those goals. In 1922 the Army Ministry carried out economies by streamlining existing army divisions, in 1924 Ugaki demobilized four divisions altogether, and when he became army minister again in 1931 Ugaki proposed demobilizing the Konoe Imperial Guard Division. These moves were strongly resisted by opponents, who argued that since Japan’s continental enemies did not have technological superiority they should be opposed by conventional forces steeped in Japan’s indomitable spirit and trained for sudden attack. Advocates of modernization had their way, but carried the day by only a single vote in the Supreme War Council in 1924. One of the most powerful opponents was General Uchida Yasaku, a Satsuma man who had held office for more than a decade and gathered a strong following. Those who placed their hopes in ‘spirit’ rather than in modernization formed the nucleus of what became known as the Imperial Way (kodo ha) faction. Araki Sadao (1877–1966), whose obscurantism muddied the waters throughout the 1930s, became a spokesman for this persuasion.

Another issue that divided army leaders concerned the policy Japan should adopt toward nationalist China. Most viewed Shidehara’s willingness to recognize the Nanking government of Chiang Kai-shek as a threat to Japan’s position in Northeast Asia, and advocated full control of that area instead. These views were naturally strongest in the Kwantung Army staff, but those who held them had numerous allies in the General Staff. Intelligence on China was available from many sources. Major Chinese warlords had Japanese officers at their headquarters, sometimes as advisers. The center for processing this intelligence was the Second Bureau of the General Staff. While this post went to able graduates of the War College, its heads were unlikely to advance to positions directly charged with policy-making. Nevertheless they were far more strategically placed than their colleagues in the Army Ministry, who were somewhat constrained by that ministry’s relations with the civilian cabinet ministries.

In the late 1920s, a new and frequently lethal form of factionalism developed through associations formed by classmates of the military academy. These horizontal groupings, nurtured in nights of discussion lubricated by drink, produced men impatient with the caution of their superiors and committed to simple solutions based on the assumption that direct action to eliminate symbols of the old order would bring to power men more likely to be willing to take risks through decisive policies. These terrorists, for that is what they were, had no clear-cut program; as one of Inukai’s assassins explained to the court, ‘We thought about destruction first. We never considered taking on the duty of reconstruction. We foresaw, however,
that once the destruction was accomplished someone would take charge of the reconstruction.’ General Araki Sadao, army minister for the first half of the 1930s, was their hero. The vision of a spiritual and resurgent Japan he held up, blurred and indistinct, was exactly the sort of rhetoric they mistook for wisdom. He, in turn, saw them as admirable, if sometimes somewhat flawed, exemplars of the Japanese spirit; they were selfless patriots, and had no hesitation in committing their lives to the cause in which they believed so passionately. Unfortunately they also had no hesitation in committing other people’s lives, and their rashness must have made many conservatives think twice before warning their countrymen about the course Japan was taking.

These currents of perverted ultra-nationalism and factionalism merged in the half-decade between the Manchurian Incident and 1936 to make Japan a dangerous place for moderates. At the highest army level General Araki used his influence as war minister to have his ally Mazaki Jinzaburo appointed vice chief of staff, and together they managed to send members of the Choshu (that is, Tanaka and Ugaki) factions off to the Hastings in retaliation for their agreement on streamlining and modernizing the army, cooperation with the political parties, and eagerness to keep from provoking the Anglo-American powers. Japan, these men felt, should rely on its traditional values and not put its faith in modern machinery; indeed, some even decried modern weaponry as inhumane. Araki’s emphasis on ideology and ‘spirit’ lent a rather unreal character to his years as army minister. He felt that conflict with the Soviet Union was inevitable, and even opposed purchase of the Chinese Eastern Railway in 1934 on grounds that it would inevitably be booty after Japan’s victory over the Soviets. He retarded military modernization to favor subsidies for ‘the villages,’ and his confidence in the superiority of Japanese spirit was so strong that he was indifferent to gains in Soviet air power. During these days Japan’s policies continued to provoke anger in the West. When the Kuomintang regime added the province of Jehol to the responsibilities of Chang Hsueh-liang, the Kwantung Army seized it for its own as essential to the defense of Manchukuo. Everything north of the Great Wall was now under Japanese rule or protection. This was followed by skirmishing south of the Great Wall. The Nanking government’s Central Army, conscious of its continuing problem with warlord forces in the area, and bullied by Kwantung Army commanders, reluctantly agreed to a cease-fire (the Tangku Truce) in May 1933 whereby the area north of the Peking-Tientsin plain was demilitarized. In a sense the fighting with Chinese forces that had taken place since the Manchurian Incident was now ending, and had Japanese army field commanders abided by their own conditions peace might have been restored. The Nanking regime retained residual sovereignty over the area, but authority was delegated to local forces that were in no position to stand up to the Japanese. It was a pattern the Japanese would later try to extend to central China; there was, in James Crowley’s words, a relentless army expansionism at work, led by field commanders, but basically condoned and approved at higher army levels.
In April 1934, Amo Eiji, a Foreign Ministry spokesman, asserted that relations between China and Japan were solely the responsibility of those two countries, and that any interference in or assistance to China either politically or economically could only harm the situation. In effect, Japan was declaring a kind of Asian Monroe Doctrine and announcing the end of the entire structure of the Washington Conference system. The disarmament, cooperation in approaches to China, and mutual guarantees of that system now lay in ruins. James Crowley writes, ‘The Japanese government was by December 1933 committed to a policy which proposed to neutralize the influence of the Soviet Union, the Nationalist government of China, and the Anglo-American nations by a diplomacy rooted in the arrogance of Japan’s military forces.’ When Admiral Saito was followed by Admiral Okada as Prime Minister in 1934, it was Araki’s turn to go. He had trumpeted the coming ‘Crisis of 1935’ with the Soviet Union so insistently that he had alarmed men who thought it urgent to build strength for a longer struggle in the future. Nagata Tetsuzan, an advocate of military modernization who had been exiled to command of an infantry regiment by Araki, was now promoted to General and returned to the center as Director of Military Affairs in the Army Ministry. The ministry declared the importance of a total national defense state in a pamphlet that contained the arresting phrase that war was ‘the father of creation and the mother of culture.’ When Okada’s foreign minister, Hirota Koki, nevertheless seemed interested in the possibility of discussions of an agreement with the Nanking government, army figures were quick to warn of probable Chinese ‘impertinence’ if talks were initiated, and moved to head off that possibility by agreements between Japanese field commanders and local Chinese leaders. The Ho Umezu (10 June) and Chin Doihara (23 June 1934) agreements were designed to ward off the danger of Kuomintang authority in North China.

C. The Big Three

These events were, however, overshadowed by revolt in Japan, the largest, perhaps, since the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877. General Nagata Tetsuzan, who had taken decisive action against participants in a plot against the Government, was hacked to death in his office by a sword-wielding Colonel Aizawa. The public trial Aizawa received became a circus for ultranationalist emotionalism, as propagandists extolled the morality and patriotism of the defendant. Currents of emotion seethed so erratically that the Foreign Ministry gave up any attempt to work things out with Nanking. At home Professor Minobe Tatsukichi, whose ‘organ theory’ of the emperor’s role had long been accepted, suddenly became the target of a campaign that ended in his resignation from the House of Peers and the burning and banning of his books. To a large extent, Minobe was the innocent victim of internecine strife among professional patriots who were out to redress the ouster of Generals Araki and Mazaki. In this atmosphere of hysteria a group of civilian extremists conspired with young officers to stage a rebellion that broke out on February 26, 1936. The army’s First Division was slated for transfer to Manchuria; this, like the
impending transfer of Ishiwara and Itagaki from the Kwantung Army five years earlier, triggered the timing of the insurrection. In a late winter snowfall assassination squads moved out to remove the principal conservative members of the authority structure.

The recent prime minister and now Lord Privy Seal Admiral Saito (age 78), Inspector General of Military Education General Watanabe (62), who held one of the army’s ‘big three’ posts, and Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo (82) were awakened from their sleep and gunned down in their bedrooms. Admiral Suzuki Kantaro (69), grand chamberlain, was severely wounded but survived because his wife pleaded for the privilege of dispatching him herself. The captain in charge of the assailants explained to her that the admiral was dying for the good of the country, saluted the old man on the floor, and left. Still another group of soldiers attacked the inn in Yugawara, in the foothills of the Hakone Mountains, to deal with Saito’s predecessor as lord keeper of the privy seal, Count Makino Shinken (75). Policemen on guard exchanged shots with the surprised attackers, and Makino, together with his daughter, a nurse, and a policeman, made his escape from the back door. The most important squad was assigned to eliminate the prime minister. The soldiers quickly took possession of the official residence, only to err by shooting Admiral Okada’s brother-in-law, who resembled him somewhat, instead of the prime minister, who escaped by hiding in a closet. Okada was declared and assumed to be dead, but he managed to slip out of the residence in disguise a few days later. Nevertheless his political career was clearly at an end. While the assassination squads were doing their work, officers of the Imperial Guard Division led their men to take over the gates to the imperial palace. Possession of the emperor was nine-tenths of the game, they thought, and they prepared to separate Hirohito from his ‘evil advisers.’ They saw the sovereign as a bespectacled and nervous young man who could be persuaded by their own righteous integrity to appoint a military government, led by General Muzaki Jinzaburo as prime minister and Araki Sadao as home minister, to carry out a ‘Showa Restoration.’ Should he hesitate, one young officer was prepared to disembowel himself on the spot to drive home the point.

The conspirators’ plans to enter the palace, however, miscarried badly. They had hoped to gain access to the palace with reasonable decorum by presenting counterfeit orders, but the palace guard commanders on duty already had word of the murders that had been carried out and managed to block their entry. The rebels had reason to believe that sympathizers in the army high command were on their side, but after some initial waffling on the part of Imperial Way faction leaders, Emperor Hirohito’s personal outrage swung the balance against them. For a few days Japan witnessed something the Meiji founders had tried to avoid, personal and direct imperial rule. By not appointing a successor to Admiral Okada immediately the court, in effect, became the cabinet. In communiqué’s the high command initially described the rebels as an ‘uprising’ but gradually, with subtle
changes of terminology, they became a ‘rebel’ force. Additional and more dependable units were called into Tokyo to surround and doom the First Division core. The rebel leaders expressed satisfaction with initial statements that granted the purity of their motives, but to their consternation these never extended to approval of what they had done.

It is clear that the personal opposition, even fury, of young Emperor Hirohito was central to this shift. The surviving members of the Saionji court faction manoeuvred skilfully; they prevented the appointment of a successor cabinet, left the rebels in uncertainty and doubt, and finally ordered their commanders to give in. This time there was no tolerance for the brazen action of the rebel terrorists. Of those who had participated 1,483 men were interrogated, and 124 were prosecuted and tried in secret courts martial, 19 officers, 73 non-commissioned officers, 19 soldiers, and 10 civilians faced the court in separate trials. Secrecy prevented any of the histrionics that had marred earlier trials, and the courts’ refusal to entertain discursive explanations about motives made it possible to complete the proceedings in two months. Thirteen officers and four civilians were sentenced to death and another fifty to lesser sentences. Only three high officers, among them General Mazaki, were prosecuted; Mazaki was acquitted, and the others received light sentences. Right-wing leaders Nishida Zei (Mitsugi) and Kita Ikki, of whom more below, were executed, but financiers who had helped provide support were interrogated but not prosecuted.

Most Japanese were puzzled by this outcome; press and many spokesmen had praised the young officers’ ‘sincerity,’ and even the initial army announcement had seemed to suggest approval. Some, closer to the facts, felt the young officers had been used and then abandoned by their sponsors. General Ugaki indicated this in his diary, ‘How disgusting it is to watch these rascals, holding in one hand the matches and in the other the water hoses, setting fire and putting it out at the same time, inciting and purging young officers, pleading their cause and then claiming credit for having put them down’.

Much has been written about the insurrection and its leaders; it, and they, should not be dismissed out of hand. Many of the young officers were well connected, including one who was son-in-law of General Honjo, who was now the emperor’s aide-de-camp. Honjo pleaded his case for the leaders’ ‘sincerity’ with his ruler, but to no avail. Had the insurgents managed to take and control the palace, moreover, the ambivalence of the high command might have gone the other way. With this chapter, insubordination and violence on this scale now came to an end. The army high command became dominated by members of the faction dedicated to control and efficiency, bureaucrats and no longer ideologues. Abashed civilian ministers and the Imperial Diet granted the army huge budget increases, and within a year the China War turned attention abroad. Insubordination and rebellion appeared once more, but only at the very end of imperial Japan a decade later when young officers opposed to the surrender once more invaded the palace.
and seized radio stations in hopes of blocking the broadcast and reversing the
decision to surrender. That, too, failed.

The years of murderous insubordination were few, but they left their mark
on Japan. There was hysteria abroad in the land that seems difficult to reconcile
with the methodical bureaucratic leadership we have come to expect. That may
be one reason why the courage and idealism, however misplaced, of the young
officers made them appealing figures for contemporary observers and even for
post-war romantics like the novelist Mishima Yukio. As late as 1988 the discovery
of court records previously unknown fastened popular interest once more on this
strange era.

In army politics the suppression of the rebellion brought a moratorium on
the kind of factionalism that had caused so much bloodshed. A group that has
become known as the Control faction now did its best to end controversy by
getting rid of both the Imperial Way and the Ugaki partisans. Political affiliation
of any sort (Ugaki, after all, had worked closely with political party leaders) was
now to be avoided. When the emperor commanded Ugaki to organize a cabinet
in 1937 the army blocked his efforts. As Professor Kitaoka puts it, sectionalism
now replaced factionalism; the office of the army minister lost influence in relation
to that of the chief of General Staff. Army budgets, which had been kept in some
sort of check by Finance Minister Takahashi, suddenly increased by a dramatic
33 per cent as new officials embarked on massive spending programs designed to
lessen internal squabbling as much as to prepare for greater war. The future lay
with cool-headed, bureaucratic figures like General Tojo Hideki.

**11.2.5 The Sacralization of *Kokutai* and the Return to Japan**

The ‘purification of the army’ that was carried out by the surviving members of the
high command after the shake-up that followed the bloodletting of the February
26 revolt did not by any means end the careers of the targets or proponents of the
violence that had taken place. The Ugaki, ‘Choshu’ mainliners, and Araki ‘Imperial
Way’ leaders lost their places in the high command, but they reappeared in other
posts. Ugaki, who had served as Hamaguchi’s War Minister (and was the hope of
the plotters of the March 1931 Incident) then followed the Admiral Saito as governor
general of Korea from 1931 to 1936; the army vetoed him as nominee for prime
minister after the 1936 revolt, but he followed Hirota Koki as foreign minister
under Prince Konoe. After a few months he resigned in protest over the
downgrading of the Foreign Ministry that followed the establishment of an Asia
(Koain, later Koasho) ministry, and retired from public service altogether. The re-
emergence of Araki, who was to have become prime minister after the October
1931 plot and who took a fatherly view of the February 1936 rebel officers, was
more startling and fateful, for Konoe resurrected him to serve as minister of
education. In that post he presided over a crusade of spiritual rearmament designed
to make sure that every Japanese would, as he put it, have as the first and major
element of his identity the consciousness that ‘I am . . . a Japanese.’ What this required was gratitude in the heart of every schoolchild and subject that the polity of kokutai centered in the ‘family state,’ a myriad of familial hierarchies in a pyramidal structure with the compassionate figure of the emperor, at once parent and divine descendant, at its apex. It was something to inspire awe and gratitude, devotion and a fierce but also protective resolve.

The distillation of this narcissistic view was necessarily ambiguous, bolstered by invocations of mythic tradition and documented by evidence of Japan’s martial and moral superiority. In 1937 the Ministry of Education issued Cardinal Principles of our National Polity, with which it blanketed schools and media. The first draft was from the brush of a distinguished Tokyo Imperial University scholar of Japanese literature, but by the time it appeared special committees and bureaucrats had added to its obscurity. Replete with invocation of elaborately named deities from the texts in which eighth-century Japanese had recorded oral transmission of ancient lore, the book seemed at once mysterious and profound. Although it was the Meiji court officials who had resuscitated much of this in an effort to provide a ritual basis for the modern national state, by 1937 the invocation of ideas couched in such language represented a retreat from Japan’s embrace of Western culture and institutions and a ‘return to Japan,’ albeit one that had never existed. In the 1880s Fukuzawa had advocated ‘Departure from Asia and Entry into the West’; now voices sought to reverse that slogan.

This was the culmination of a process that had been under way since the late 1920s, and its chief components were agrarian culturalism and ethnicity. Self-appointed spokesmen for the virtues of Japan’s rural past had decried the impact of capitalism, the luxury of urban life, and the corruption of politics that had followed. Gondo Seikyo (Seikei, 1868–1937) and Tachibana Kozaburo (1893–1974) wrote widely to deplore Japan’s departure from its rural roots to follow the false gods of capitalism. Western-style representative government, they argued, institutionalized partisan conflict and corrupted the familial patterns of Japanese social organization. The makers of the modern bureaucratic state had tried to throw off the village values that lay at the core of Japanese tradition. Tachibana went a step farther to identify virtue and country with the emperor, and called for the establishment of a brotherhood of men prepared to lay down their lives to carry out his presumed wishes. Gondo saw the imperial house as the center of a national tutelary shrine, and felt it had been disfigured and dishonored by the trappings of modern Western-style royalty. The Nichiren Buddhist priest Inoue Nissho (1886–1967), it will be remembered, had organized a Blood Brotherhood Band of youths prepared to take responsibility for the death of individual leaders of the capitalist elite. Okawa Shumei (1886–1957), a student of Islam and Asian philosophies, also believed it necessary to purge society of capitalist and bureaucratic leaders so that Japan could become the center of a renaissance of Asian peoples who would look to it for moral guidance and physical liberation from the imperialist West.
These spokesmen were themselves educated representatives of the modern society who turned away from or, in Okawa's case, utilized 'modern' prestigious attainments as a platform from which to denounce modernity. They were intimately involved in the plots and terrorism of the early 1930s. Their instigation was particularly attractive to young navy and especially army officers, who were at once commanders of recruits who followed their orders unthinkingly and yet trapped by the bureaucratic structure of the armed forces. They could deplore the 'state of the villages' whose young men they led and the process and privilege of bureaucracy which they themselves exemplified. Ben-Ami Shillony has shown that for all the talk of 'villages' the young officers who led the insurrection in 1936 were for the most part well connected with army families in higher echelons; they were, as R. P. Dore has put it, more interested in villages than villagers.

Disapproval of capitalist political institutions found support from a quite different perspective. Kita Ikki (1883–1937), an advocate of National Socialism, was a true outsider to the social elite. Born on the Japan Sea island of Sado, he audited courses at Waseda University and immersed himself in socialist writers. An early result was a slender volume entitled *Our National Policy and Pure Socialism* that was quickly banned. He was acquainted with Kotoku Shusui and other socialists, and then turned his attention to revolution in China. When that broke out in 1911 he was sending regular and voluminous reports to Japanese Asianists, especially the Amur or Black Dragon Society leader Uchida Ryoei. Kita attributed the failure of revolution in China in good measure to the greed of Japanese capitalism, which failed to supply the revolutionaries with resources of which they were critically short. Japan's future in Asia, he concluded, was limited unless it carried out a decisive social and institutional renovation of its own. A return to China during the May Fourth movement of 1919 gave him personal experience of anti-Japanese sentiment. The problems of Asia thus had their roots in Japan.

From this background Kita worked out a proposal for a corporate state. Private greed and power would be replaced by state-led enterprises; even the emperor would be a 'people's emperor,' living on an annual salary instead of being able to draw on private resources. Kita was clearly not an agrarianist; he was far more in tune with contemporary National Socialism than with the virtues of premodern Japan. The book in which he outlined these plans was censored so heavily that whole sections—notably on the emperor—were reduced to empty pages by his publisher. For all his criticism of capitalist corruption, however, Kita accepted a subsidy and an automobile from businessmen who may have regarded this as a form of insurance. But his brand of radicalism also commended him to young officers. Documents discovered in 1988 show that the 1936 rebels planned for Kita to be named minister without portfolio in the Mazaki government that would take power. He was one of six civilians charged and executed for plotting rebellion after the February 26 uprising. Kita was one of the few accused who refused to shout 'Long live the Emperor!' when they faced the firing squad.
Currents of nationalism and cultural ethnicity also reached into higher levels of society. Among academics the leading voice calling for reverence for the emperor as the sole criterion of value was that of Hiraizumi Kiyoshi (1895–1984), who came to play the role of theoretician or theologian for matters of kokutai. His interpretation of history, known as ‘imperial history’, became a force academic skeptics had to contend with. A graduate of Tokyo Imperial University’s Faculty of Japanese History, Hiraizumi became known as a specialist on the religious and cultural life of medieval Japan. In 1930 he traveled to universities in Germany, England, Austria, and Italy to better prepare himself in the practice and history of historical scholarship, and on his return the following year he published an influential work on the attempted imperial restoration of 1333. That failed effort, it will be recalled, had ushered in the competition between rival imperial courts that had caused so much controversy in interpretation two decades before. Hiraizumi seems to have immersed himself in those issues and factored in a disapproval of trends in the Japan of his own day. He became an advocate of a ‘Showa Restoration’ and began to delegate some of his university teaching to disciples.

Hiraizumi himself lectured in a private school he established near the campus. Before long he had a following of young military officers who were glad to have one of Japan’s foremost historians espousing the cause of ethnic nationalism and imperial sovereignty. As Japan’s armies advanced, so too did Hiraizumi, invited to lecture to Henry Pu Yi, head of state of the new Manchukuo. He may have been implicated in the planning for the attempted coup of February 26, but if so, drew back and added his voice to others dissuading the emperor’s brother, Prince Chichibu, from showing sympathy for the rebels. Hiraizumi’s highest reward was an invitation to assist in drafting the emperor’s declaration of war in 1941.

A final element that should receive mention is that of ultra-nationalist organizations. Though, more action-oriented toward than thought, patriotic societies were numerous and everywhere. They seemed to thrive at the intersection of the respectable and disreputable, the legal and the illegal, exhorting and intimidating as the occasion demanded. The parent, and strongest, of these was the Kokuryukai or Amur Society. It won fame in the West through a literal translation of its name as Black Dragon, as the Amur is written in Chinese. Its manifesto asserted, long before the establishment of Manchukuo, that the Amur River should be Japan’s northern border, but its efforts went well beyond agitation for a strong foreign policy against Russia. The organization traced its genesis to participation in the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement, and worked for freedom—in collaboration with Japan—for Asian nationalists like Sun Yat-sen and Kim Ok-kyun. It was sharply critical of Japanese capitalist society and active in calls for a ‘Showa Restoration.’ It warred against an education system slavishly copied from those of the West. A purified polity, centered on the divinity of the imperial line, could then extend its compassionate governance to Asian lands burdened by Western imperialism. The career of the leading figure in these activities, Toyama Mitsuru (1855–1944), illustrates continuities in Japan’s modern history. Born to
samurai parents in Fukuoka, his imprisonment for anti-government activities prevented his participation in the Satsuma Rebellion. After being released he formed a Kyushu branch of the jiju-minken movement, but soon turned to lead opposition to the government’s slow progress on treaty reform. He was implicated in the attack on Foreign Minister O’kuma in 1889, and then busied himself in efforts to strengthen Japanese policy in Korea, the while trying to organize help for Sun Yat-sen—in anticipation of cooperation with China—as well. For some decades after that he was a behind-the-scenes manipulator and funder with growing influence, on the fringes of politics and business, and by the years of World War II, always pictured in his native dress and flowing beard, he was the grand old man of patriotism, writing newspaper columns calling for united national effort. At the last Toyama’s rival columnist was Tokutomi Soho. The two non-conformists of the 1880s, different as they were, thus ended the nationalist establishment.

11.2.6 The Economy: Recovery and Resources

Japanese aggression in China, the political fallout of the early 1930s, the murderous vendettas of army factionalism, and agitation for a ‘Showa Restoration’ all took place during the years of the World Depression. They were years in which the international trading system broke down as countries pursued goals of economic nationalism. The collapse of the international silk market devastated thousands of Japanese villages, and also handicapped the country’s need for export earnings with which to finance the import of raw materials. The international capitalist order seemed to have broken down; trade preferences, protectionism, and currency crises that resulted in bank failures brought investment to a halt. Agrarianists could call for return to an imagined Eden of the past, reformers could argue for an increase of bureaucratic state controls, but all had to agree that the current system seemed to have run its course.

Yet Japan also proved to have advantages relative to other capitalist countries. Its banking crisis came earlier with the events that brought down the Wakatsuki government in 1927; consolidation and mergers left the system better prepared to weather future storms of international competition. The government’s brief dalliance with the gold standard was followed by a deflation so severe that, while it further distressed the agricultural sector, made exports more competitive. Japan was in crisis before its competitors among developed countries, and its steps toward recovery also preceded theirs. Dimensions of control advanced as cartels and mergers came to dominate markets that had been competitive. A new combine produced 97.5% of iron and 51.5% of steel production, and a new trust controlled 90% of newsprint. All along the line new combinations in banking, machinery, electric power, and consumption items like beer, each centered around a larger and more powerful bank, dominated the economy. This did not, to be sure, endear the zaibatsu to the Japanese people. The zaibatsu banks were accused of profitable currency speculations during the brief experiment with the gold standard. Every writer who deplored the devastation of the villages contrasted it with the prosperity

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of the new economic royalists, and the murder of politically connected industrialists like the Mitsui head Baron Dan Takuma could bring a chorus of praise for the purity of the assassins’ motives.

The contrast was greatest in agricultural districts within range of the great metropolis; the single prefecture of Ibaraki, on the outskirts of Tokyo, had the dubious distinction of producing the murders of Baron Dan, Finance Minister Inoue, and Prime Minister Inukai. In this period of economic emergency the Ministry of Finance was headed by Takahashi Korekiyo (1854–1936). No modern Japanese leader has had a more striking career or better deserves a full biography. Born in Edo and adopted by a Sendai samurai, Takahashi studied English as a houseboy for a foreigner (and later also worked for Mori Arinori), attended what was to become the Imperial University, dabbled in speculation and in an unsuccessful attempt to develop a silver mine, and then found his niche in finance. He advanced steadily in the Bank of Japan and the Yokohama Specie Bank, worked in government at Matsukata’s elbow, and then joined the Seiyu kai, headed the Finance Ministry under Hara Takashi and briefly succeeded him as prime minister. Takahashi returned to head the Ministry of Finance under Tanaka Gi’ichi, a role in which he resolved the banking crisis, and served again under Prime Ministers Inukai, Saito, and Okada, serving from 1931 to 1936 except for a six-month interlude, before he was shot on February 26.

Nakamura Takafusa describes Takahashi as an early Keynesian. During his years at the helm, government spending rose markedly, and steps to spur production combined with economic nationalism to accelerate industrialization. He allowed the yen to find its market valuation, resulting in a devaluation of some 40%. Spending for agricultural relief and military expansion increased, much of it financed by government bonds. Low interest rates, low exchange rates, and higher government spending for public works, relief, and armament brought a rapid improvement. A revival of exports and government spending combined to expand the economy. Terms like ‘national emergency’ and ‘national defense state’ became popular as justification for measures to restore prosperity at home and permit expansion abroad. Tariffs were raised to protect industries, and as the exchange rate worsened the higher cost of imports further contributed to domestic investment and capacity in chemical and heavy industries. Low interest rates were made available for village reconstruction, and public health insurance and other social legislation built confidence and welfare. Military spending was an important item in this renewal of growth, but not, it seems, as central as many have thought. In heavy machinery and chemicals the percentage of outputs devoted to military needs was at its highest at the beginning of the decade, and then declined by 1936. It may, of course, have played a particularly important role in the start-up stage of economic recovery. In this context the enthusiastic responses to the military moves in Manchuria and North China that the media and their readers showed is probably understandable. Many people felt they were better off. Some were, none more so than urban laborers in the modern sector of the economy.
By the time Takahashi was murdered in 1936, his policies had succeeded in creating full employment and relating the economy. He now thought it desirable to rein in the agents of inflation, but those who followed him instead approved expansion plans for the army and navy to extend five and six years respectively. The government’s 1937 budget was almost 40% higher than that for the previous year, but even that percentage paled after the outbreak of the war with China in July 1937, for in the three months that followed military spending rose to consume practically the entire national budget for that year. The inevitable result was a spiral of inflation that drove up further the cost of the imports of raw materials essential to the industrial sector. Business leaders stockpiled imports in anticipation of future price increases, and the balance of trade worsened day by day. In the analysis of Bai Gao this led to an increasingly ‘managed economy’ that became at the last a command economy. Government leaders created new boards, notably the Cabinet Planning Board (October 1937), the Diet passed laws designed to control some industries (beginning with the Important Industries Control Law, 1931) and control imports (Temporary Capital Adjustment Law and Temporary Export and Import Commodities Law), culminating in the National Mobilization Law of 1938. Under its provisions the government was empowered to establish firms, issue directives relating to the manufacture, distribution, transfer, and consumption of materials related to imports, and issue directives for the management of labor, working conditions, and the administration, use, and expropriation of factories and mines.

By the mid-1930s Japanese leaders saw the world becoming divided into dollar, sterling. One notes the absence of a Soviet bloc; the USSR’s external trade was not yet a significant factor, and in any case the Japanese army was deeply committed to the view of a coming struggle with the Soviet Union once the Soviet Five-Year Plan was completed in 1936 (the so-called crisis of 1936). Ishiwara Kanji’s vision for Manchukuo now became formalized in a series of plans to prepare for what he considered a certain war with the Soviet Union that would precede Japan’s struggle with the West. Plans envisioned the creation and consolidation of a Northeast Asia bloc centered on Japan, drawing on the resources of Manchuria (iron, coal, aluminium, gold, industrial salt, and agricultural products, chiefly soyabeans). Korea would contribute coal, iron, aluminium, magnesium, cotton, and wool, and North China coal, cotton, wool, salt, and meat. China, however, was not yet completely in the fold, and that is why army leaders preferred working with local leaders of splinter regimes, where the disparity of strength with Japan was greatest, to trying to deal with the national government at Nanking. All well and good, but this ‘yen bloc’ was a dream of the future, based on hopes of rapid industrialization through the expenditure of vast sums, particularly in Manchukuo. In the meantime precious gold reserves were being drained away to pay for essential raw materials, particularly petroleum, for which the bloc could make no provision. Out of this came complaints of unfairness on the part of the United States and the European imperialist powers in South Asia; by virtue of getting their first they
found themselves in control of impressive resources in what is now Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia, the while presuming to lecture—and gradually to strangle—Japan in its search for a place in the sun. At this point ironies abound. The skilled machinist quoted above felt better off and saw his life as one of prosperity brought about by war, but many more workers, particularly those in textiles, suffered from the shift of national priorities to heavy industry. Moreover Japan was shifting to an area in which its need for imports placed it at a comparative disadvantage. The decline of Japanese exports and the worsening of the trade balance, together with the inflation this spawned, began to reduce real wages. Yasukichi Yasuba summarizes these contradictions particularly clear, that Japan was emerging successfully from the depression on the basis of exports of light industry, when the military build-up shifted weight to chemical and heavy industry, in which Japan was poorly equipped. Since military build-up and the resultant expansion of heavy industries tremendously increased demand for natural resources, the previously non-existent shortage of natural resources eventually became real, and the terms of trade started to deteriorate at that point. The military build-up and imperialistic expansion started to look necessary. Warnings of impending economic crisis became self-fulfilling and the imagined problems had become real.

Many who observed this taking place had their doubts about the wisdom and practicality of political and zaibatsu military policies, but no sector of society protested. Leaders of export industries and banks were unenthusiastic about the prospect of wartime taxes, but they profited from the government loans and guarantees that financed increased expansion of capacity and conversion. The crisis that resulted from the dispute with China helped bring labor leaders into line. Labor was by this time divided between right and left-wing organizations; the right led, and the left followed, to support the state in time of perceived crisis. Government measures to promote order and productivity improved working conditions and stifled worker organizations. Home Ministry bureaucrats worked to improve standards of safety and thereby efficiency in the workplace. The same years that saw the end of internal army violence brought an end to open disputes between labor and management. The outbreak of hostilities with China shortly afterward served to firm things up. The military were eager to curb radicalism in the union movement, and in this they had the enthusiastic support of big business. Soon the unions pledged not to strike. After the China War began Sodomei leaders resolved that ‘our task is to protect the rear base of the nation as soldiers who fight in the industrial front in thus time of emergency.’ They went on to propose the establishment of a council representing labor and industry, but the government had its own ideas. In 1938 preparatory work began on what would become the Patriotic Industrial Organization, which was under state control. Five million workers in more than six thousand firms were enrolled. In 1940 labor unions were banned. Regulations designed to prevent worker mobility became an ironic forerunner of
the much-praised ‘life time employment’ of post-war Japan, and a free labour movement was ruled out until after the surrender in 1945.

Check Your Progress

1. What symbolised an era of internationalism in Japan?
2. What came to be known as ‘Washington Conference system’?
3. What was the purpose of Four Power Pact?
4. What was the aim of the Nine Power Treaty?
5. What caused the rise of militant forces in Japan?
6. Why did Japan witness political tensions in 1928?
7. What led to the Manchurian crisis?
8. Which regions in China form the parts of Manchuria?
9. Who was credited with coining the phrase that Manchuria and Mongolia was Japan’s ‘lifeline’?
10. What was the purpose of the Lytton Commission?

11.3 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS QUESTIONS

1. Japan occupied a place of honor in the new League of Nations, which now replaced the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in Japanese diplomacy. It was a mark of Japan’s growing status that Nitobe Inazo, the Sapporo student and Tokyo educator mentioned earlier, was named Under Secretary-General, thereby symbolizing an era of internationalism. A new generation of intellectuals, teachers, and students shared fully in the world-wide hope that this new era would find Japan taking its rightful place at world conference tables.

2. Many Japanese were in favor of international cooperation. At the Washington Conference, Japan was represented by Ambassador to the United States Shidehara Kijuro, Tokugawa Iesato, and Admiral Kato Tomosaburo. The conference produced a network of interrelated agreements that can be described as the ‘Washington Conference system’; it set the parameters of Pacific policy and security for the rest of the decade.

3. A Four Power Pact, with the United States and France included, replaced the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Its members pledged themselves to respect the status quo in the Pacific and to consult if the security of any one power was threatened. Naval limitation was at the center of the negotiations that followed. In Japan a ‘fleet faction’ had advocated the construction of eight battleships and eight cruisers. The Anglo-American counter proposal was for a moratorium on all construction of capital ships.
4. The Nine Power Treaty, was designed to protect Chinese sovereignty. The powers profiting from ‘unequal treaties’ with China pledged to respect China’s territorial sovereignty, maintain the ‘Open Door’ in trade, and cooperate in helping China achieve unity and stability. In the early 1920s Japan moved to live up to the commitments it had made at Washington. The former German holdings in Shantung were returned to China.

5. The rise of militant forces in Japan resulted not from a seizure of power by a new political party but from the growing influence of such elements at the top of political hierarchy. During the 1920s, a multi-party system based on democratic practices appeared to be emerging. Radical elements existed at each end of the political spectrum, but neither militant nationalists nor violent revolutionaries appeared to present a threat to the stability of the system. In fact, the political system was probably weaker than it seemed at the time. Both of the major parties were deeply dependent on campaign contributions from powerful corporations and conservative forces connected to the military or the old landed aristocracy were still high influential behind the scenes.

6. Political tensions in Japan increased in 1928 when Zhang Xueliang, son and successor of the Japanese puppet Marshal Zhang Zuolin resisted Japanese threats and decided to integrate Manchuria into the Nanjing republic.

7. On the night of 18 September, 1931, a section of the South Manchuria Railway near Mukden was blown up by explosives planted along the tracks. Almost simultaneously Japanese forces invested and occupied the Manchurian capital. This was part of a carefully prepared plan, put into operation by the Japanese military without prior consultation with the government at Tokyo, thereby producing a chain of crises which led ultimately to the Pacific War.

8. The three north-eastern provinces of China—Liaoning (or Fengtien), Kirin, and Heilungkiang—were the homeland of China’s ruling Manchus. Non-Chinese often referred to the area as ‘Manchuria.’ Manchu legislation had tried to prevent Chinese immigration into this area, but those restrictions had become a dead letter in the nineteenth century. The area, together with the province of Jehol, lay immediately north of the Great Wall, and the Shanhaikuan mountain pass served as entry to the province of Hopei, in which the capital of Peking was located.

9. Matsuoka Yosuke (1880–1946), a diplomat whose flamboyant style distinguished Japan’s crisis years, and who entered the Foreign Ministry within a year of Yoshida, served as executive and president of the SMRR before becoming foreign minister. He was credited with coining the phrase that Manchuria and Mongolia was Japan’s ‘lifeline’, a term that came into wide use.

10. The Lytton Commission had visited Japan and China and spent six weeks in Manchuria trying to sort things out. Its verdict, while damaging to Japan’s
case, was by no means completely hostile to the Japanese cause. Matsuoka, however, would break no criticism and led his delegation out of the hall when he saw the certainty of a defeat in the League’s General Assembly.

11.4 SUMMARY

- Japan occupied a place of honor in the new League of Nations, which now replaced the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in Japanese diplomacy. It was a mark of Japan’s growing status that Nitobe Inazo, the Sapporo student and Tokyo educator mentioned earlier, was named Under Secretary-General, thereby symbolizing an era of internationalism.

- Many Japanese were in favor of international cooperation. At the Washington Conference, Japan was represented by Ambassador to the United States Shidehara Kijuro, Tokugawa Iesato, and Admiral Kato Tomosaburo. The conference produced a network of interrelated agreements that can be described as the ‘Washington Conference system’; it set the parameters of Pacific policy and security for the rest of the decade.

- A Four Power Pact, with the United States and France included, replaced the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Its members pledged themselves to respect the status quo in the Pacific and to consult if the security of any one power was threatened.

- The Nine Power Treaty, was designed to protect Chinese sovereignty. The powers profiting from ‘unequal treaties’ with China pledged to respect China’s territorial sovereignty, maintain the ‘Open Door’ in trade, and cooperate in helping China achieve unity and stability.

- During the mid-1930s, the influence of the military and extreme nationalists over the government steadily increased. Minorities and left-wing elements were persecuted and moderates were intimidated into silence.

- On the night of 18 September, 1931, a section of the South Manchuria Railway near Mukden was blown up by explosives planted along the tracks. Almost simultaneously Japanese forces invested and occupied the Manchurian capital.

- The rise of militant forces in Japan resulted not from a seizure of power by a new political party but from the growing influence of such elements at the top of political hierarchy. During the 1920s, a multi-party system based on democratic practices appeared to be emerging.

- The three north-eastern provinces of China—Liaoning (or Fengtien), Kirin, and Heilungkiang—were the homeland of China’s ruling Manchus. Non-Chinese often referred to the area as ‘Manchuria.’

- Matsuoka Yosuke (1880–1946), a diplomat whose flamboyant style distinguished Japan’s crisis years, and who entered the Foreign Ministry
within a year of Yoshida, served as executive and president of the SMRR before becoming foreign minister. He was credited with coining the phrase that Manchuria and Mongolia was Japan’s ‘lifeline’, a term that came into wide use.

- The Japanese presence in Manchuria had been won from Russia in the Treaty of Portsmouth of 1905 and bolstered by extensions of the lease won under the Twenty-one Demands a decade later.
- Mori Kaku, a Seiyukai leader, was in full sympathy with Manchurian agitation and advised all party representatives to utilize the Manchurian-Mongolian ‘problem’ in their rhetoric.
- In the days preceding the explosion that triggered the Manchurian Incident an unsavory group of Japanese had collected at Kwantung Army headquarters. Amakasu Masahiko, who had murdered Osugi Sakae in 1923, was there with money sent by Japanese rightists.
- Japan was now in clear violation of the Nine Power Pact and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of Paris. Other developed economies were reeling under the impact of the world depression.
- Manchuria absorbed immense quantities of capital investment in the drive to develop a heavy industry base. It became, in Louise Young’s words, a sinkhole for capital, and resources at a time when immense armament programs were also being carried out in Japan.
- A ‘Manchukuo’ army and police force was organized, but for most of the decade that followed it required continual effort to control guerrillas and ‘bandits,’ many of them Communists from across the border.
- In April 1934, Amo Eiji, a Foreign Ministry spokesman, asserted that relations between China and Japan were solely the responsibility of those two countries, and that any interference in or assistance to China either politically or economically could only harm the situation.
- Another issue that divided army leaders concerned the policy Japan should adopt toward nationalist China. Most viewed Shidehara’s willingness to recognize the Nanking government of Chiang Kai-shek as a threat to Japan’s position in Northeast Asia, and advocated full control of that area instead.
- James Crowley writes, ‘The Japanese government was by December 1933 committed to a policy which proposed to neutralize the influence of the Soviet Union, the Nationalist government of China, and the Anglo-American nations by a diplomacy rooted in the arrogance of Japan’s military forces.’
- Japanese aggression in China, the political fallout of the early 1930s, the murderous vendettas of army factionalism, and agitation for a ‘Showa Restoration’ all took place during the years of the World Depression. They were years in which the international trading system broke down as countries pursued goals of economic nationalism.
11.5 KEY WORDS

- The Mukden Incident: The Mukden Incident or Manchurian Incident, was an event staged by Japanese military personnel as a pretext for the Japanese invasion in 1931 of northeastern China, known as Manchuria.
- Manchukuo: This was a puppet state of the Empire of Japan in Northeast China and Inner Mongolia from 1932 until 1945. It was founded as a republic, but in 1934 it became a constitutional monarchy. It had limited international recognition and was under the de facto control of Japan.
- The tondenhei: They were military settler colonists recruited after the Meiji Restoration to develop and defend Japan’s northern frontier in Hokkaido against foreign invaders.
- Satsuma Rebellion of 1877: This was the final act of organized military resistance to the reforms of the Restoration Government. This civil war pitted a well-trained samurai army commanded by Saiga Takamori and deeply imbued with the traditional concepts of feudal Japan against the Imperial Army of 'conscripted farmers.'
- The Kwantung Army: This was an army group of the Imperial Japanese Army in the first half of the 20th century. It turned out to be the largest and most prestigious command.

11.6 SELF ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

Short Answer Questions
1. Briefly mention Japan’s place in the new League of Nations.
2. Write in a brief about the prospect of an ‘Anglo-American peace’.
3. What was the significance of Washington Conference on naval limitations?
4. Mention the Shidehara policy of peaceful cooperation.
5. State the Japanese references to the ‘Manchurian-Mongolian problem.’

Long Answer Questions
1. Discuss the significance of the Washington Naval Conference in bringing in internationalism in Japan’s diplomacy.
2. Analyse the influence of the military and extreme nationalists over the Japanese government.
3. Enumerate the various causes which led to the Manchurian crisis.
4. Discuss the role of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria’s occupation.
5. Examine the impact of heavy Japanese migration to Manchukuo.
11.7 FURTHER READINGS


12.0 INTRODUCTION

In the early 1900s, uprisings became common in every part of China. The lowest level of society was extremely disturbed and was highly volatile. China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 was a major shock to the common people. Students and intellectuals formed a number of revolutionary organizations and propagated revolutions both inside and outside China. All sections of the society were boiling with anger. The situation was ripe for revolution. To give the revolution a national identity Dr. Sun Yat-sen was the much-needed force. Sun being native of the southern province of Guangdong, was revolutionary in character. However, when he tried to meet leading reformers of the scholar official class Kang Youwei in 1893 and Liang Qichao in 1894 in order to join their reform activities, he failed. Sun then decided to work towards overthrowing the Qing Dynasty. On October 8, 1900, Sun launched an uprising with 20,000 men, making use of the mayhem created by the Boxer Rebellion. This revolt is known as the Huizhou Uprising. By October 22, 1900, the uprising failed.
Yuan Shikai was a decisive factor in modern Chinese history. During his civil service career, he went up the political ladder and held important posts such as governor general, grand councilor and prime minister in the Qing court. With vast political and military power at his disposal, Yuan was too formidable a force to be ignored by the revolutionaries. The revolutionaries could not have taken the risk of engaging with Yuan’s forces in a long civil war. Initially, there were two major groups of warlords, those of the southern provinces who opposed Yuan Shikai and the breakaway generals of Yuan Shikai’s Beiyang Army. The two groups fought for territorial expansion in the initial two years after Yuan’s death. Chiang Kai Sheik or Jiang Jieshi gave a call to Nationalist members who were opposed to communist influence and Russian dominance in the Wuhan government to join him. The right wing members established a new government in Nanjing under Jiang’s leadership in 1927.

This unit discusses the period of military dictatorship in China and explains the role of popular figures namely Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Yuan Shikai and Chiang Kai Sheik.

12.1 OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit, you will be able to:

- Examine military dictatorship in China
- Analyse Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary activities
- Discuss Yuan Shikai as a decisive factor in modern Chinese history
- Explain Chiang Kai Sheik’s contribution as a supreme leader
- Enumerate the purge of the communists in China

12.2 DR. SUN YAT-SEN: A PARAMOUNT REVOLUTIONARY LEADER

China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 was a major shock to the common people. After Taiwan was ceded to Japan, refugees flocked to Fujian Province in southern China. It was an added burden to an already impoverished society. Many secret societies were formed and old ones became active. Peasants who lost their livelihoods due to natural calamities roamed idly. Armed uprisings became common in every part of the country. Thus, the lowest level of society was extremely disturbed and was highly volatile.

In the early 1900s, a new group of intellectuals and students emerged thanks to the late-Qing reform. The newly educated class was influenced by the modern Western socio-economic-political system. Missionary activities and overseas stay
and travel diffused ideas like democracy and constitutionalism among them. The failure of the Self-Strengthening Movement, the Hundred Days’ Reform and the Boxer Rebellion frustrated them. The educated group came to believe that reforms from the top were ineffectual, and a well-organized revolution from below was the only hope. Students and intellectuals formed a number of revolutionary organizations and propagated revolutions both inside and outside China.

All sections of the society were boiling with anger. The situation was ripe for revolution. The need of the hour was to bring together the disorganized class specific and region specific groups under one umbrella to give the revolution a national identity. Dr. Sun Yat-sen was the much-needed force.

Sun Yat-sen was born in a village near Canton into a peasant family in 1866. He had a traditional Chinese classical education in early childhood. At the age of thirteen, Sun went to Hawaii to stay with his elder brother. There, Sun received Western education. Later, he studied medicine in Hong Kong. He became a doctor in 1892 and later embraced Christianity. Sun was concerned about his country’s plight. Being farthest from Beijing, southern China was a hotbed of anti-Manchu activities. Sun being native of the southern province of Guangdong, was revolutionary in character. However, when he tried to meet leading reformers of the scholar official class Kang Youwei in 1893 and Liang Qichao in 1894 in order to join their reform activities, he failed. Sun then decided to work towards overthrowing the Qing Dynasty.

Sun Yat-sen’s background had its advantage and disadvantage. Since he was a commoner, a Western-style doctor and a Christian, scholar officials such as Liang Qichao and Kang Youwei were apprehensive about him. Sun was just another ordinary rebel for them, not a scholar to be allied with. However, since Sun belonged to the peasant class and had lived among overseas Chinese, ordinary Chinese peasants could connect with him easily, something the Confucian scholars lacked.

![Image of Sun Yat-sen](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Sunyatsen1.jpg)
12.2.1 Sun Yat-Sen’s Revolutionary Activities

After Li Hongzhang refused to meet him, Sun left China for Hawaii. In Hawaii, Sun established a secret society named Xingzhong Hui (the Revive China Society) in 1894. The society’s goal was to overthrow the Qing Dynasty and establish a republic in China. The members were mostly overseas Chinese and Christians. On October 26, 1895, making use of the mayhem created by China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War, the Society planned a revolt in Canton. The uprising, known as the First Guangzhou Uprising, was unsuccessful, as the plan was leaked. As a result, Sun fled China.

After this failure, Sun started traveling to foreign countries to widen his support base within overseas Chinese and winning sympathy from Western countries. However, no foreign country, not even Hong Kong, allowed him to organize revolutionary activities from their soil. As luck had it, while Sun was in London in 1896, Qing officials detained him in the Chinese legation. Sun escaped with the help of a British friend. When he published his story, he became a revolutionary hero overnight.

Sun’s support base and popularity rose when he travelled to Japan. Many Japanese intellectuals were in favour of a pan Asian anti-West alliance to counter Western imperialism in Asia. Therefore, they were sympathetic toward Sun’s revolutionary cause. Sun was able to meet influential Japanese, broaden his base, raise money for his revolution, and get personal protection. Qing government did not attempt to harm Sun again after the London debacle. On October 8, 1900, Sun launched an uprising with 20,000 men, making use of the mayhem created by the Boxer Rebellion. This revolt is known as the Huizhou Uprising. By October 22, 1900, the uprising failed.

After the second failure, Sun turned to the overseas Chinese students, especially those in Japan seeking their active participation in anti-Qing revolution. He took a two-pronged strategy of military training and ideological doctrinarian through mass meeting and debate. The military training was not so successful. However, Sun worked out a modern revolutionary ideology, later known as San min Zhuyi (variously translated as the Three People’s Principles and the Three Principles of the People). Through this political philosophy, Sun established himself as a modern thinker among overseas Chinese students and as an intellectual in the Chinese gentry circle, writing off the image of one of the ordinary anti-Qing rebels. Sun wrote numerous articles in newspapers and journals debating the benefits of a republican system and condemning imperialism in China. He started organizing mass meetings at which he lectured overseas Chinese. Sun won the confidence of overseas students, mainly because first, the failure of the government-sponsored reforms demonstrated their futility, second, the situation at home fanned their anti-Manchu and anti-imperialist sentiments and third, they could identify with Sun’s modern outlook and argument that only a revolution could save China.
In 1905, like-minded revolutionaries came together and formed a secret society named Tongmeng Hui (variously translated as United Allegiance Society, Chinese United League, United League and Chinese Revolutionary Alliance) by merging a number of secret societies including Sun’s Xingzhong Hui, Huang Xing’s Huaxing Hui (China Revival Society) and Guangfu Hui (the Restoration Society) led by Cai Yuanpei. Sun was chosen the paramount leader because of his contact with secret societies, foreigners and overseas Chinese, his ability to raise money for the cause and his familiarity with organizing revolutionary activities. Huang Xing was second in command.

Sun Yat-sen’s strategy was to stage armed uprisings in China’s southern border regions to capture at least one province and make a base in China. Then, spread the revolution to other parts of the country to overthrow the Qing Dynasty. If overthrowing the dynasty took time, then the revolutionaries would declare formation of a republic in south China. They try to legitimize the republic by winning foreign recognition and conquer the rest of the country. Sun and his deputy Huang staged a number of revolts in the next few years, but all of them failed. The main reason for the failure was weak military supplies and financial constraints.

The failures put a question mark in Sun’s methods and leadership ability. Some members of the Tongmeng Hui grew apprehensive about armed uprisings. They suggested other methods. Some went further and blamed Sun of embezzling funds. The unity of the alliance weakened. The constituent groups of the Tongmeng Hui started organizing revolts on their own, applying their own methods. The national character of the Tongmeng Hui was lost. However, Sun continued his revolutionary activities outside China.

Check Your Progress
1. Who was Dr. Sun Yat-sen?
2. What is the Huizhou Uprising?

12.3 YUVAN SHIKAI: A FORMIDABLE FORCE

Let us study the rise of Yuan Shikai in Chinese history.

12.3.1 The Yuan Shikai Factor (1912–1916)

Politically and militarily powerful Yuan Shikai was a decisive factor in modern Chinese history. Yuan was born in an affluent Han family in 1859. Although he failed to qualify even for the lowest degree in the civil service examinations, he purchased an official title in 1880. During his civil service career, he went up the political ladder and held important posts such as governor general, grand councillor and prime minister in the Qing court. He was a part of Li Hongzhang’s Huai Army
and served in Korea in 1882. In 1885, the court appointed him the imperial resident of Seoul. In 1895, Yuan became the commander of the first New Army. In 1902, he took charge of the governorship of Zhili Province and the largest, best-trained and most effective military force in north China, the Huai Army. He renamed it the Beiyang Army. Yuan was also in charge of Qing military modernization after 1901. His position allowed him to expand the Beiyang Army. His protégés commanded a majority of the army divisions and other senior military positions. Yuan also enjoyed the good will of the foreign powers in China which made him an extremely powerful figure during the final days of the Qing Dynasty. When the Qing court summoned Yuan after the Wuchang Uprising, he delayed resuming duty to bargain for more power for himself. He was able to extract the prime ministership of the constitutional monarchy in November 1911.

With vast political and military power at his disposal, Yuan was too formidable a force to be ignored by the revolutionaries. The revolutionaries could not have taken the risk of engaging with Yuan’s forces in a long civil war. Moreover, since revolutionaries mostly operated from outside China, they needed more time to build up a solid popular base in China. There was also a lack of coordination and unity among the revolutionaries themselves. It could be therefore stated that Sun Yat-sen took a wise decision to involve Yuan Shikai in the formation of the republic. However, although Yuan was pro-reform, he simply did not believe in the merit of constitutionalism. He was not an idealist either. Rather, he was open to deals as long as it was beneficial to his own interest. Yuan Shikai supported the Republic of China because he saw personal gain in doing so. Firstly, he had no real loyalty to the Qing court. In addition, by supporting the republican movement he confirmed foreign support for himself. Therefore, he had no reservation in accepting the presidency of the Republic of China in 1912.

True to his nature, immediately after assuming office, Yuan started engaging in a political conspiracy to consolidate his power. He started appointing his own men in important posts. In January 1913, Guomindang emerged victorious in parliamentary elections. With a parliament consisting of five representatives from each province and a prime minister to run the government, the president’s power was curtailed. A prominent parliament member and Guomindang politician Song Jiaoren, who publicly criticized Yuan’s policies and favoured further curtailing of the president’s power, was assassinated in March 1913. A close associate of Yuan was implicated for plotting the murder, but due to a lack of evidence, Yuan’s links could not be established. Yuan stopped paying salary to Huang Xing’s fifty thousand revolutionary soldiers, resulting in the disbandment of the force. In May 1913, Yuan negotiated a loan with a five-power bank consortium without the approval of the parliament. When some Guomindang members protested, Yuan simply dismissed them.

It was clear that parliamentary methods would not be effective to restrict Yuan’s dictatorship. In May 1913, Sun Yat-sen and others prepared an armed
uprising to remove Yuan from power. They approached the provincial military-gentry governors for support. This short-lived trumpery affair of 1913 is commonly called the Second Revolution (Dierci Geming). Yuan quickly bought the loyalty of the provincial military leaders and revamped his Beiyang Army with the money he borrowed from the foreign banks. Yuan crushed Sun’s Second Revolution within months, charged the Guomindang with sedition and banned it. Sun Yat-sen fled China in August. In 1914, Yuan dissolved the National Assembly and appointed a political council to draft a new constitution. This body was composed of Yuan’s cronies. The new constitution granted unlimited power to the president, including extending the terms of office to ten years which was renewable by re-election thereafter, and also power to select a successor. Yuan then tried to reign in the provinces under central rule, but achieved only limited success. Thereafter, Yuan plotted to gain absolute power by reviving the monarchy. He encouraged his men to petition him i.e. the President of the Republic, for the revival of monarchy. He then pretended to bow to the public pressure and made himself the emperor in late 1915. Yuan had calculated that in the midst of the First World War, foreign powers would not meddle too much in the internal affairs of China.

Japan was at war with Germany during the First World War. She had captured Germany’s privileges in China and in January 1915 sent Yuan a list of demands, known as the Twenty-one Demands (Ershiyi Tao) with a threat of war if China did not comply. Yuan accepted the demands because instead of weakening his army by fighting a war with Japan, he wanted to use his military to make the provincial military gentry fall in line and strengthen his rule.

These moves, however, backfired. On the face of widespread protest from home and abroad, Yuan abandoned his plans to become emperor. He also agreed to give up absolute civil authority while retaining the formal post of the President of the Republic. Yuan Shikai died in June 1916.
12.3.2 The Warlord Period (1916–1928)

After Yuan Shikai proclaimed himself the emperor of China, many military generals in southern China opposed the idea. They waged an anti-monarchy war, Huoguo Zhanzheng (Save the Nation War) between 1915 and 1916. Military leaders such as Tang Jiyao and Cai E of Yunnan Province and Li Liejun of Jiangxi Province raised a special force named the National Protection Army with the mission to face Yuan militarily and declared independence from Beijing in December 1915. Before Yuan’s army could reach Yunnan to tackle the issue, Guizhou, Guangxi, Guangdong, Shandong, Hunan, Shanxi, Jiangxi and Jiangsu provinces also declared independence by mid-1916. After Yuan Shikai’s death, the central military authority of the Beiyang Army ended. The commanders of the Beiyang Army started operating independently in northern China. Thus, a major part of the Chinese republic became fragmented into a number of military cliques, starting the Warlord Period (Junfa Shidai) in China.

Initially, there were two major groups of warlords, those of the southern provinces who opposed Yuan Shikai and the breakaway generals of Yuan Shikai’s Beiyang Army. The two groups fought for territorial expansion in the initial two years after Yuan’s death. The Beiyang Army was further divided into two factions, the Anhui Clique and the Zhili Clique. The two groups fought for control over Beijing. Besides the Anhui and Zhili cliques, there were other warlord cliques in northern China. Fengtian Clique was a major clique. The southern warlords also frequently fought among themselves over territorial control. Major cliques of southern China included Yunnan Clique, Old Guangxi Clique, New Guangxi Clique and Sichuan Clique. For selfish reasons, foreign imperialist powers often supported one warlord or the other.

![Beiyang Army](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Beiyang_Army.jpg)
Besides politically fragmenting China, the infighting of the warlords had serious repercussions for China’s economy and society. The warlords encouraged opium cultivation because opium trade was profitable. Private soldiers of rival warlords frequently destroyed crops and looted farm animals in each other’s territory. Trade was affected in a similar fashion. Rival territories often obstructed the transport of goods from one area to another, and imposed local taxes on trade and transport of goods. Warlords often forced industrialists to contribute money. Unsure of returns, industrialists often eschewed investing in long-term projects. Warlords were not interested in social reform or welfare but were driven solely by self-interest. Not too different from the foreign imperialists, the warlords were out to exploit common people to the maximum. Peasants were forced to provide cattle and cart to the warlord soldiers; this hampered agricultural production. Forced cultivation of poppy only benefited the warlords and actually wasted arable land. Warlords also increased land tax and collected them in advance. Some warlords even collected tax up to the year 1968 in advance! They also introduced new taxes, which could be as bizarre and outrageous as such the laziness tax for not cultivating opium. Those who cultivated opium had to pay the opium tax.

The political instability due to recurring civil warfare was such that between 1916 and 1928, the Chinese republic witnessed twenty-five cabinets with seven heads of state and a number of caretaker governments. The republic, instead of laying a new foundation for national strength, existed only on paper. The Warlord Era lasted until Guomindang leader Jiang Jieshi unified China in 1928.

Check Your Progress
1. Why was Yuan Shikai acknowledged as a decisive factor in modern Chinese history?
2. Which were the two major groups of warlords in China during the period of 1916-28?

12.4 CHIANG KAI SHEIK OR JIANG JIESHI

As early as 1917, Sun Yat-sen had planned to launch an expedition to northern China to expel the northern warlords and broaden the base of his government to effectively deal with foreign imperialist forces stationed in China. The nationalist movement Sun Yat-sen had initiated gained momentum after his death. After Sun Yat-sen’s death, the Nationalist Party made Sun’s plans its main objective. In the summer of 1926, Jiang Jieshi finally launched the Northern Expedition (Beifa) jointly with the Communist Party.

The Russian military adviser to the Nationalist Party Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher was the chief strategic planner of the Northern Expedition. Two columns of the National Revolutionary Army were to charge northwards from its southern
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Self-Instructional Material

Base simultaneously, through Hunan and Jiangxi provinces. The first target was Hankou. From Hankou, the Expedition planned to move down the Yangze to Nanjing and Shanghai. From Shanghai, the plan was to move further north towards Beijing along the lines of the Beijing-Hankou and the Tianjin-Pukou railways. Jiang Jieshi was the supreme commander of the operation. He was in direct command of the armies operating through Jiangxi.

Within about nine months, the National Revolutionary Army had conquered half of China. The rapid elimination of the warlords was made possible due to smart strategies followed in the campaign. The National Revolutionary Army carried out extensive propaganda among the peasants and the army of local warlords ahead of each military operation, mobilizing popular support for its cause. A substantial number of warlord forces defected to the National Revolutionary Army as a result. This strengthened the National Revolutionary Army, while weakened the warlord armies.

By the spring of 1927, the National Revolutionary Army had quadrupled in size. It had captured the areas surrounding Wuhan, Nanjing and Shanghai. However, a split occurred within the Nationalist rank and between the Nationalists and the Communists. Even before the start of the Northern Expedition, the Nationalist Party members were divided into left and right wings. While the right wing members were against the formation of alliance with the Communist Party, the left leaning group supported the Communists. However, for the greater national cause, they patched up their differences and took on the Northern Expedition. Jiang Jieshi was a right wing Nationalist, while the most prominent left wing Nationalist leader was Wang Jingwei. Within the Communist Party itself, some did not support the Northern Expedition but were bound by Comintern instructions. The newly created Communist Party had not yet been able to consolidate itself. Therefore, the main
motive behind the Comintern strategy of forming a united front and allowing dual membership for the Communists was to make use of the Nationalist Party's already established organizational aperture to spread communism in China. The Nationalists, on the other hand, saw this as a means to control the communists from within. Thus, the United Front began operating on an unsustainable ground. Soon, there emerged conflict of interests between the two factions, undermining the United Front.

The Zhongshan Warship Incident (Zhongshan Jian Shijian) of 1926 worsened the alliance, though did not end it. On March 20, 1926, Jiang Jieshi arrested the captain of a gunboat named Zhongshan that was anchored next to the Whampoa Military Academy, seized the warship and declared martial law in Canton. Jiang alleged that Captain Li Zhilong, a Communist Party member, had plotted to kidnap him. Following the incident, Jiang restricted the communists to hold high post in the government. Several left leaning Nationalist leaders went into hiding. After side-lining the Communists and the left leaning Nationalists, Jiang consolidated his position in the Party and the government. However, when Jiang was commanding the Northern Expedition, the leftist influence increased in the Canton government. In an anti-Jiang move, the Central Executive Council removed Jiang from the top post of the Canton government and military, and shifted the capital of the Republic to Wuhan in 1927. Wang Jingwei assumed the post of the president of the Republic on March 20, 1927.

Fig. 12.5 Northern Expedition 1926–27
Jiang Jieshi gave a call to Nationalist members who were opposed to communist influence and Russian dominance in the Wuhan government to join him. The right wing members established a new government in Nanjing under Jiang’s leadership in 1927. On April 12, 1927, once troops of the Northern Expedition had entered Shanghai, Jiang Jieshi ordered an all-out purge of the Communists from the Nationalist Party in all areas under Nationalist control. Jiang’s forces arrested over a thousand Communists and eliminated around three hundred of them, while more than five thousand went missing. This incident is known as the Shanghai Massacre and White Terror. The incident officially ended the First United Front between the Communists and the Nationalists. Jiang also cracked down on the left-leaning Nationalist faction, flattened the Wuhan government and emerged as the supreme leader of the Nationalist Party and government.

In early 1928, Jiang resumed the Northern Expedition. The National Revolutionary Army marched across the Yellow River and reached Beijing via Manchuria. Jiang defeated the Beiyang regime and captured Beijing in June 1928. After Jiang had defeated most of the northern warlords in battle, some pledged loyalty to Jiang to avoid military conflict. A small number remained independent and engaged Jiang in fighting sporadically until the 1940s, leaving the ultimate objective of the Northern Expedition only partially accomplished. Nevertheless, the Northern Expedition was an important feat in that Jiang Jieshi was able to unify the country under a centralized structure. After capturing Beijing, the Nationalist Party led Jiang Jieshi Government got international recognition as the legitimate government of the Republic of China.

12.4.1 The Second United Front

The purge of the Communists in 1927 resulted in a civil war between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party. During the civil war with the communists, Jiang had to instigate one warlord against another or appease them to gain their support for maintaining political stability in areas under his control. Meanwhile, Japan was advancing her imperialist activities in China. The Japanese particularly wanted Manchuria. Jiang Jieshi had to handle sporadic attacks by communist forces, warlord politics and an immediate Japanese imperialist threat all at the same time. However, survival issues took precedence over tackling the Japanese advance in China.

Following the unification of most of China during the Northern Expedition and the establishment of a central government in Beijing, Japan became apprehensive at the prospect of the Jiang government unifying Manchuria, hampering Japanese economic interests. Manchuria was under the rule of warlord Zhang Zuolin of the Fengtian Clique. He maintained a conciliatory relationship with the Japanese while retaining his independence. In 1928, following Zhang Zuolin’s assassination by the Japanese, his son Zhang Xueliang took over.
the Northern Expedition, Zhang Xueliang pledged allegiance to Jiang Jieshi. Zhang Xueliang’s alliance with the Nationalist government was a cause of much worry for Japan. In an aggressive move, Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931. Zhang Xueliang was disappointed by the Nationalist Party’s lack of action against the Japanese aggression. In December 1936, Jiang travelled to Xi’an tracking the Communists. Zhang Xueliang assisted him in this expedition. However, when they reached Xi’an on December 12, Zhang arrested Jian and demanded that Jiang take action against the Japanese invaders in Manchuria. This incident is known as the Xi’an Incident (Xi’an Shibian). Jiang was released on December 25, 1936 after agreeing to take action against the Japanese for their aggression in Manchuria.


Jiang was originally firmly against any alliance with the Communists. However, the Xi’an incident convinced him of the need to take action against the Japanese. It also contributed to the establishment of the Second United Front. The Communists agreed to form the Second United Front under pressure from Soviet Russia. The Russians wanted the Communists and the Nationalists to form an alliance because of Russia’s international concerns, particularly the growth of Nazi Germany and Japan.

The alliance remained an uneasy one throughout the military campaign against Japan. It was more of a truce than an alliance. The Nationalists fought on the front line against the Japanese, while the Communists engaged in guerrilla warfare with little open confrontation with the Japanese. These different strategies resulted in
heavy casualties for the Nationalist forces while the communist forces were little affected. In 1941, the hostilities between the two sides resurfaced. The Second United Front broke down completely after war against the Japanese ended with the end of the Second World War.

Check Your Progress
5. When did Jiang Jieshi launch the Northern Expedition (Beifa)?
6. How was the Second United Front founded?

12.5 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS QUESTIONS

1. Dr. Sun Yat-sen was born in a village near Canton into a peasant family in 1866. He had a traditional Chinese classical education in early childhood. Sun was revolutionary in character. However, when he tried to meet leading reformers of the scholar official class Kang Youwei in 1893 and Liang Qichao in 1894 in order to join their reform activities, he failed. Sun then decided to work towards overthrowing the Qing Dynasty.

2. On October 8, 1900, Sun Yat-sen launched an uprising with 20,000 men, making use of the mayhem created by the Boxer Rebellion. This revolt is known as the Huizhou Uprising. By October 22, 1900, the uprising failed.

3. Politically and militarily powerful Yuan Shikai was a decisive factor in modern Chinese history. During his civil service career, he went up the political ladder and held important posts such as governor general, grand councilor and prime minister in the Qing court. In 1895, Yuan became the commander of the first New Army. In 1902, he took charge of the governorship of Zhili Province and the largest, best-trained and most effective military force in north China, the Huai Army. He renamed it the Beiyang Army. Yuan was also in charge of Qing military modernization after 1901. His position allowed him to expand the Beiyang Army. Yuan also enjoyed the good will of the foreign powers in China which made him an extremely powerful figure during the final days of the Qing Dynasty.

4. There were two major groups of warlords, those of the southern provinces who opposed Yuan Shikai and the breakaway generals of Yuan Shikai’s Beiyang Army. The two groups fought for territorial expansion in the initial two years after Yuan’s death. The Beiyang Army was further divided into two factions, the Anhui Clique and the Zhili Clique. The two groups fought for control over Beijing. Besides the Anhui and Zhili cliques, there were other warlord cliques in northern China. Fengtian Clique was a major clique.
The southern warlords also frequently fought among themselves over territorial control. Major cliques of southern China included Yunnan Clique, Old Guangxi Clique, New Guangxi Clique and Sichuan Clique. For selfish reasons, foreign imperialist powers often supported one warlord or the other.

5. The nationalist movement Sun Yat-sen had initiated gained momentum after his death. After Sun Yat-sen’s death, the Nationalist Party made Sun’s plans its main objective. In the summer of 1926, Jiang Jieshi finally launched the Northern Expedition (Beifa) jointly with the Communist Party. The Russian military adviser to the Nationalist Party Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher was the chief strategic planner of the Northern Expedition.

6. Jiang was originally firmly against any alliance with the Communists. However, the Xi’an incident convinced him of the need to take action against the Japanese. It also contributed to the establishment of the Second United Front. The Communists agreed to form the Second United Front under pressure from Soviet Russia. The Russians wanted the Communists and the Nationalists to form an alliance because of Russia’s international concerns, particularly the growth of Nazi Germany and Japan.

12.6 SUMMARY

- Sun Yat-sen being native of the southern province of Guangdong, was revolutionary in character. However, when he tried to meet leading reformers of the scholar official class Kang Youwei in 1893 and Liang Qichao in 1894 in order to join their reform activities, he failed. Sun then decided to work towards overthrowing the Qing Dynasty.
- Some members of the Tongmeng Hui grew apprehensive about armed uprisings. They suggested other methods. Some went further and blamed Sun of embezzling funds. The unity of the alliance weakened. The constituent groups of the Tongmeng Hui started organizing revolts on their own, applying their own methods. The national character of the Tongmeng Hui was lost. However, Sun continued his revolutionary activities outside China.
- In 1895, Yuan became the commander of the first New Army. In 1902, he took charge of the governorship of Zhili Province and the largest, best-trained and most effective military force in north China, the Huai Army. He renamed it the Beiyang Army.
- Immediately after assuming office, Yuan started engaging in a political conspiracy to consolidate his power. He started appointing his own men in important posts. In January 1913, Guomindang emerged victorious in parliamentary elections. With a parliament consisting of five representatives
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not from each province and a prime minister to run the government, the
president’s power was curtailed.

- Besides politically fragmenting China, the infighting of the warlords had
  serious repercussions for China’s economy and society. The warlords
  encouraged opium cultivation because opium trade was profitable.

- The political instability due to recurring civil warfare was such that between
  1916 and 1928, the Chinese republic witnessed twenty-five cabinets with
  seven heads of state and a number of caretaker governments. The republic,
  instead of laying a new foundation for national strength, existed only on
  paper. The Warlord Era lasted until Guomindang leader Jiang Jieshi unified
  China in 1928.

- The nationalist movement Sun Yat-sen had initiated gained momentum after
  his death. After Sun Yat-sen’s death, the Nationalist Party made Sun’s plans
  its main objective. In the summer of 1926, Jiang Jieshi finally launched the
  Northern Expedition (Beifa) jointly with the Communist Party.

- After Jiang had defeated most of the northern warlords in battle, some
  pledged loyalty to Jiang to avoid military conflict. A small number
  remained independent and engaged Jiang in fighting sporadically until the
  1940s, leaving the ultimate objective of the Northern Expedition only partially
  accomplished.

- During the Northern Expedition, Zhang Xueliang pledged allegiance to
  Jiang Jieshi. Zhang Xueliang’s alliance with the Nationalist government was
  a cause of much worry for Japan. In an aggressive move, Japan invaded
  Manchuria in 1931.

- The Second United Front broke down completely after war against the
  Japanese ended with the end of the Second World War.

12.7 KEY WORDS

- The Boxer Rebellion: The Boxer Rebellion, Boxer Uprising, or Yihetuan
  Movement was an anti-foreign, anti-colonial, and anti-Christian uprising
  that took place in China between 1899 and 1901, toward the end of the
  Qing dynasty.

- The Beiyang Army: This was a powerful, Western-style Imperial Chinese
  Army established by the Qing Dynasty government in the late 19th century.
  It was the centerpiece of a general reconstruction of Qing China’s military
  system.

- The Zhongshan Warship Incident: The Canton Coup of 20 March 1926,
  also known as the Zhongshan Incident or the March 20th Incident, was a
purge of Communist elements of the Nationalist army in Guangzhou undertaken by Chiang Kai-shek.

- **The Northern Expedition**: This was a military campaign launched by the National Revolutionary Army of the Kuomintang, also known as the “Chinese Nationalist Party”, against the Beiyang government and other regional warlords in 1926.

- **The Xi’an Incident**: This was a political crisis that took place in Xi’an, Republic of China in 1936. Chiang Kai-shek, leader of the Republic of China, was detained by his subordinates, Generals Zhang Xueliang.

### 12.8 SELF ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS

**Short Answer Questions**

1. Mention the circumstances which led to the birth of revolutionary leaders in China.
2. Write in brief about the Sun Yat-Sen’s revolutionary activities in China.
4. What was Jiang Jieshi’s strategy to deal with foreign imperialist forces in China?
5. List the failures of the Second United Front in China.

**Long Answer Questions**

1. Discuss the impact of China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 on the common people in China.
2. Analyse Sun Yat-sen’s strategy as a revolutionary leader during the uprising in China.
3. Enumerate Yuan Shikai’s role in formation of the republic in China.
4. Discuss the role of the National Revolutionary Army in establishing stability in China during the period.
5. Discuss Jiang Jieshi’s role in the unification of most of China.

### 12.9 FURTHER READINGS

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UNIT 13 SECOND SINO-JAPANESE 
WAR (1937-45)

Structure
13.0 Introduction
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13.2 Formation of the Chinese Communist Party
  13.2.1 Nationalist Party or the Kuomintang (KMT)
  13.2.2 The Long March
13.3 Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45): An Overview
  13.3.1 Invasion of China
  13.3.2 The Chinese Strategy
  13.3.3 Chinese and Japanese Equipment
  13.3.4 Stalemate and Foreign Aid
  13.3.5 The Pacific War
  13.3.6 War and Aftermath
13.4 Answers to Check Your Progress Questions
13.5 Summary
13.6 Key Words
13.7 Self Assessment Questions and Exercises
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13.0 INTRODUCTION

The Second Sino-Japanese War was a military conflict between the Republic of China and Japan from July 7, 1937, to September 2, 1945. The war was the result of a decades-long Japanese imperialist policy to expand its influence politically and militarily. The war began with the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in 1937 in which a dispute between Japanese and Chinese troops escalated into a battle. With aid from the Soviet Union and the United States, China fought Japan. The war merged with other conflicts of World War II after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. Many scholars consider the start of the full-scale Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937 to have been the beginning of World War II. It was aptly touted as the largest Asian war in the 20th century and accounted for a massive civilian and military casualties in the Pacific War. The Marco Polo Bridge Incident not only led China and Japan to war, but also hastened the setting up of the second Kuomintang-Communist Party of China (CCP).

China, with little military strength and fewer mechanized divisions, was less prepared for war that Japan forced upon it. As Japan could not sustain the war for long, it adopted the strategy of rapid warfare and conquests. The Chinese goal was to undermine Japanese military power before it went offensive. The nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek, who also faced a threat from communist forces of Mao Zedong, avoided heavy frontal battle. He hoped to win over Communists after the Japanese had left.
13.1 OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit, you will be able to:

- Discuss the Second Sino-Japanese War
- Learn the invasion of China
- Analyse the Chinese strategy during the war
- Explain the period of stalemate during the war
- Discuss the Pacific War
- Examine China’s emergence as a great military power

13.2 FORMATION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

The success of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia played an important role in popularizing communism in China. Like Russia, China had a large number of poor peasants. Chinese intellectuals felt that if the Russian revolution was successful, then a potential Chinese revolution could be successful as well. The Communists in the Soviet Union had also announced that they would give up the imperialist privileges enjoyed by Czarist Russia in China. This gesture endeared some Chinese intellectuals to the Soviet Union and, by extension, the Soviet Union’s political ideology.

The May Fourth incident of 1919 had created a politically conscious social force in China. Students, merchants, workers and middle class Chinese were all charged with revolutionary spirit. This made it easy to unite ordinary citizens against foreign imperialism.

The Leninist view that workers, peasants and the middle class of a subjugated country need to form a united front to fight against imperialist powers appealed to Chinese intellectuals. Besides, communism was more concerned with social problems and their solutions compared to democracy and capitalism. Marxist-Leninist ideas of denouncing material benefits and consciously promoting moral values like self-sacrifice for the sake of revolution, party and country and the principle of group unity fitted well with traditional Chinese ideas. Therefore, the illiterate masses could readily accept the new ideology.

The First World War proved that the capitalist system was flawed in that the capitalist countries of Europe fought against each other. The failure of the Western parliamentary democratic system anguished many Chinese. The Versailles Treaty of 1919 that transferred Germany’s concessions in China to Japan disappointed the Chinese people. The Chinese viewed the act as grave injustice to China. Intellectuals began to suspect the impartiality of the Western system.

Some of them lost confidence in Western political ideas and institutions in general.
This situation prompted some intellectuals to seek an alternative political and economic model in communism. Some intellectuals felt that more revolutionary and drastic efforts were required to save China. The situation also instilled a sense of urgency in people to do something to save the motherland.

**Founding of the Communist Party of China**

In the spring of 1920, a delegation of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Communist International (Comintern) arrived in Beijing to explore the option of setting up a communist party in China. The delegation, led by Grigori Voitinsky, came under the guise of journalists for the Shanghai Chronicles. In 1919, a few Russian socialists had set up the Shanghai Chronicle in Shanghai. The newspaper was published with financial support from the Russian government.

Some of the intellectuals who were at the forefront of the New Culture Movement formed study groups to study Marxism–Leninism in the late 1910s. For example, Li Dazhao, who worked as a librarian in Beijing University, formed a Marxist study group in Beijing and Chen Duxiu, who worked as dean in Beijing University from 1917 to 1919, formed a similar study group in Shanghai in 1920. More such study groups existed in other cities.

In China, Voitinsky met Li Dazhao, Chen Duxiu and other radical intellectuals and discussed the possibility of uniting the informal Marxist study groups into a formal political party. In August 1920, Voitinsky along with the radical intellectuals established the China Branch of the Comintern. The East Asia Secretariat of the Comintern started operating from the Shanghai Chronicle’s office. In 1920, a meeting to form a political party was held in Shanghai. As a result of the meeting, Marxist study groups scattered all over China were merged into one united entity, which functioned as an informal political party for almost a year.

On July 23, 1921, the First National Congress of the Communist Party of China began in Shanghai. Twelve Chinese delegates representing various Chinese communist groups and two Comintern representatives attended the deliberations. The communists thought that Shanghai was a safe location because the city was a French concession. However, the police got a hint of their meeting in advance. Consequently, the delegates left Shanghai for Jiaxing in Zhejiang Province. To avoid the wrath of the authorities, they pretended to be tourists enjoying boat ride on South Lake, located at the south of Jiaxing. The formal birth of the Communist Party of China was declared onboard. The new party was to act as a branch of the Comintern. Under instructions from the Comintern, the Communist Party of China formed an alliance with the Nationalist Party of China.

**13.2.1 Nationalist Party or the Kuomintang (KMT)**

After the failure of the Second Revolution in 1913 to overthrow President Yuan Shikai and consequent ban on the Nationalist Party by President Yuan, Sun Yat-sen fled to Japan to evade arrest.
The Struggle for Stability

While in Japan, Sun changed the name of the Nationalist Party (Guomindang) to the Chinese Revolutionary Party (Zhonghua Gemingdang) in 1914. All members of the Party were required to take an oath of personal allegiance to Sun Yat-sen. Many former Nationalist Party and Tongmeng Hui members refused to comply with the new rules that required swearing personal allegiance to Sun Yat-sen, as they felt this was against the spirit of democracy and revolution. As a result of this and other stricter rules, the number of members of the Guomindang reduced considerably.

Sun returned to China in 1917. At that time, the Chinese Revolutionary Party lacked organizational and military strength. Hence, it was impossible for Sun to undertake any revolutionary activity by himself. Therefore, he took help from two southern warlord cliques, the Yunnan Clique and the Old Guangxi Clique. These two cliques were in the forefront of anti-Yuan Shikai protest when Yuan declared himself the emperor of China.

When the Beiyang government dissolved the National Assembly because of the restoration of the monarchy on June 13, 1917, Sun requested the members of the National Assembly to come to Canton to save the Provisional Constitution. On August 25, 1917, around one hundred members of parliament met in Canton and passed a resolution to form a military government in Canton. This government started the Constitutional Protection Movement (Hufa Yundong) to challenge the Beiyang government.

The military government was to be headed by a generalissimo, assisted by three field marshals. On September 1, 1917, the members of the Assembly voted Sun Yat-sen to the post of generalissimo, and selected other administrative team members from among the two military cliques and the National Assembly members. The Old Guangxi Clique soon developed differences with Sun. In May 1918, an administrative restructuring resulted in the replacement of the generalissimo by a seven-member governing committee. After being sidelined by the military government, Sun Yat-sen left Canton for Shanghai. In Shanghai, Sun renamed the Chinese Revolutionary Party the Chinese Nationalist Party or the Nationalist Party of China (Zhongguo Guomindang) on October 10, 1919. In 1920, a local warlord named Chen Jiongming drove the Old Guangxi Clique out of Canton and restored Sun to power. The remaining members of the 1912 National Assembly elected Sun Yat-sen to the post of president of the restored regime. However, as the number of members who elected Sun Yat-sen was less than the minimum required quorum, Sun Yat-sen’s election was not legally binding. Therefore, Sun assumed office as the ‘Extraordinary President’ in 1921. In 1922, Chen Jiongming and Sun Yat-sen started developing a difference of opinion. As a result, Chen expelled Sun from Canton in a military operation. With the help of warlord Tang Jiyao, Sun retook Canton in 1923.
Reorganization of the Party

After returning to power and reestablishing the Nationalist government in Canton, Sun Yat-sen turned his attention to strengthening the organization of the Party to carry on the ultimate goal of unification of the country under a strong central government. Sun wanted the Party to be united by a common action plan instead of by personal allegiance to him. He wanted to reorganize the Party and the government on the lines of the Communist Party of Russia. He, therefore, turned to the Comintern for help.

In September 1923, Comintern agent Mikhail Markovich Borodin arrived in China to take charge as the principal adviser to Sun Yat-sen. Borodin stayed in China until 1927 and helped build the loosely structured Nationalist Party into a highly centralized organization with a strong military. The measures to strengthen the Party included re-registration of the members of the old Party and allowing members of the Communist Party of China to take membership of the Nationalist Party as individuals. In 1924, the First National Congress of the Nationalist Party took place.

The Nationalist government’s biggest weakness was a lack of a strong army. Sun had to rely on the warlords for military support. Since Sun planned to unify China militarily, the utmost requirement was to build a strong military force. Borodin was instrumental in arranging Soviet aid for raising an army for the Nationalist government. To train able army officers, the Whampoa Military Academy was established at Huangpu in 1924. Sun Yat-sen sent Jiang Jieshi to Moscow to study Soviet political and military systems. Jiang was a comrade-in-arms and a close confidant of Sun. sun appointed Jiang as the head of the Whoampoa Military Academy upon the latter’s return to China in 1924. Members of both the Communist and Nationalist parties trained in the Academy. Borodin also arranged for the importation of Soviet armaments for the Nationalist military.

The Philosophy of the Nationalist Party of China

The philosophy of the Nationalist Party of China are documented in the Party manifesto adopted in the First Congress, lectures delivered by Sun Yat-sen at different occasions published as the Three People’s Principles (Sanmin Zhuyi), and two other documents titled the Fundamentals of National Reconstruction (Jianguo Fanglüe) and the Bases of National Reconstruction (Jianguo Dagang). These documents aimed at instilling a revolutionary zeal in the members to march ahead and unify the country. Sun Yat-sen had been strongly advocating his Three Principles of the People (nationalism, democracy and people’s livelihood) as the core of his philosophy since 1905. However, he rewrote some of the concepts in 1924, giving them a new connotation. He also formulated three major policies, namely an alliance with Soviet Russia, cooperation with the Communist Party of China and support for the workers’ and peasants’ movements. These doctrines provided the theoretical base for the alliance between the Nationalists and the
Communists in their common mission of rejuvenating the motherland in the later half of the 1920s. Sun’s followers and the Communists did not get along for long. However, both groups claim him to be their own. Both revere Sun Yat-sen as the father of the Chinese nation (Guofu).

### 13.2.2 The Long March

The Long March of the Red Army (Hongjun Changzheng), often abbreviated as the Long March, refers to the strategic retreat of a series of communist Red Army columns including Mao Zedong’s First Front Army from the Jiangxi Soviet and Zhang Guotao’s Fourth Front Army from the E-Yu-Wan Soviet to evade the Nationalist forces. There were around fifteen soviets operating in the Chinese countryside. During Jiang Jieshi’s fifth encirclement campaign, some soviets were destroyed and the Red Army was scattered. Under such circumstances, the Communists decided to vacate their bases and set up strongholds elsewhere, so that the Red Army could be consolidated. Statistics vary on the exact number of people that undertook the Long March. It is assumed that approximately 200,000 people took part, of which less than one third survived. The armies walked about 12,500 kilometres over 370 days across the southern provinces and reached northern China.

The Jiangxi Soviet had been facing total annihilation because of the siege by the government forces. The Communist leadership of the Jiangxi Soviet under Mao Zedong decided to evacuate. More than 100,000 members of the Jiangxi Soviet started to evacuate on October 14, 1934, dividing themselves into one central column and five corps. In two echelons along two axes, the Red Army and the communist civilian apparatus embarked on a strategic retreat to the west and north through southern and central China into Yan’an in Shaanxi Province. The government forces constantly chased and attacked the various Red Army columns during the march. This stopped the communists from reuniting and also inflicted heavy casualties on them. By January 1935, only one third of the original number of Red Army troops remained. This failure damaged the position of the leaders in charge of the operation. The First Front Army arrived in Zunyi in January 1935. The leaders convened a conference to deliberate on future strategies. The Zunyi conference pointed out the weakness in the traditional communist strategy. Maoist strategies were officially accepted and Mao Zedong became the strategic and military head of the Long March. Mao reached Yan’an in northern Shaanxi in October 1935.

In the course of the Long March, numerous high-level disputes erupted within the Communist leadership over the direction that the communist movement should take in China. The Long March caused unprecedented suffering and loss of life for the Red Army. The communist soldiers and leaders left their bases leaving behind hundreds of local sympathizers, who bore the brunt of the government forces. Thousands of troops sacrificed their lives while their leaders engaged in bitter inter-soviet and intra-soviet power struggle. Mao Zedong emerged as the
strongest of all the leaders during the power struggle. The Long March proved that Mao’s civil and military policies were better suited to the Chinese situation compared to orthodox Marxist and Leninist ones. The success of Mao’s stress on peasants as the main force behind the revolution, innovative land reform policies and guerrilla warfare tactics established him at the core of the Communist leadership in China. The changes in the orthodox policies of Marxism-Leninism by incorporating Mao’s innovative policies to suit Chinese conditions marked the introduction of Mao Zedong’s thoughts and the evolution of a Chinese version of communism. Mao’s support base grew stronger. Most of the leaders in later phases of the Communist Party came from his First Front Army.

There are controversial and conflicting accounts of the Long March. The mystery of what actually occurred could not be uncovered because after Mao Zedong formed the national government in Beijing in 1949, the outside world came to know the Maoist version of the march. The Communist Party of China has been using the Long March as a propaganda symbol for the Communist Party, romanticizing Mao and his leadership. In 1935 Mao stated, ‘The Long March is a manifesto. It has proclaimed to the world that the Red Army is an army of heroes, while the imperialists and their running dogs, Jiang Kai-shek and his like, are impotent. It has proclaimed their utter failure to encircle, pursue, obstruct and intercept us. The Long March is also a propaganda force. It has announced to some 200 million people in eleven provinces that the road of the Red Army is their only road to liberation.’

Even today, the Communist Party of China guards the secrets of the Long March closely and prevents independent scholars from exploring the topic.

13.3 SECOND SINO-JAPANESE WAR (1937-45): AN OVERVIEW

The Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), which ended with Japan’s defeat and surrender in World War II, was a major invasion of eastern China by Japan.

13.3.1 Invasion of China

To most historians, the Battle of Lugou Bridge (Marco Polo Bridge Incident) on 7 July, 1937 marked the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War. However, according to contemporary Chinese historians, the Mukden Incident of 18 September, 1931, was the starting point. In the aftermath of the Mukden Incident, the Japanese Guandong Army won Manchuria and set up the puppet state of Manchukuo in February 1932. Japan forced China to recognize the independence of Manchukuo. After the Battle of Lugou Bridge in 1937, Japanese occupied Shanghai, Nanjing and Northern Shanxi as part of its strategy to involve approximately 200,000 of its soldiers, and considerably more Chinese soldiers. According to Chinese historians, around 300,000 people died in the Nanjing Massacre, after the fall of Nanjing.
The Marco Polo Bridge Incident not only led China and Japan to war, but also hastened the setting up of the second Kuomintang-Communist Party of China (CCP). The joint exercise occurred with salutary effects for the besieged CCP. The two nations openly distrusted each other. The uneasy alliance began to totter by late 1938, despite Japan’s territorial gains in northern China, the coastal regions, and the rich Yangtze River Valley in central China. After 1940, in the areas that were not in Japanese control, the conflict between the Nationalists and Communists became more pronounced and more frequent. The Communists by virtue of mass organizations, administrative reforms, land and tax reforms in favour of the peasants tried to spread their influence, whereas the Nationalists tried to block their attempts. The Japanese were neither keen nor capable of administering China. Installing puppet government there was their sole aim. However, the army actions made the puppet governments very unpopular and denied the Japan the opportunity to negotiate with either the Kuomintang or the Communist Party of China, the measures that could have earned it popularity.

13.3.2 The Chinese Strategy

China, with little military strength and fewer mechanized divisions, was less prepared for war that Japan began. First, up to mid-1930s, China hoped the League of Nations would check Japan’s aggression. Secondly, the Kuomintang government was engaged in its conflict with the Communists. As a result, China avoided a frontal attack and opted to conserve its army strength. Although, to pester the enemy and make its administration over the vast lands difficult, it continued with pockets of resistance.

13.3.3 Chinese and Japanese Equipment

When the war began between China and Japan, the Japanese Army was in possession of 17 divisions, each comprising nearly 22,000 men, 5,800 horses, 9,500 rifles and sub-machine guns, 600 heavy machine guns of assorted types, 108 artillery pieces, and 24 tanks. It was also equipped with special forces. The Japanese Navy, ranked third in the world, could displace 1.9 million tonnes and carried 2,700 aircraft at a time. Each Japanese unit had combat power of three Chinese units. The Chinese Army was equipped with only 80 infantry divisions, 9 brigades, 9 cavalry divisions, 2 artillery brigades, 16 regiments and one or two armoured divisions. The Chinese Navy carried 600 aircraft and displaced 59,000 tonnes. However, the Chinese had size advantage: its territory was 31 times bigger than that of Japan and population 5 times of Japan.

As Japan could not sustain the war for long, it adopted the strategy of rapid warfare and conquests. In the first three months of war, the Japanese made rapid gains in what was dubbed as the ‘China Incident’. Aiming to weaken the Japanese war capabilities, China remained defensive. The Chinese goal was to undermine Japanese military power before it went offensive.
13.3.4 Stalemate and Foreign Aid

By 1940, the war had reached a stalemate. While Japan conquered most of the eastern coastal areas of China, guerrilla attacks continued in these areas. The nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek, who also faced a threat from communist forces of Mao Zedong, avoided heavy frontal battle. He hoped to win over Communists after the Japanese had left. Under-equipped army and opposition to his leadership both within Kuomintang and in China at large also stopped Chiang from pitching a direct battle against the Japanese. Most military observers had predicted the inability of Kuomintang to hold its front as the Japanese had gained control on most of the war factories located in the prosperous areas. Other global powers were also not keen to come to China’s rescue as they foresaw the Chinese defeat and did not wish to antagonize the mighty Japanese who could be a threat to them. The Japanese taunted the Kuomintang with the prospect of defeating them comprehensively in three months. Germany and the Soviet Union also did not come to China’s aid before the war escalated to the Asian region of World War II. The Soviet Union was arm-twisting the Kuomintang government to stop Japan from invading Siberia, thus saving itself from a two-front war. Further, it also hoped a major conflict with Japan would hamper Kuomintang from undermining the Communist Party of China (CCP) opposition. In fact, it nurtured the hopes of secretly installing a Comintern ally after the dwindling of Kuomintang authority. However, Soviet technicians did upgrade and operate some of the Chinese war-supply transport and provided military supplies. Soviet advisors, including future Soviet war hero Georgy Zhukov, witnessed the battle of Tai er zhuang. In reality, the Soviets supported the Communists, at least until its war with Germany compelled it to conserving everything for its own forces.

In view of Chiang’s anti-communist nationalist policies and the hopes of defeating the CCP, Germany modernized and trained the Kuomintang armies. Kuomintang officers (including Chiang’s second son) had earlier served in the German army prior to World War II. However, the proposed 30 new divisions equipped with all German arms did not materialize as Germany later allied with Japan in World War II. Other prominent powers, including the United States, Britain and France, officially assisted China in war supply contracts up to the attack on Pearl Harbour in late 1941. This was the time when a major influx of trained military personnel and supplies gave a big boost to the Kuomintangs’ chance of sustaining the fight. Unofficially, the public opinion in the United States was in favour of support to Kuomintang. Earlier, at the start of the 1930’s, the public opinion in the United States was in favour of supporting the Japanese. However, the reports of Japanese brutality and the Japanese attack on the U.S.S. Panay, the United States public opinion sharply went against Japan. By the start of 1941, the United States had begun to sponsor the American Volunteer Group, also known as the Flying Tigers, in the aid of Chinese air defences. Further, the United States also imposed an oil and steel embargo making it impossible for Japan to continue...
its operations in China without getting another source of oil from Southeast Asia. Irged by these actions, the Japan was all set to launch its attack on Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941.

13.3.5 The Pacific War

Soon after the attack on Pearl Harbour, both the United States and China officially declared war against Japan. Chiang Kai-shek now received large supplies of arms from the United States, as the Chinese conflict had merged into the Asian theatre of World War II. Chiang was also appointed as Commander-in-Chief of the Allies in China theatre in 1942. General Joseph Stilwell, for a brief period, served as Chiang’s chief of staff, while commanding the US forces in the China-Burma-India Theatre. However, the relationship between the two leaders turned sour, largely because of the corruption and inefficiency of the Chinese government. Despite massive American lend-lease aid (over US$5 billion from 1941 to 1945), the Nationalist Chinese Army often avoided major operations against Japan and instead stockpiled materials for a later struggle with the communists. Stilwell criticized China’s conduct in the American media, and to President Franklin Roosevelt. Having lost the confidence in China, the Allies built up their operations against Japan in the Pacific Ocean Areas and South West Pacific Area.

To the United States, the Chinese theatre was a means to tie up a large number of Japanese troops, and also a possible American airbase. In 1944, as Japan’s position in the Pacific was deteriorating fast, it launched Operation Ichi-Go on the airbases and brought the Hubei, Henan, and Guangxi provinces under its control. However, Japan could not transfer its troops to fight the Americans and could only commit the Guandong Army from Manchuria in its ‘Sho plan’, which later helped the Soviet advancement after the Soviet war declaration on 8 August, 1945.

13.3.6 War and Aftermath

By mid-1945, it was expected the war would continue for at least another year. However the dropping of the two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki ended the war suddenly. Japan yielded to the Allies on 14 August, 1945 and the Japanese troops in China formally surrendered on 9 September, 1945. Under the provisions of the 1943 Cairo Conference, Japan returned Manchuria, Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands to China. However, it retained the Ryukyu islands.

In 1945, China emerged from the war as a great military power but in reality a country economically prostrate and facing the immediate prospects of an all-out civil war. The military demands of foreign war, internal strife, spiralling inflation, profiteering by Nationalists, speculation and hoarding had ruined the nation’s economy. The war-ravaged country was gripped by starvation. Millions had become homeless by floods and the unsettled conditions in several parts of the country. The situation was further deteriorated by an Allied agreement at the

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Yalta Conference in February 1945 that brought Soviet troops into Manchuria to bring an early end to the war against Japan. Although China was not present at Yalta, it was consulted about it and had agreed to have the Soviets enter the war with the hope they would deal only with the Nationalist government. After the war, the Soviet Union, as part of the Yalta agreement’s nod to Soviet sphere of influence in Manchuria, removed more than half the industrial equipment left there by Japanese forces. The Soviet presence in northeast China helped the Communists arm themselves with the equipment surrendered by the withdrawing Japanese army. It was not easy for China to rehabilitate the formerly Japanese-occupied areas and reconstruct the nation from the ravages of a protracted war.

The war had severely weakened the Nationalists besides making them unpopular, whereas it had helped the Communists become popular and a viable fighting force. At Yanan and elsewhere in the ‘liberated areas,’ Mao could adapt Marxism-Leninism to Chinese conditions. He taught party cadres to lead the masses by emulating them. However, when this failed, they employed more repressive forms of coercion, indoctrination and ostracization. The Red Army could create an image of conducting guerrilla warfare for protecting the people. Further, they succeeded in splitting the CCP into ‘Red’ (cadres working in the ‘liberated’ areas) and ‘White’ (cadres working underground in enemy-occupied territory) spheres, a split that would later introduce factionalism within the CCP. Communist troops adapted to new wartime conditions and became a seasoned fighting unit. Mao also started preparations for setting up a new China, far from the front at his base in Yanan. In 1940, he gave shape to Chinese Communists’ plan for an eventual seizure of power and geared up for the final push for consolidation of CCP power under his authority. His ideas formed the central tenets of the CCP doctrine that came to be formalized as ‘Mao Zedong Thought’. With intelligent organizational and propaganda work, the Communists could raise party membership from 100,000 in 1937 to 1.2 million by 1945. Soon, the KMT and CCP fought an all-out war that banished the Nationalists to Taiwan and made the Communists the rulers of the mainland.

‘Only the dead have seen the end of war’–Plato.

**Check Your Progress**

1. What is the significance of the Battle of Lugou Bridge (Marco Polo Bridge Incident) in Second Sino-Japanese War?
2. Why did China avoid a frontal attack against Japan in the war?
3. Why was the Soviet Union arm-twisting the Kuomintang government?
4. Why did the United States enter into the war against Japan?
5. What is the impact of war on China’s domestic front?
1. To most historians, the Battle of Lugou Bridge (Marco Polo Bridge Incident) on 7 July, 1937 marked the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War. After the Battle of Lugou Bridge in 1937, Japanese occupied Shanghai, Nanjing and Northern Shanxi as part of its strategy to involve approximately 200,000 of its soldiers, and considerably more Chinese soldiers. According to Chinese historians, around 300,000 people died in the Nanjing Massacre, after the fall of Nanjing. The Marco Polo Bridge Incident not only led China and Japan to war, but also hastened the setting up of the second Kuomintang-Communist Party of China (CCP).

2. China, with little military strength and fewer mechanized divisions, was less prepared for war that Japan began. First, up to mid-1930s, China hoped the League of Nations would check Japan’s aggression. Secondly, the Kuomintang government was engaged in its conflict with the Communists. As a result, China avoided a frontal attack and opted to conserve its army strength.

3. The Soviet Union was arm-twisting the Kuomintang government to stop Japan from invading Siberia, thus saving itself from a two-front war. Further, it also hoped a major conflict with Japan would hamper Kuomintang from undermining the Communist Party of China (CCP) opposition. In fact, it nurtured the hopes of secretly installing a Comintern ally after the dwindling of Kuomintang authority.

4. Japan launched its attack on Pearl Harbour on 7 December, 1941. Soon after the attack on Pearl Harbour, both the United States and China officially declared war against Japan. Chiang Kai-shek now received large supplies of arms from the United States, as the Chinese conflict had merged into the Asian theatre of World War II. Chiang was also appointed as Commander-in-Chief of the Allies in China theatre in 1942. General Joseph Stilwell, for a brief period, served as Chiang’s chief of staff, while commanding the US forces in the China-Burma-India Theatre.

5. The war had severely weakened the Nationalists besides making them unpopular, whereas it had helped the Communists become popular and a viable fighting force. At Yanan and elsewhere in the ‘liberated areas,’ Mao could adapt Marxism-Leninism to Chinese conditions. He taught party cadres to lead the masses by emulating them. His ideas formed the central tenets of the CCP doctrine that came to be formalized as ‘Mao Zedong Thought’.
13.5 SUMMARY

- The Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), which ended with Japan’s defeat and surrender in World War II, was a major invasion of eastern China by Japan.
- After the Battle of Lugou Bridge in 1937, Japanese occupied Shanghai, Nanjing and Northern Shanxi as part of its strategy to involve approximately 200,000 of its soldiers, and considerably more Chinese soldiers.
- The Marco Polo Bridge Incident not only led China and Japan to war, but also hastened the setting up of the second Kuomintang-Communist Party of China (CCP).
- China, with little military strength and fewer mechanized divisions, was less prepared for war that Japan began. First, up to mid-1930s, China hoped the League of Nations would check Japan’s aggression.
- As Japan could not sustain the war for long, it adopted the strategy of rapid warfare and conquests. In the first three months of war, the Japanese made rapid gains in what was dubbed as the ‘China Incident’. Aiming to weaken the Japanese war capabilities, China remained defensive.
- By 1940, the war had reached a stalemate. While Japan conquered most of the eastern coastal areas of China, guerrilla attacks continued in these areas. The nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek, who also faced a threat from communist forces of Mao Zedong, avoided heavy frontal battle. He hoped to win over Communists after the Japanese had left.
- In view of Chiang’s anti-communist nationalist policies and the hopes of defeating the CCP, Germany modernized and trained the Kuomintang armies. Kuomintang officers (including Chiang’s second son) had earlier served in the German army prior to World War II.
- By the start of 1941, the United States had begun to sponsor the American Volunteer Group, also known as the Flying Tigers, in the aid of Chinese air defenses.
- Soon after the attack on Pearl Harbour, both the United States and China officially declared war against Japan. Chiang Kai-shek now received large supplies of arms from the United States, as the Chinese conflict had merged into the Asian theatre of World War II.
- In 1944, as Japan’s position in the Pacific was deteriorating fast, it launched Operation Ichigo on the airbases and brought the Hubei, Henan, and Guangxi provinces under its control. However, Japan could not transfer its troops to fight the Americans and could only commit the Guandong Army from Manchuria in its ‘Sho plan’.

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- The Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45)
In 1945, China emerged from the war as a great military power but in reality a country economically prostrate and facing the immediate prospects of an all-out civil war. The military demands of foreign war, internal strife, spiraling inflation, profiteering by Nationalists, speculation and hoarding had ruined the nation’s economy. The war-ravaged country was gripped by starvation.

The Red Army could create an image of conducting guerrilla warfare for protecting the people. Further, they succeeded in splitting the CCP into ‘Red’ (cadres working in the ‘liberated’ areas) and ‘White’ (cadres working underground in enemy-occupied territory) spheres, a split that would later introduce factionalism within the CCP.

With intelligent organizational and propaganda work, the Communists could raise party membership from 100,000 in 1937 to 1.2 million by 1945. Soon, the KMT and CCP fought an all-out war that banished the Nationalists to Taiwan and made the Communists the rulers of the mainland.

13.6 KEY WORDS

- **The Marco Polo Bridge Incident**: Also known by Lugou Bridge Incident or Seventy-seven Incident, it was a battle between the Republic of China’s National Revolutionary Army and the Imperial Japanese Army. It is widely considered to have been the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War.

- **Comintern**: Communist International (Comintern) was an organization of communist. The Soviet Union abolished the Comintern in 1943 to placate its World War II allies.

- **Operation Ichi-Go**: Operation Ichi-Go was a campaign of a series of major battles between the Imperial Japanese Army forces and the National Revolutionary Army of the Republic of China, fought from April to December 1944. It consisted of three separate battles in the Chinese provinces of Henan, Hunan and Guangxi.

- **The KMT**: Kuomintang (KMT) is a political party that governed all or part of mainland China from 1928 to 1949 and subsequently ruled Taiwan under Chiang Kai-shek and his successors for most of the time since then.

- **The Red Army**: The Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, renamed Chinese People’s Red Army in 1936, commonly known as the Chinese Red Army, or simply the Red Army, was the armed forces of the Communist Party of China.
13.7 SELF ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

Short Answer Questions

1. Write a short note on Japan’s occupation of Chinese territories during the Second Sino-Japanese War.


3. What was the role of the US forces in the China-Burma-India Theatre?

4. Write a brief note on the rise of Communists’ popularity after the Sino-Japanese War.

Long Answer Questions

1. Discuss in detail the Japanese invasion of China during the Second Sino-Japanese War.

2. Critically analyse the comparative military strength of China and Japan during the Sino-Japan War.

3. Enumerate the rift between Nationalist Government and Communists in China.

4. Discuss the role of the National Revolutionary Army in establishing stability in China during the period.

5. Analyse CCP doctrine which was formalized as ‘Mao Zedong Thought’ after the Second Sino-Japanese War.

13.8 FURTHER READINGS


UNIT 14 ROLE OF CHINA AND JAPAN IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Structure
14.0 Introduction
14.1 Objectives
14.2 China and Japan in the Second World War and its Impact
   14.2.1 Japan’s Interest in the Second World War
   14.2.2 Japan’s Surrender
   14.2.3 The Allied Occupation and Demilitarization of Japan
14.3 Answers to Check Your Progress Questions
14.4 Summary
14.5 Key Words
14.6 Self Assessment Questions and Exercises
14.7 Further Readings

14.0 INTRODUCTION

Although Empire of Japan declared to concentrate only on settling the Chinese front and keep out of the European conflict when the Second World War began in 1939, the fall of Netherlands, Belgium and France to the German strategy between May and June 1940 gave Japan a free hand in her military quests. On September 27, 1940, Japan signed the Tripartite Pact, creating the Germany-Italy-Japan Axis alliance. The United States stepped in and served Japan an ultimatum to withdraw troops from China and French Indochina. On December 7, 1941, Japan attacked the United States naval installation at Pearl Harbor and completely destroyed it. This resulted in the United States declaring war on Japan on December 8, 1941, and formally joining the Second World War. By 1945, the United States bombarded major cities on the Japanese mainland. This caused a huge number of casualties including many civilians. On August 6, 1945, the United States dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, and on August 9, 1945, dropped another atomic bomb on Nagasaki. The atomic bomb completely obliterated the cities of Nagasaki and Hiroshima and caused over 200,000 civilian deaths. On August 15, 1945, Emperor Hirohito accepted the Potsdam Declaration and announced Japan’s surrender.

The occupation forces, in addition to implementing major drastic changes, stripped Japan of all its wartime gains and abolished the institutional supports upon which the military establishment rested. The occupation forces reduced the
size of the Japanese empire to the four main islands that constituted Japanese territory at the beginning of the Meiji Era.

This unit aims at studying Japan’s interests in the Second World War and explains her fall at the hands of the United States and Allied forces.

14.1 OBJECTIVES

After going through this unit, you will be able to:

- Examine the role of China in Second World War
- Learn the interests of Japan in the Second World War
- Analyse the Japan’s strategy in the war
- Explain the Allied powers’ occupation of Japan
- Enumerate the major changes brought in by the occupation leadership in Japan

14.2 CHINA AND JAPAN IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND ITS IMPACT

When the Second World War began in 1939, Japan declared that she would keep out of the European conflict, and rather concentrate on settling the Chinese front. However, the fall of Netherlands, Belgium and France to the German strategy of blitzkrieg between May and June 1940 gave Japan a free hand in her military quests.

14.2.1 Japan’s Interest in the Second World War

Japan quickly occupied the French Indochina and the Netherlands Indies. On September 27, 1940, Japan signed the Tripartite Pact, creating the Germany-Italy-Japan Axis alliance. Finally the United States stepped in and served Japan an ultimatum to withdraw troops from China and French Indochina. In July 1941, United States President Franklin Delano Roosevelt announced an oil embargo against Japan for refusal to withdraw troops from China and French Indochina. The American moves served as an ideal pretext for Japan. Japan calculated that before moving southward and eastward to occupy the Netherlands Indies, the Philippines and other places, Japan needed to neutralize American striking power in the Pacific. To do this, the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor and the Far East Air Force in the Philippines needed to be destroyed.
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Fig. 14.1 The Beginning of Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor

On December 7, 1941, Japan attacked the United States naval installation at Pearl Harbor and completely destroyed it. This resulted in the United States declaring war on Japan on December 8, 1941, and formally joining the Second World War.

Fig. 14.2 Aftermath of the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor
Japan’s strategy initially proved to be successful. By the summer of 1942, Japan had gained control of Burma (present-day Myanmar), Siam (modern-day Thailand), the Philippines, and the Dutch East Indies. However, the momentum of the war changed with Japan’s decisive defeat in the Battle of Midway in June 1942. The United States followed a strategy of ‘island hopping’, also called ‘leapfrogging’, by avoiding heavily fortified positions and conquering less fortified positions, with the goal of attacking the main Japanese islands. By 1945, the United States had superior air power, and repeatedly bombarded major cities on the Japanese mainland. This bombardment caused a huge number of casualties including many civilians. On the night of March 9, 1945, the bombing of Tokyo resulted in a firestorm that killed over 100,000 people in the city. Many people considered the brutal bombings of Japanese cities as an act of vicious revenge by the United States for the attack on Pearl Harbor.

**Fig. 14.3** Tokyo City after the Bombing on March 9, 1945


### 14.2.2 Japan’s Surrender

On August 6, 1945, the United States dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, and on August 9, 1945, dropped another atomic bomb on Nagasaki. The atomic bomb completely obliterated the cities of Nagasaki and Hiroshima and caused over 200,000 civilian deaths. The Soviet Union declared war on Japan on August 8, 1945. The Soviet army invaded and captured Japanese controlled areas including northern China, northern Korea and the Kuril Islands. Faced with dreadful nuclear destruction of cities and the loss of Manchuria and other colonies, and also facing the prospect of Soviet military invading mainland Japan, Japan unconditionally surrendered.
surrendered on August 14, 1945. On August 15, 1945, Emperor Hirohito (reigned 1926–1989) accepted the Potsdam Declaration and announced Japan’s surrender over the radio. The United States later justified its bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by saying that it prevented the deaths of thousands of soldiers who would have died if the United States had invaded the Japanese mainland. However, many remained unconvinced by this logic. Till today, the United States has not apologized to Japan for the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Japan had entered the Second World War with the intention of fighting a limited war. Its principal objectives were to secure the resources of Southeast Asia and China and to establish a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. However, the operational strategy of Japan adopted at the beginning of the war doomed the hope of a limited conflict. This was also imperialist Japan’s first ever defeat. America’s use of atomic bombs and the Soviet invasion of Manchuria made Japan’s unconditional surrender unavoidable.

14.2.3 The Allied Occupation and Demilitarization of Japan

The Allied powers led by the United States occupied Japan in 1945. For the first time in Japan’s history, the nation was defeated and occupied by a foreign power. The American General Douglas MacArthur was appointed as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) to lead the occupation. Allied occupation policy in Japan focused on three aspects: demilitarization, democratization and rehabilitation. Greater emphasis was put on the first two aspects.

To demilitarize Japan, the occupation forces stripped Japan of all its wartime gains and abolished the institutional supports upon which the military establishment rested. The occupation forces reduced the size of the Japanese empire to the four main islands that constituted Japanese territory at the beginning of the Meiji Era. The reduction in size necessitated the repatriation of more than six million Japanese from the Japanese colonies to the mainland. Demilitarization called for abolition of the ministries of Army and Navy, of all war industries and also air transportation. The occupation leadership destroyed the Japanese armed forces and purged around 180,000 individuals from positions of leadership in government services and education. Twenty-five leaders who the occupation forces tried for their involvement in war crimes during the Second World War were executed. Seven of them including former Prime Minister Hideki Tojo were hanged in 1948. The occupation leadership suppressed the state Shinto religion and cut off state support to all Shinto shrines. However the Allied forces allowed Japan to retain their emperor and did not try him for any crimes. This was done so as to provide the new Japanese nation a link with the past. Moreover, the occupation leadership feared that trying Emperor Hirohito, who was considered almost a god by the Japanese people, for war crimes, would result in mass unrest and destabilize the occupation.

The most important political change was the establishment of a new constitution modelled after an example provided by MacArthur. The new document changed the fundamental structure of the Japanese state. Article Nine of the new
constitution prevented Japan from maintaining a standing army and using war as an instrument of state policy. The English translation of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution stated:

'(1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. (2) To accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.'

Fig. 14.4 Former Prime Minister Hideki Tojo appearing before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East


In the economic front, the occupation leadership tried to break the economic and financial monopoly of big business houses. Anti-monopoly legislations were passed and labour unions were encouraged to counterbalance the power of the management. The occupation forces initiated new land reform as well. Those who cultivated land themselves were allowed to retain up to seven and half acres of land, and absentee owners were allowed to retain two and half acres. The de-
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industrialization of Japan was one of the initial objectives of the occupation. Due to severe food shortage, MacArthur organized a food distribution network with aid from the United States government. After reviewing the cost to maintain food aid, the policy of de-industrialization was abandoned in favour of reconstruction of Japan’s economy.

The occupation leadership brought in major changes in the education sector as well. Shinto-based morals taught in Japanese schools were found to be fuelling ultra-nationalistic attitudes in Japan. Therefore, in a major curriculum revamp, the ‘morals’ course was replaced by a ‘social study’ course. School textbooks of history were changed as well. The SCAP also enforced strict censorship of the Japanese media. Criticism of the occupation or anything related to occupation was prohibited. As a result of the Cold War, the United States changed its Japan policy after 1948. The SCAP increasingly started handing over power to native Japanese leaders. On April 28, 1952, the occupation of Japan ended as a result of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, signed on September 8, 1951.

Check Your Progress

1. When did Japan sign the Tripartite Pact?
2. Why did the United States announce embargo against Japan?
3. How was Japan’s strategy successful in the beginning of the Second World War?
4. When did Japan surrender unconditionally?
5. Which are the three aspects on which the Allied occupation policy focused?
6. Why was the policy of de-industrialization abandoned in Japan after the Second World War?

14.3 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS QUESTIONS

1. On September 27, 1940, Japan signed the Tripartite Pact, creating the Germany-Italy-Japan Axis alliance.
2. In July 1941, United States President Franklin Delano Roosevelt announced an oil embargo against Japan for refusal to withdraw troops from China and French Indochina. The American moves served as an ideal pretext for Japan.
3. Japan quickly occupied the French Indochina and the Netherlands Indies. On September 27, 1940, Japan signed the Tripartite Pact, creating the Germany-Italy-Japan Axis alliance. Japan calculated that before moving southward and eastward to occupy the Netherlands Indies, the Philippines and other places, Japan needed to neutralize American striking power in
the Pacific. To do this, the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor and the Far East Air Force in the Philippines needed to be destroyed. On December 7, 1941, Japan attacked the United States naval installation at Pearl Harbor and completely destroyed it. This resulted in the United States declaring war on Japan on December 8, 1941, and formally joining the Second World War. Japan’s strategy initially proved to be successful. By the summer of 1942, Japan had gained control of Burma (present-day Myanmar), Siam (modern-day Thailand), the Philippines, and the Dutch East Indies. However, the momentum of the war changed with Japan’s decisive defeat in the Battle of Midway in June 1942.

4. Faced with dreadful nuclear destruction of cities and the loss of Manchuria and other colonies, and also facing the prospect of Soviet military invading mainland Japan, Japan unconditionally surrendered on August 14, 1945. On August 15, 1945, Emperor Hirohito (reigned 1926–1989) accepted the Potsdam Declaration and announced Japan’s surrender over the radio.

5. Allied occupation policy in Japan focused on three aspects: demilitarization, democratization and rehabilitation. Greater emphasis was put on the first two aspects. To demilitarize Japan, the occupation forces stripped Japan of all its wartime gains and abolished the institutional supports upon which the military establishment rested.

6. The de-industrialization of Japan was one of the initial objectives of the occupation. Due to severe food shortage, MacArthur organized a food distribution network with aid from the United States government. After reviewing the cost to maintain food aid, the policy of de-industrialization was abandoned in favour of reconstruction of Japan’s economy.

14.4 SUMMARY

- When the Second World War began in 1939, Japan declared that she would keep out of the European conflict, and rather concentrate on settling the Chinese front. However, the fall of Netherlands, Belgium and France to the German strategy of blitzkrieg between May and June 1940 gave Japan a free hand in her military quests.
- On December 7, 1941, Japan attacked the United States naval installation at Pearl Harbor and completely destroyed it. This resulted in the United States declaring war on Japan on December 8, 1941, and formally joining the Second World War.
- Japan’s strategy initially proved to be successful. By the summer of 1942, Japan had gained control of Burma (present-day Myanmar), Siam (modern-day Thailand), the Philippines, and the Dutch East Indies. However, the momentum of the war changed with Japan’s decisive defeat in the Battle of Midway in June 1942.
On August 6, 1945, the United States dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, and on August 9, 1945, dropped another atomic bomb on Nagasaki. The atomic bomb completely obliterated the cities of Nagasaki and Hiroshima and caused over 200,000 civilian deaths.

Japan had entered the Second World War with the intention of fighting a limited war. Its principal objectives were to secure the resources of Southeast Asia and China and to establish a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. However, the operational strategy of Japan adopted at the beginning of the war doomed the hope of a limited conflict.

The Allied powers led by the United States occupied Japan in 1945. For the first time in Japan’s history, the nation was defeated and occupied by a foreign power. The American General Douglas MacArthur was appointed as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) to lead the occupation.

To demilitarize Japan, the occupation forces stripped Japan of all its wartime gains and abolished the institutional supports upon which the military establishment rested. The occupation forces reduced the size of the Japanese empire to the four main islands that constituted Japanese territory at the beginning of the Meiji Era.

The most important political change was the establishment of a new constitution modelled after an example provided by MacArthur. The new document changed the fundamental structure of the Japanese state.

In the economic front, the occupation leadership tried to break the economic and financial monopoly of big business houses. Anti-monopoly legislations were passed and labour unions were encouraged to counterbalance the power of the management.

The occupation leadership brought in major changes in the education sector as well. Shinto-based morals taught in Japanese schools were found to be fueling ultra-nationalistic attitudes in Japan. Therefore, in a major curriculum revamp, the ‘morals’ course was replaced by a ‘social study’ course.

**14.5 KEY WORDS**

- **Pearl Harbor**: The Attack on Pearl Harbor was a surprise military strike by the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service against the United States naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii Territory, on the morning of December 7, 1941. The attack, also known as the Battle of Pearl Harbor, led to the United States’ entry into World War II.

- **The Meiji Era**: Meiji era, is a Japanese era which extended from October 23, 1868, to July 30, 1912. This period represents the first half of the Empire of Japan, during which Japanese society moved from being an isolated feudal society to a Westernized form.
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- **Shinto**: This is the traditional religion of Japan that focuses on ritual practices to be carried out diligently to establish a connection between present-day Japan and its ancient past.

- **The SCAP**: The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) was the title held by General Douglas MacArthur during the Allied occupation of Japan following World War II.

### 14.6 SELF ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

**Short Answer Questions**

1. Briefly mention Japan’s military quest during the Second World War.
2. Write in brief about Japan’s interest in the Second World War.
3. Write a short note on the United States’ strategy while attacking the main Japanese islands.
4. Mention Japan’s unconditional surrender in the Second World War.
5. What were the major Economic changes brought in by Allied occupation policy in Japan after the War?

**Long Answer Questions**

2. Analyse the impact of bombings by the United States in Japan during the Second World War.
3. Discuss the role of the Allied occupation in effecting major changes in Japan’s new constitution after the Second World War.

### 14.7 FURTHER READINGS


